This products liability case arose after Bethany Cartwright died by suicide two weeks after being prescribed the antidepressant Zoloft, an SSRI manufactured by Pfizer; her estate and heirs alleged that Pfizer knew of an association between the drug and self-harm but failed to warn of it. Pfizer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs' state-law failure-to-warn claims were preempted by federal FDA drug-approval and labeling regulations. The court denied the motion, holding that the claims were not preempted. It reasoned that Texas law imposes a duty to warn of scientifically discoverable risks that runs parallel to, rather than conflicts with, FDA requirements that manufacturers update labeling with new safety information as it becomes known, and therefore does not obstruct federal objectives.
In this employment discrimination case, plaintiff Molly Harvill sued her former employer Westward Communications and related entities, alleging sexual harassment by a coworker, constructive discharge, and retaliation under federal law, along with related state claims. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all federal claims. It reasoned that the employer maintained and communicated an anti-harassment policy, promptly investigated Harvill's October 2001 complaint by interviewing multiple employees (none of whom corroborated the allegations), and took reasonable steps to address the conduct, such that any ongoing incidents did not render her working conditions intolerable enough to support constructive discharge. The court further held that the absence of constructive discharge defeated the retaliation claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.
This case was an employment discrimination lawsuit brought by the EEOC on behalf of Sharon Boyd against TCIM Services, Inc., alleging that the company violated Title VII by retaliating against Boyd, a white female recruiter, through termination after she refused a branch manager's alleged directive not to hire too many African-Americans. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Boyd was terminated solely for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons related to her poor job performance as a recruiter. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation due to the lack of substantial evidence showing a causal connection between the alleged protected activity and the termination. Evidence instead indicated that Boyd herself attributed her firing to other factors, such as performance issues reported by a coworker or her use of a heart monitor.
This case involved a claim by Ferrostaal, Inc. against Donald Seale, an employee of Union Pacific Railroad, for conversion after a 1997 rail shipment of steel billets went missing in Texas and was later sold by the railroad. The plaintiff had previously sued Union Pacific in federal court in New York for non-delivery under the Carmack Amendment, but that suit was dismissed as time-barred. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. It reasoned that the Carmack Amendment preempts state-law tort claims like conversion against carriers and their employees acting within the scope of employment, and that res judicata barred relitigating the claim after the prior final judgment on the merits.
business & regulatoryfederal powerproceduretorts & liability
This case involves Felton Jimmerson's suit under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of his application for supplemental security income benefits. After the plaintiff's 1992 application was denied by an ALJ, remanded twice by the Appeals Council with specific instructions including evaluation of the plaintiff's literacy claim, and denied again, the district court examined whether the final decision was supported by substantial evidence and applied proper legal standards. The court found that the record, including uncontradicted testimony, lacked substantial evidence for the ALJ's determination that the plaintiff had a marginal education rather than being illiterate. It therefore reversed that finding and ordered the Commissioner to award the benefits.
This case is a declaratory judgment action in which State Farm sought a ruling that it had no duty to defend or indemnify real estate agent Wanda Wheeler against claims by the Gosses for the death of their daughter in a house fire on property Wheeler was selling. The court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment. Applying Texas's Eight Corners Rule, the court compared the underlying state-court petition with the terms of both the business policy and homeowner's policy and found that the claims fell within exclusions: the business policy did not cover the premises because they were not used for general office purposes or listed real estate operations, and the homeowner's policy excluded coverage for property owned by the insured. The court held that the exclusions were unambiguous and that Wheeler had not shown any exception applied.
