This case involved a dispute over a landslide that blocked a private road easement providing access to properties owned by the plaintiff and cross-complainants, allegedly caused by the appellant's operation of a commercial garbage dump and his efforts to widen the road with heavy equipment. The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction for removal of the obstruction, while the cross-complainants also claimed damages for negligence and inconvenience; the appellant was accused of contributing to the slide through road work and truck traffic. During a bench trial, the court denied the appellant's attempts to represent himself after a dispute with his insurance-appointed counsel, held him in contempt, removed him from the courtroom, and proceeded without him, later awarding damages to the plaintiff and cross-complainants. On appeal, the court held that the appellant's due process rights were violated by the denial of self-representation and exclusion from trial, along with errors in admitting hearsay expert testimony and awarding speculative or improper damages, including to a non-party. The judgment was reversed, verdicts set aside, and the case remanded for a new trial.
In Burns v. Cities Service Company, Robert Burns sued to enforce a mechanic’s lien and underlying contract claim for construction work performed as a subcontractor on a project owned by Cities Service (successor to Columbian Carbon). After the lien was dismissed as untimely, intervening assignees Houghton and Richardson moved for summary judgment to remove Burns as a party, supported by evidence of a joint venture agreement and assignment transferring all proceeds of the contract to them. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Burns, finding he no longer held any interest in the subject matter. The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under Rule 17(a) requiring prosecution by the real party in interest and Rule 56 summary judgment standards, Lawson-Light met its burden to show a complete assignment with no genuine factual dispute, and Burns failed to introduce the joint venture agreement or other evidence demonstrating any retained interest or benefit from tax lien priority arguments. The decision rested on the absence of evidence contradicting the unconditional assignment and the requirement that a party opposing summary judgment must present specific facts showing a triable issue.
This case involved a dispute over the interpretation of a will executed by Mary Pauline Gelwicks, in which a clause specifying the amount of a bequest to a church foundation trust was omitted during drafting. The circuit court allowed testimony from the drafting attorney and interpolated language directing the executor to calculate a total bequest of $35,000 (less lifetime gifts of about $13,510), ordering payment of the balance from the estate. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed, holding that the will's language was incomplete on its face and that extrinsic evidence could not be admitted to supply missing words or amounts. The court reasoned that such parol evidence is admissible only to interpret existing will language, not to add new provisions, as doing so would amount to rewriting the will in violation of longstanding precedent against judicial interpolation based on speculation or scrivener error.
This case involved a prohibition proceeding in which the Clerk of the West Virginia House of Delegates sought to bar a circuit court from hearing a mandamus petition filed by Senator Judith Herndon. The petition challenged the constitutionality of certain 1975 revenue bills for allegedly violating requirements for three readings under the state constitution, after an identical petition had been refused by the Supreme Court of Appeals. The court awarded the writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court lacked authority to proceed. Its core reasoning was that the Supreme Court's prior refusal to issue a rule constituted taking "cognizance" under Code 53-1-2 and an implicit determination that no prima facie case existed under Code 53-1-5, consistent with constitutional grants of concurrent jurisdiction that permit statutory clarification of extraordinary writ procedures without impairing them.
The case involved the Woman's Club of St. Albans seeking a judicial interpretation of a will that devised property to it on the condition that it be used for club purposes, with the property reverting otherwise. The club wanted to determine if it could sell or commercially use the property without triggering the reversion. The circuit court dismissed the action, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complaint lacked sufficient particularity regarding any proposed use and that the will provisions did not present an ambiguity under the relevant statute requiring construction absent a present controversy.
This case is an appeal from the denial of a habeas corpus petition filed by Roy Spaulding after his conviction for breaking and entering with a recidivist sentence enhancement. Spaulding missed the deadline to file a direct appeal and raised multiple constitutional claims in habeas, including the admission of a confession without a prior voluntariness hearing, evidence from an allegedly unlawful search, and denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing. The court reversed the denial of habeas relief and ordered Spaulding's discharge from the conviction, subject to possible retrial, because he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the preliminary hearing, a critical stage where counsel could have protected his interests under the criteria from Coleman v. Alabama. Other alleged errors were deemed non-jurisdictional and forfeited due to the missed appeal deadline, while the recidivist sentencing and pretrial bail issues were not reached or were moot.
