In Tarr v. General Electric Co., the plaintiff, a former GE franchisee, alleged in Count II of his complaint that GE refused to renew his franchise in retaliation for his earlier antitrust lawsuit against the company and to coerce him into waiving future antitrust claims. The court granted GE's motion to dismiss this count. The court reasoned that GE had simply exercised its contractual right to terminate the franchise agreement according to its terms, and that even if the decision was motivated by the prior litigation, malicious intent does not convert a lawful act into a tort under principles established in House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co.; the claim therefore amounted at most to damnum absque injuria.
Dr. Ina Braden sued the University of Pittsburgh and its chancellor for sex discrimination in the non-renewal of her teaching contract, seeking damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the university acting under color of state law. After an initial dismissal and remand from the Third Circuit for further fact-finding, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the university's ties to Pennsylvania. The evidence established that a state statute designated the university as a state-related institution, required twelve state-appointed trustees on its board, provided appropriations with oversight and audit rights, and gave the university access to state capital programs. The court concluded that these connections created a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged employment action to treat it as state action under precedents like Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority. It therefore denied the motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim while granting dismissal on other asserted grounds.
In Rhoads v. Ford Motor Company, the plaintiff sued Ford under Pennsylvania strict product liability law (§ 402A) after a car accident caused by a defective steering mechanism, seeking damages for his injuries and his wife's death; Ford joined the plaintiff as a third-party defendant seeking contribution. The jury found the vehicle was dangerously defective when sold, that the defect caused the accident, and that the plaintiff's own negligence was also a proximate cause, awarding damages totaling over $150,000. The court denied Ford's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding that the plaintiff's concurrent negligence did not bar recovery in strict liability and was not a superseding cause. It also denied Ford's request for contribution from the plaintiff, reasoning that under Pennsylvania law a product seller and a negligent user are not in pari delicto due to their unequal status, so the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act does not apply.
In Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, a female assistant professor sued the university and its chancellor on behalf of herself and other women in professional positions, alleging sex discrimination in employment terms, compensation, and treatment since 1968 under four separate legal theories. The district court dismissed all counts of the complaint. Count I under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was dismissed because that statute applies only to racial discrimination, not sex discrimination. Count II under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was dismissed for insufficient allegations of state action. Count III under an Executive Order regarding federal contractors was dismissed because the order does not create a private cause of action. Count IV, a pendent state-law claim under the Pennsylvania Equal Pay Law, was dismissed because there was no remaining federal claim to support pendent jurisdiction.
Travelers Insurance Company sued Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, claiming that Blue Cross's standard contracts with hospitals—which reimburse at audited costs for Blue Cross subscribers while hospitals charge commercial insurers like Travelers about 14% more—give Blue Cross an unfair competitive advantage and allow it to dominate over half the hospitalization insurance market in western Pennsylvania. After a non-jury trial, the court dismissed the complaint in full. The core reasoning was that all challenged Blue Cross activities, including the hospital contracts and subscriber rates, are subject to comprehensive regulation and approval by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department under the Nonprofit Hospital Plan Act of 1937, enacted to address public health needs for affordable hospital care; this state oversight and public purpose exempt the practices from federal antitrust scrutiny, and any injunction would conflict with consumer-protection aims. The court also rejected related pendent state-law claims on the same grounds.
This case involved a 15-year-old boy who suffered serious spinal injuries after diving head-first into a shallow, above-ground vinyl pool purchased from the May Department Store Company and manufactured by Muskin Manufacturing Company. The plaintiffs sued the seller under strict product liability (Restatement of Torts (2d) § 402A), alleging the pool was in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition. A jury found the pool defective, that the boy had not assumed the risk, that the product reached the users unchanged, and no negligence by the pool owners; it awarded damages, with the seller then seeking indemnity from the manufacturer. The court denied the defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding that the evidence supported the jury's findings on defect and lack of assumption of risk, that diving was not necessarily an abnormal use, and that indemnity from the supplier was appropriate. The court also denied the manufacturer's motion for a new trial, finding the evidentiary rulings proper under the strict liability standard.
