This case was a class action brought by owners of 2003 Hyundai Tiburón GT vehicles alleging that the cars had a defective manual transmission, that Hyundai knew of the defect, and that it concealed the issue from consumers while directing dealers to make non-warranty repairs. The parties reached a settlement providing 50-100% reimbursement for qualifying repair costs plus rental car coverage, which the court approved. Plaintiffs then moved for attorneys' fees and costs under California's CLRA fee-shifting provision and the private attorney general statute. The court granted the motion, holding that California substantive law applies to determine both the availability and amount of fees, that current prevailing market rates are permissible, that detailed time records are not required so long as plaintiffs prove the hours were reasonable, and that the court has discretion to use either the lodestar or percentage-of-recovery method without needing a cross-check.
The case involved an orthopedic surgeon who developed carpal tunnel syndrome from performing repetitive high-force surgical procedures over many years and sought disability benefits under three insurance policies that covered total disability resulting from either sickness or accidental bodily injury. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract and bad faith after the insurer denied coverage on the ground that his condition was a sickness rather than an accidental injury, and both parties moved for summary judgment. Applying California law, the court granted the insurer’s motion and denied the plaintiff’s, holding that the surgeon’s CTS constituted a disease or sickness, not an accidental bodily injury, because it resulted from cumulative work-related stress rather than a sudden external event. The decision rested on state appellate precedents distinguishing accidental injuries (which typically involve external trauma) from illnesses or conditions caused by repetitive occupational activities, which fall under the sickness category with shorter benefit periods.
Jeff Tracy, Inc. held a directors and officers liability insurance policy from U.S. Specialty Insurance Company. During the policy period, employees filed a class action lawsuit alleging failures to pay prevailing wages and other wage law violations on public works projects, and the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement issued related civil wage assessments. After the insurer denied coverage, Jeff Tracy sued for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The court granted the insurer's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Jeff Tracy's summary judgment motion, holding that the claims were excluded under the policy's Exclusion F for actions brought by or on behalf of the insured organization or its employees and did not qualify as covered Loss because the policy excluded wages, fines, penalties, and similar matters.
This case involves a proposed class action by plaintiff Don Saulic against Symantec Corporation and Digital River, Inc., alleging that their use of online credit card forms requiring personal identifying information (PII) such as address and phone number violates California's Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, Civil Code § 1747.08. The plaintiff sought class certification for consumers who downloaded products online using credit cards and were required to provide PII, along with civil penalties, an injunction, and fees. The court denied the motion for class certification, concluding that the Act does not apply to online transactions because they involve distinct fraud prevention concerns not addressed by the statute, which primarily targets in-person transactions to prevent misuse of PII for marketing purposes. The decision analogized online sales to excluded refund transactions due to similar verification needs, and the court also denied the parties' requests for judicial notice.
In this case, federal inmate Mohammad Salman P. Qureshi filed a pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prisons' refusal to immediately transfer him to a community corrections center or halfway house. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal after the petitioner was released from BOP custody on April 7, 2008, rendering the request for injunctive relief moot. The district court adopted the recommendation and dismissed the action as moot, holding that no live controversy remained under Article III because the petitioner was no longer in custody and the capable-of-repetition exception did not apply. The court noted that the petition did not allege any collateral consequences from the denial of earlier placement.
The case concerned a plaintiff's claims against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and related defendants for long-term disability benefits under an employee benefits plan governed by the plan's terms for both the initial 'own occupation' period and the subsequent 'any occupation' period. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendants approved and paid benefits with interest for the 'own occupation' period through February 22, 2006, but had not yet decided the claim for the 'any occupation' period. The court treated the defendants' post-answer motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) and granted it, finding that payment of the approved benefits rendered that portion of the claims moot while the undecided portion was premature because the plaintiff had not exhausted the plan's required administrative appeal procedures. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment without prejudice on the same grounds. The reasoning emphasized that a claimant must complete the plan's internal review process before bringing suit in federal court, even where no final decision has been issued.
