Herbert Peter Sorg

In Tarr v. General Electric Co., the plaintiff, a former GE franchisee, alleged in Count II of his complaint that GE refused to renew his franchise in retaliation for his earlier antitrust lawsuit against the company and to coerce him into waiving future antitrust claims. The court granted GE's motion to dismiss this count. The court reasoned that GE had simply exercised its contractual right to terminate the franchise agreement according to its terms, and that even if the decision was motivated by the prior litigation, malicious intent does not convert a lawful act into a tort under principles established in House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co.; the claim therefore amounted at most to damnum absque injuria.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

Dr. Ina Braden sued the University of Pittsburgh and its chancellor for sex discrimination in the non-renewal of her teaching contract, seeking damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the university acting under color of state law. After an initial dismissal and remand from the Third Circuit for further fact-finding, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the university's ties to Pennsylvania. The evidence established that a state statute designated the university as a state-related institution, required twelve state-appointed trustees on its board, provided appropriations with oversight and audit rights, and gave the university access to state capital programs. The court concluded that these connections created a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged employment action to treat it as state action under precedents like Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority. It therefore denied the motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim while granting dismissal on other asserted grounds.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In Rhoads v. Ford Motor Company, the plaintiff sued Ford under Pennsylvania strict product liability law (§ 402A) after a car accident caused by a defective steering mechanism, seeking damages for his injuries and his wife's death; Ford joined the plaintiff as a third-party defendant seeking contribution. The jury found the vehicle was dangerously defective when sold, that the defect caused the accident, and that the plaintiff's own negligence was also a proximate cause, awarding damages totaling over $150,000. The court denied Ford's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding that the plaintiff's concurrent negligence did not bar recovery in strict liability and was not a superseding cause. It also denied Ford's request for contribution from the plaintiff, reasoning that under Pennsylvania law a product seller and a negligent user are not in pari delicto due to their unequal status, so the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act does not apply.

torts & liability

In Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, a female assistant professor sued the university and its chancellor on behalf of herself and other women in professional positions, alleging sex discrimination in employment terms, compensation, and treatment since 1968 under four separate legal theories. The district court dismissed all counts of the complaint. Count I under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was dismissed because that statute applies only to racial discrimination, not sex discrimination. Count II under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was dismissed for insufficient allegations of state action. Count III under an Executive Order regarding federal contractors was dismissed because the order does not create a private cause of action. Count IV, a pendent state-law claim under the Pennsylvania Equal Pay Law, was dismissed because there was no remaining federal claim to support pendent jurisdiction.

civil rightslabor & employment

Travelers Insurance Company sued Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, claiming that Blue Cross's standard contracts with hospitals—which reimburse at audited costs for Blue Cross subscribers while hospitals charge commercial insurers like Travelers about 14% more—give Blue Cross an unfair competitive advantage and allow it to dominate over half the hospitalization insurance market in western Pennsylvania. After a non-jury trial, the court dismissed the complaint in full. The core reasoning was that all challenged Blue Cross activities, including the hospital contracts and subscriber rates, are subject to comprehensive regulation and approval by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department under the Nonprofit Hospital Plan Act of 1937, enacted to address public health needs for affordable hospital care; this state oversight and public purpose exempt the practices from federal antitrust scrutiny, and any injunction would conflict with consumer-protection aims. The court also rejected related pendent state-law claims on the same grounds.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

This case involved a 15-year-old boy who suffered serious spinal injuries after diving head-first into a shallow, above-ground vinyl pool purchased from the May Department Store Company and manufactured by Muskin Manufacturing Company. The plaintiffs sued the seller under strict product liability (Restatement of Torts (2d) § 402A), alleging the pool was in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition. A jury found the pool defective, that the boy had not assumed the risk, that the product reached the users unchanged, and no negligence by the pool owners; it awarded damages, with the seller then seeking indemnity from the manufacturer. The court denied the defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding that the evidence supported the jury's findings on defect and lack of assumption of risk, that diving was not necessarily an abnormal use, and that indemnity from the supplier was appropriate. The court also denied the manufacturer's motion for a new trial, finding the evidentiary rulings proper under the strict liability standard.

torts & liability

This case involved a lawsuit by Travelers Insurance Company against Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act through unreasonable restraints on competition and attempts to monopolize the market for hospitalization coverage via preferential hospital contracts. Blue Cross moved for summary judgment, arguing that its activities constituted state action immune from federal antitrust law because they were approved and regulated by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department under the Non-Profit Hospital Plan Act. The court denied the motion, holding that Blue Cross remained a private entity created by individuals rather than the state and that mere state regulation and supervision, without specific legislative authorization to engage in anticompetitive conduct for a governmental purpose, did not qualify as state action exempt from the Sherman Act.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

The case involved a plaintiff seeking a federal declaratory judgment that a Pennsylvania state court mortgage foreclosure judgment and related proceedings were invalid, alleging that the state courts denied due process by refusing a hearing on the amount due under the mortgage and committing legal errors, despite multiple state court decisions and appeals affirming the foreclosure. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted the motion, holding that the requested declaratory relief would function as a restraint on state proceedings prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 absent review by the U.S. Supreme Court, and that the issues were res judicata entitled to full faith and credit.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedureproperty

This case involved a former Ford automobile dealer suing the company under federal antitrust laws and the Automobile Dealers’ Franchise Act for damages after termination of his franchise agreement, alleging bad faith by the manufacturer. The antitrust claims were dismissed, but a jury awarded the plaintiff lost profits under the Franchise Act; the court then granted Ford’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court held that the Act requires manufacturers to act without coercion or intimidation but does not bar termination for poor performance and that the evidence failed to show either bad faith by Ford or compensable damages to the dealer from any violation.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case concerned plaintiffs' motion to suppress as evidence certain money wrappers recovered after a private burglary of their home, which local police had turned over to federal IRS agents investigating the plaintiffs' tax returns via a summons under 26 U.S.C. 7602. The court denied the motion to suppress. It reasoned that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments protect only against governmental action and do not require exclusion of evidence obtained by private individuals with no official involvement or knowledge at the time of the theft, following the principles in Burdeau v. McDowell. The court distinguished later cases expanding exclusionary rules, noting they apply where state or federal officers participate in or direct the unlawful seizure.

criminal lawcivil rightsproceduretaxes

The case concerned a nationwide strike by the United Steelworkers of America against major steel producers that the President determined imperiled national health and safety. Acting under the national emergency provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, the United States petitioned for an injunction to end the work stoppage. The court found that the strike affected a substantial part of an industry engaged in interstate commerce and production of goods for commerce, and that its continuation would cause irreparable injury through disruptions to national defense, exports, and dependent industries. The court therefore issued an injunction directing the union and its members to cease striking, resume work under the terms of expired agreements, and engage in good-faith collective bargaining, with the order to remain in effect until further court action.

labor & employmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a defendant indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 for threatening to kill a witness and his family if the witness provided incriminating information to the FBI during an investigation. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment. The court granted the motion and dismissed the indictment, holding that Section 1503 applies only to interference with judicial proceedings pending in federal courts and does not cover threats related to FBI investigations, as the FBI is an investigative rather than a judicial arm of the government and the statute must be strictly construed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a claim under the Miller Act payment bond for materials supplied for a federal hospital construction project. The use plaintiff, Hardwood Products Corp., supplied doors to Illinois Valley Manufacturing Company, which had contracted with the prime contractor John A. Johnson & Sons, Inc., but sought the unpaid balance from the prime contractor's bond after partial payment. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing lack of privity and that Illinois Valley was only a materialman. The court denied the motion, reasoning that Illinois Valley qualified as a subcontractor under the Miller Act because it agreed to furnish specific millwork items per the prime contract specifications, allowing suppliers to such subcontractors to recover on the bond per Supreme Court precedent in MacEvoy.

business & regulatory

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit arising from a 1954 car-truck collision in Pennsylvania, brought under federal diversity jurisdiction by a New York plaintiff against a Michigan driver and Ohio trucking company owners. Defendant Weber moved to dismiss for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), which limits such actions to districts where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside. The court noted that the other defendants had waived venue objections by appearing and answering, but held that venue is a personal privilege that each defendant may assert or waive independently, and that use of Pennsylvania highways under the non-resident motorist statute did not establish venue. The motion was granted and the complaint dismissed without prejudice as to Weber only.

proceduretorts & liability