
Shenker v. Lockheed Sanders, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1996-03-20 · cited 8×
In Shenker v. Lockheed Sanders, Inc., plaintiff Joel Shenker sued his former employer for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and related common law tort and contract claims after his termination in a company-wide reduction in force at age 48. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts. The court reasoned that Shenker failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination or rebut the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination, that the release of claims was enforceable, and that the common law claims lacked evidence of detrimental reliance or were barred by workers' compensation statutes.
labor & employmentcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability
Lindner Dividend Fund, Inc. v. Ernst & Young
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1995-03-23 · cited 27×
This case involved investors Lindner Dividend Fund and Whitehill Capital suing auditor Ernst & Young for alleged violations of Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, along with state-law claims of gross negligence and violations of the Missouri Uniform Securities Act, based on the plaintiffs' purchases of securities in reliance on misleading 1988 financial reports for the Bank of New England Corporation. The defendant moved to dismiss on grounds including failure to plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b), lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and statutes of limitations. The court dismissed the federal Section 18(a) claim with prejudice, reasoning that the amended complaint did not sufficiently particularize the alleged fraud despite prior notice and opportunity to amend, and it dismissed the state claims without prejudice after finding no diversity jurisdiction due to the defendant's partners being citizens of multiple states including those of the plaintiffs, and declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction once the sole federal claim was eliminated early in the case.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Williams v. Ashland Engineering Co., Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1994-09-12 · cited 2×
The case involved trustees of an ERISA-governed employee benefit fund suing a delinquent subcontractor and the surety on a state-mandated construction bond to recover unpaid employer contributions for work on a Massport project. The court held that ERISA preempts the Massachusetts statute (Mass. Gen. L. c. 149, § 29) that creates a cause of action against the surety bond for such contributions. The reasoning was that the state law both relates to ERISA plans by singling them out for special treatment and provides an additional enforcement mechanism that conflicts with ERISA’s exclusive civil remedies; it also does not qualify for the ERISA saving clause as a law regulating insurance.
labor & employmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory
Bergin v. Wausau Ins. Companies
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1994-07-18 · cited 4×
This case involved a dispute over whether a Massachusetts law requiring continued health insurance coverage for a divorced spouse without additional premiums applied to a self-funded employee medical benefits plan governed by ERISA. The court addressed cross motions for summary judgment after the case was removed from state court. It decided that the state law is preempted by ERISA as applied to self-funded plans. The core reasoning was that while the state law regulates insurance and would generally be saved from preemption, the ERISA deemer clause prevents self-funded plans from being treated as insurance companies subject to state regulation.
labor & employmenthealthcarefederal powerbusiness & regulatory
Sharpe v. Kelley
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1993-10-13 · cited 1×
This case involves a plaintiff suing under the federal RICO statute and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) based on allegations of repeated job-related sexual harassment by a defendant who controlled two corporations, claiming the conduct amounted to extortion of her civil rights, contractual job rights, and partnership interests. The court treated the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a motion for failure to state a claim and denied it as to the RICO count, finding that the complaint could support a Hobbs Act violation with intangible property and that the alleged acts over five to six months might establish the required pattern and continuity of racketeering activity. The court granted the motion as to the § 1985(3) count because the allegations involved only one individual and thus could not establish a conspiracy. The rulings are based on taking the complaint's allegations as true and assessing whether the plaintiff could prove any viable theory.
criminal lawcivil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Marvin Music Co. v. BHC Ltd. Partnership
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1993-07-29 · cited 14×
The plaintiffs, owners of copyrighted musical compositions represented by ASCAP, sued the defendants who own and operate the Club Cafe for six counts of copyright infringement arising from unauthorized public performances of their songs on October 4, 1991. The defendants had previously held an ASCAP license that was terminated in 1989 for nonpayment of fees amid a dispute over the club's entertainment policy, and they continued to host performances without authorization despite multiple warnings. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding the defendants had conceded the essential elements of infringement, holding the partnership, corporation, and individual officer jointly and severally liable based on the officer's control and financial interest, and awarding $15,000 in statutory damages, attorneys' fees, costs, and a permanent injunction against further unauthorized performances. The core reasoning relied on undisputed facts of ownership, public performance without license, and vicarious liability standards under the Copyright Act.
business & regulatory
Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1993-06-21 · cited 13×
The case concerns Data General's application to recover over $5 million in attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, other costs, and prejudgment interest after prevailing on copyright and trade secret claims against Grumman. The court held that the application was inadequate because Data General had not shown compliance with the copyright registration prerequisite of 17 U.S.C. § 412 for all software revisions at issue and had failed to provide a sufficiently detailed breakdown of fees and costs to allow assessment of reasonableness and eligibility. The court ordered Data General to resubmit a revised application within 30 days that identifies compensable portions of fees tied to properly registered works, while limiting recovery of expert fees and certain costs under federal statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Kettenbach v. Demoulas
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1993-05-28 · cited 5×
This case involves plaintiffs Kettenbach and Leland Properties suing defendant Arthur Demoulas in federal court for alleged violations of state and federal law through a campaign of industrial espionage, including installing listening devices and stealing documents amid a broader Demoulas family business dispute. The defendant moved to dismiss under forum non conveniens, contending that the federal action was vexatious and that the claims should instead be litigated in related ongoing state-court proceedings involving overlapping issues and parties with business ties to the plaintiffs. The court denied the motion, reasoning that forum non conveniens is intended for truly inconvenient distant or foreign forums rather than a nearby state court, that a strong presumption favors the plaintiffs' choice of their home forum, and that the defendant had not met the heavy burden of showing that private and public interest factors clearly pointed to the alternative forum, especially since the plaintiffs were not parties to the state action.
procedure
Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1993-05-28 · cited 7×
In this case, the plaintiff Tropix sued Lumigen for patent infringement, claiming that its product-by-process patent covered purified chemiluminescent compounds regardless of the manufacturing method used. The court decided that the patent was limited to the specific process claimed and did not extend to identical products made by a different process, so there was no infringement. The core reasoning was that historical Supreme Court authority and the Federal Circuit's Atlantic decision controlled over the conflicting Scripps ruling, especially where the product existed in prior art, and that claims must be construed consistently with their process limitations for infringement purposes.
business & regulatory
Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1993-05-11 · cited 31×
This case involved post-trial motions following a nine-week jury trial in which Data General prevailed on claims of federal copyright infringement and state-law misappropriation of trade secrets against Grumman Systems Support Corp., resulting in a combined verdict of over $54 million plus an additional $9 million enhancement for willful conduct. Data General sought to add Grumman's parent corporation as a new party and amend the complaint under Rules 15(b) and 21 to assert vicarious liability based on trial evidence, while Grumman moved to correct the judgment, obtain a new trial or remittitur, and secure judgment as a matter of law. The court denied all motions, holding that the unpleaded vicarious-liability theory had not been tried by consent of the parties, that evidence relevant to existing claims could not support amendment, and that the jury's findings on damages and willfulness were supported by the record without grounds for alteration or new trial.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Austin v. Bradley, Barry & Tarlow, P.C.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1993-04-30 · cited 14×
This case involved four investors who sued the law firm Bradley, Barry & Tarlow, P.C. and two partners after losing money in a 1982 yacht sale and management offering by Ocean Limited; the firm had prepared portions of the offering memorandum that allegedly omitted material facts about Ocean's insolvency. The investors asserted claims under federal securities law (Rule 10b-5), aiding and abetting, common-law fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all remaining counts. It reasoned that the firm owed no duty to disclose the information to nonclient investors because doing so would conflict with its duty of confidentiality to its client, that no privity or actual knowledge of reliance existed for the negligent misrepresentation claim, and that the firm did not provide substantial assistance for aiding-and-abetting liability.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
United States v. Kaplan
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1992-10-19 · cited 29×
This case involved the IRS's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court of adversary proceedings brought by debtors Kaplan and Gervais, who challenged their personal liability under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 as responsible persons for a defunct corporation's unpaid federal payroll taxes. The district court denied the motion, holding that it was not timely filed and that the IRS had not shown cause for withdrawal. The court reasoned that § 157(d) requires both timeliness and cause, that bankruptcy matters are presumptively to remain in bankruptcy court, and that the IRS's desire to consolidate proceedings with a non-debtor and avoid duplication did not overcome that presumption given the advanced stage of the bankruptcy litigation.
taxesprocedurebusiness & regulatory
Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1992-10-09 · cited 6×
This case involves claims by Data General Corporation against Grumman Systems Support Corporation for copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets arising from Grumman's use of Data General's ADEX computer software. The primary issue addressed is Grumman's late-filed motion to dismiss those claims based on Data General's inability to produce the original ADEX source code, which Grumman argued prevented proof that the copied program matched the copyrighted version. The court denied leave to file the motion after the scheduling deadline because Grumman had known or should have known the relevant facts at least six weeks earlier from Data General's responses during discovery and failed to act diligently in raising the issue. Related motions, including those to exclude evidence and compel discovery, were denied without prejudice, deemed moot, or left for trial. The opinion emphasizes adherence to pretrial scheduling orders and the parties' prior agreements on exchanging software versions.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1992-09-10 · cited 6×
This case involves ongoing litigation between Data General and Grumman over alleged copyright infringement of Data General's ADEX computer software, following a December 1988 preliminary injunction that barred Grumman from using or copying the software. Grumman sought partial summary judgment to preclude post-injunction damages, arguing full compliance and that any such claims would be speculative or not cognizable under copyright law, while Data General countered with evidence of continued infringement and moved for contempt. The court denied Grumman's summary judgment motion, holding that factual disputes over compliance and the availability of post-infringement damages required a trial on the merits rather than resolution as a matter of law. It also deferred ruling on the contempt motion until after trial and issued rulings on various counterclaims, a cross-motion for summary judgment on the copyright claim, and a motion to consolidate with a related case. The decisions turned on the need for factual development at trial and the standards for summary judgment and civil contempt.
propertyprocedure
Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1992-07-20 · cited 7×
This case involves a dispute over ownership of nearly two thousand ancient Greek and Lycian silver coins that the Republic of Turkey alleges were illegally excavated and removed from its territory in 1984 under Turkish law vesting such artifacts in the state. Turkey brought claims for equitable replevin, conversion, constructive trust, RICO violations, and Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act violations against the defendants who allegedly purchased the coins with knowledge of their provenance. The court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss in full, ruling that Turkey's allegations sufficiently pleaded ownership under foreign law to overcome McClain-based challenges and to establish standing, that the RICO claims adequately alleged injury, predicate acts, and a pattern, and that statute of limitations defenses could not be resolved on the pleadings because of potential fraudulent concealment and the discovery rule.
propertycriminal lawprocedure
United States v. Dumas
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1992-07-17 · cited 4×
In this federal criminal case, defendant Roland M. Dumas was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved for a new trial, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment because his court-appointed attorney from the Federal Defender Office was suspended from the District of Columbia bar for unpaid dues and was not admitted to practice in the District of Massachusetts under the applicable local rules. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion, finding that the attorney had provided aggressive and effective representation at trial with no showing of deficient performance or prejudice to the defense under the Strickland v. Washington standard. The court reasoned that the attorney's technical violations—suspension for nonpayment of dues and failure to list a valid state bar number—did not automatically constitute ineffective assistance, as such issues did not impair his ability to furnish zealous advocacy or affect the reliability of the trial outcome. The evidence of guilt was strong, and the motion was therefore denied.
criminal lawprocedure
Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1992-06-03 · cited 31×
This case involves a copyright infringement suit by Data General against competitor Grumman over Grumman's use and copying of diagnostic software (ADEX) developed for Data General computers, along with related state-law claims such as misappropriation of trade secrets. The court denied Grumman's motion to bifurcate the trial into separate liability and damages phases. It granted partial summary judgment barring statutory damages and certain attorneys' fees because the original software versions were unregistered at the time of infringement and later revisions were treated as derivative works under 17 U.S.C. §§ 412 and 504. The court also granted summary judgment on some state claims as preempted by federal copyright law but denied it on the trade-secret claims, reasoning that those claims rested on wrongful acquisition rather than mere copying and thus were not equivalent to copyright infringement.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
Slavin v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1992-05-11 · cited 21×
This case involved a class action by investors who bought bonds issued by Bank of New England in a 1989 public offering underwritten by the defendants; the bonds became worthless after the bank's 1991 bankruptcy. Plaintiffs alleged that the prospectus omitted material information about regulatory criticisms of the bank's lending practices and an agreement with the OCC, violating federal securities laws (Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act) as well as state common law claims. The court granted the motion to dismiss the 1933 Act claims (counts I and II) as barred by the statute of limitations under Section 13, finding the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice by late 1989, but denied dismissal of the remaining claims. It held that the 1934 Act claims were pled with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b), including specific omissions and scienter, and retained supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 since the federal claims remained viable.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Little Souls, Inc. v. Petits
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1992-03-19 · cited 2×
This case involved a copyright and trademark infringement lawsuit brought by Little Souls, Inc., a maker of soft-sculptured dolls marketed as folk art for adult collectors, against Les Petits and its owners, who produced similar dolls sold mainly as children's toys. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants copied protected elements of its Little Souls and Special Edition doll designs and that there was a likelihood of consumer confusion regarding the origin of the dolls under the Lanham Act. Following a bench trial, the court ruled for the defendants on all claims, finding that while the plaintiff held valid copyrights in the distinctive hairstyles and facial expressions of certain dolls, the defendants' works did not constitute unlawful appropriation under the ordinary observer test, and there was no likelihood of confusion based on factors including channels of trade, advertising, and lack of actual confusion evidence. The court also determined that the defendants did not intend to copy the plaintiff's trademarks and that the marks were sufficiently dissimilar.
business & regulatory
Cummings Properties Management, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1992-03-19 · cited 4×
The case involved a dispute over whether the FDIC, acting as receiver for an insolvent bank, could remove an automatic teller machine from property leased by the bank from Cummings Properties Management, Inc. The plaintiff argued that the ATM had become a fixture under the lease and Massachusetts law, while the FDIC sought to remove it as part of liquidating the bank's assets. The court granted the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the FDIC from removing the machine during the litigation. It reasoned that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) does not bar judicial review of whether a specific action falls within the FDIC's powers, that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits based on the lease terms treating fixtures as remaining with the landlord, and that the other factors for injunctive relief—irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest—favored the plaintiff.
propertyfederal powerbusiness & regulatory