William Merritt Steger

This products liability case arose after Bethany Cartwright died by suicide two weeks after being prescribed the antidepressant Zoloft, an SSRI manufactured by Pfizer; her estate and heirs alleged that Pfizer knew of an association between the drug and self-harm but failed to warn of it. Pfizer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs' state-law failure-to-warn claims were preempted by federal FDA drug-approval and labeling regulations. The court denied the motion, holding that the claims were not preempted. It reasoned that Texas law imposes a duty to warn of scientifically discoverable risks that runs parallel to, rather than conflicts with, FDA requirements that manufacturers update labeling with new safety information as it becomes known, and therefore does not obstruct federal objectives.

federal powerhealthcaretorts & liability

In this employment discrimination case, plaintiff Molly Harvill sued her former employer Westward Communications and related entities, alleging sexual harassment by a coworker, constructive discharge, and retaliation under federal law, along with related state claims. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all federal claims. It reasoned that the employer maintained and communicated an anti-harassment policy, promptly investigated Harvill's October 2001 complaint by interviewing multiple employees (none of whom corroborated the allegations), and took reasonable steps to address the conduct, such that any ongoing incidents did not render her working conditions intolerable enough to support constructive discharge. The court further held that the absence of constructive discharge defeated the retaliation claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case was an employment discrimination lawsuit brought by the EEOC on behalf of Sharon Boyd against TCIM Services, Inc., alleging that the company violated Title VII by retaliating against Boyd, a white female recruiter, through termination after she refused a branch manager's alleged directive not to hire too many African-Americans. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Boyd was terminated solely for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons related to her poor job performance as a recruiter. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation due to the lack of substantial evidence showing a causal connection between the alleged protected activity and the termination. Evidence instead indicated that Boyd herself attributed her firing to other factors, such as performance issues reported by a coworker or her use of a heart monitor.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a claim by Ferrostaal, Inc. against Donald Seale, an employee of Union Pacific Railroad, for conversion after a 1997 rail shipment of steel billets went missing in Texas and was later sold by the railroad. The plaintiff had previously sued Union Pacific in federal court in New York for non-delivery under the Carmack Amendment, but that suit was dismissed as time-barred. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. It reasoned that the Carmack Amendment preempts state-law tort claims like conversion against carriers and their employees acting within the scope of employment, and that res judicata barred relitigating the claim after the prior final judgment on the merits.

business & regulatoryfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

This case involves Felton Jimmerson's suit under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of his application for supplemental security income benefits. After the plaintiff's 1992 application was denied by an ALJ, remanded twice by the Appeals Council with specific instructions including evaluation of the plaintiff's literacy claim, and denied again, the district court examined whether the final decision was supported by substantial evidence and applied proper legal standards. The court found that the record, including uncontradicted testimony, lacked substantial evidence for the ALJ's determination that the plaintiff had a marginal education rather than being illiterate. It therefore reversed that finding and ordered the Commissioner to award the benefits.

federal powerprocedure

This case is a declaratory judgment action in which State Farm sought a ruling that it had no duty to defend or indemnify real estate agent Wanda Wheeler against claims by the Gosses for the death of their daughter in a house fire on property Wheeler was selling. The court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment. Applying Texas's Eight Corners Rule, the court compared the underlying state-court petition with the terms of both the business policy and homeowner's policy and found that the claims fell within exclusions: the business policy did not cover the premises because they were not used for general office purposes or listed real estate operations, and the homeowner's policy excluded coverage for property owned by the insured. The court held that the exclusions were unambiguous and that Wheeler had not shown any exception applied.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Texas inmate R.L. Shiloh-Bryant, who alleged that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to notify him that his conviction had been affirmed on direct appeal and that he could seek discretionary review pro se. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, granting the petition after a de novo review. The court found that Texas law imposes a duty on appellate counsel to provide such notification, as established in cases like Ex parte Jarrett and Ex parte Wilson, and that counsel's failure here prejudiced the petitioner by denying him the opportunity to file a timely petition for discretionary review. This conclusion was not barred by Teague v. Lane and aligned with the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance, as clarified in Roe v. Flores-Ortega. As a result, the court ordered that the petitioner's conviction be reversed unless the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals grants an out-of-time appeal within ninety days allowing him to pursue discretionary review.

criminal lawprocedure

In Mims v. Carrier Corp., plaintiff Quentin Mims, a long-term employee, sued his employer Carrier and several supervisors alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII, along with intentional infliction of emotional distress under Texas law, based on alleged offensive comments about his perceived sexual orientation and subsequent adverse actions after he complained. Individual defendant Bob Chauvin filed counterclaims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The court granted Carrier's motion for summary judgment on all of Mims's claims and dismissed the action with prejudice, reasoning that Title VII does not cover harassment based on perceived homosexuality as sex discrimination, that Mims failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation or severe conduct supporting emotional distress, and that individual supervisors cannot be liable under Title VII. The court denied Chauvin's motion for summary judgment on his counterclaims.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

This case involves plaintiff Rosie Padilla, a Black female employee at Carrier Air Conditioning, who alleged claims of racial discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, defamation, and related issues stemming from workplace injuries, supervisor conduct, rumors about her personal life, and denied benefits after filing a workers' compensation claim. The defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims. The court reviewed the evidence under the summary judgment standard, finding no genuine issues of material fact on any element of the claims, including lack of evidence of discriminatory intent, retaliatory actions, or actionable defamation. Accordingly, the court granted the motion and dismissed the case.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

This case involves an insurance coverage dispute in which TV-3, a Mississippi corporation operating television stations and towers in Mississippi and Texas, sued Royal Insurance Company of America and Globe Indemnity Company after the insurers denied a claim for the collapse of a broadcasting tower in Jackson, Mississippi, during approved maintenance work. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, bad faith, fraud, and related claims under a multi-state property insurance policy, while the defendants relied on a policy exclusion for towers undergoing non-routine repairs. The defendants moved to transfer venue from the original district to the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division, under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The court granted the transfer, concluding that venue was proper in the Southern District because a substantial part of the events occurred there, and that transfer served the convenience of parties and witnesses as well as the interests of justice, including factors such as the location of evidence and potential application of Mississippi law.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryproperty

The case involved plaintiff Jack William Hawkins challenging the administrative forfeiture of $19,867 in currency seized from his home pursuant to a state-issued drug search warrant. After the state district court ordered the funds transferred to the DEA for federal forfeiture proceedings, the DEA sent written notice by certified mail to the plaintiff and his counsel and published notice in a newspaper, setting a deadline for claims; Hawkins' claim and bond arrived after the deadline, resulting in administrative forfeiture. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed the bill-of-review action with prejudice, holding that the notices complied with due-process requirements, the claim was untimely, and the state court's turnover order properly allowed federal proceedings without jurisdictional conflict.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

State Farm Fire & Casualty Company brought this declaratory judgment action in federal court seeking a ruling that its homeowners insurance policy did not require it to defend or indemnify Adam Brooks against Jane Doe's state court claims arising from an alleged sexual assault. The district court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that the underlying petition alleged intentional, nonconsensual acts that fell outside the policy's definition of a covered "occurrence" (an accident) and were barred by the intentional act exclusion, consistent with Texas rules for interpreting insurance contracts.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision in a Chapter 13 proceeding involving IRS claims for unpaid federal income taxes from multiple years. The district court reviewed the bankruptcy court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and its legal conclusions de novo. The court affirmed all of the bankruptcy court's factual findings, including details of the tax assessments, filings, and payments made during the bankruptcy. It also upheld the legal conclusion that the IRS, as the party seeking equitable tolling of the time limits under 11 U.S.C. § 507, was required to initiate an adversary proceeding to obtain such relief rather than attempting collection directly, and that the IRS had acted inequitably by not doing so.

taxesprocedurefederal power

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court order involving a constitutional mechanic’s lien claimed by South Coast Supply Company against debtor A & M Operating Company (doing business as Custom Vessel Company) for materials supplied and incorporated into vessels, with Ralph M. Parsons Company as the appellant. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s grant of a constitutional lien for $309,464.32 on materials sold directly but reversed and rendered judgment to also grant a lien for an additional $24,544.72 on sales from South Coast’s general inventory. The core reasoning reviewed the history and self-executing nature of Texas Constitution article XVI, section 37, which provides an automatic lien to materialmen in privity with the property owner for the value of materials furnished and incorporated into articles made or repaired, without requiring notice or recording, and found that both categories of sales qualified under this provision and precedent interpreting it. The court rejected arguments that the lien was limited to goods manufactured by the supplier or did not extend to the final article constructed.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act in which plaintiff Ms. Perkins sued the United States for injuries from a car accident caused by a federal employee. The central issue was whether defense counsel could have ex parte contacts with the plaintiff's non-party treating physicians without authorization. The court held that such contacts are not permitted, ruling that Texas physician-patient privilege law applies and that the filing of suit makes the physicians' opinions discoverable but does not authorize unilateral ex parte communications. The court reasoned that state law governs privileges in this context, that Texas rules require a level playing field in obtaining medical information, and that the defense could depose the physicians with plaintiff present instead.

proceduretorts & liability

In Hawkins v. Upjohn Co., plaintiffs including J.C. and Glenda Hawkins sued The Upjohn Company and various individual defendants including researchers, FDA officials, and attorneys, alleging RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., civil conspiracy, fraud, negligence, gross negligence, and strict product liability related to the drugs Halcion and Xanax. Several RICO defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the motions, holding that RICO sections 1965(b) and (d) do not authorize unlimited nationwide service of process absent personal jurisdiction over at least one alleged conspirator in the forum state. Because none of the RICO defendants had minimum contacts with Texas under the state long-arm statute and due process requirements, the court lacked jurisdiction over them.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In Hawkins v. Upjohn Co., plaintiffs alleged in count II that defendant Upjohn conspired to market the prescription drugs Halcion and Xanax by withholding safety information from the FDA and consumers, leading to their injuries. Upjohn moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the claim improperly sought private enforcement of the FDCA, which does not authorize such actions. The court denied the motion, holding that count II sufficiently pleaded independent Texas state-law claims for conspiracy to commit fraud (based on indirect reliance through FDA approval) and conspiracy to market an unreasonably dangerous product. The court further reasoned that these tort claims were not preempted by the FDCA, as federal drug regulation does not displace general state common-law liability for fraud or negligence.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, acting as receiver for two failed Texas savings and loan institutions, sued their former owner and director over eight loans approved in 1984 and 1985 that allegedly caused losses to the institutions. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the claim of ordinary negligence but denied it on the claims of gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. It held that the latter claims were viable under Texas law and that genuine issues of material fact existed, while applying a two-year statute of limitations that could potentially be tolled by the doctrine of adverse domination if a majority of the board engaged in gross negligence or other wrongdoing. The court also dismissed the Texas Attorney General from the case as intervenor.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case was a products liability action filed in Texas state court by Texas plaintiffs against a Texas retailer and a non-Texas manufacturer, alleging severe injuries from a riding mower and asserting claims of strict liability, warranty, and gross negligence. After the state court granted summary judgment to the retailer, the parties agreed to sever those claims, leaving only the diverse parties, at which point the manufacturer removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiffs moved to remand, contending that the involuntary summary judgment against the non-diverse defendant precluded removal under the voluntary-involuntary rule. The court examined the removal statutes, the voluntary-involuntary rule, and Fifth Circuit precedent on severance, focusing on whether the plaintiffs' voluntary agreement to sever the claims against the retailer effectively discontinued those claims and created complete diversity. The court determined that the agreed severance satisfied the requirements for removal.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a civil rights claim by Billy Don Hamrick against police officers and the City of Eustace, Texas, arising from his June 1985 arrest on theft charges and the search of his car. Hamrick had taken a valve grinding machine he claimed to own after a wage dispute with his former employer, but officers obtained an arrest warrant based on a sworn statement containing misrepresentations about ownership and significant omissions about the circumstances, including the employer's lack of ownership and Hamrick's wage claim. The court considered the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after a jury found liability. It concluded that the officers were not shielded by the magistrate's warrant because they had misled the magistrate through both affirmative misstatements and omissions about key facts, breaking any causal chain that might otherwise protect them from liability under precedents like Malley v. Briggs.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure