Alicemarie Huber Stotler

This case was a class action brought by owners of 2003 Hyundai Tiburón GT vehicles alleging that the cars had a defective manual transmission, that Hyundai knew of the defect, and that it concealed the issue from consumers while directing dealers to make non-warranty repairs. The parties reached a settlement providing 50-100% reimbursement for qualifying repair costs plus rental car coverage, which the court approved. Plaintiffs then moved for attorneys' fees and costs under California's CLRA fee-shifting provision and the private attorney general statute. The court granted the motion, holding that California substantive law applies to determine both the availability and amount of fees, that current prevailing market rates are permissible, that detailed time records are not required so long as plaintiffs prove the hours were reasonable, and that the court has discretion to use either the lodestar or percentage-of-recovery method without needing a cross-check.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved an orthopedic surgeon who developed carpal tunnel syndrome from performing repetitive high-force surgical procedures over many years and sought disability benefits under three insurance policies that covered total disability resulting from either sickness or accidental bodily injury. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract and bad faith after the insurer denied coverage on the ground that his condition was a sickness rather than an accidental injury, and both parties moved for summary judgment. Applying California law, the court granted the insurer’s motion and denied the plaintiff’s, holding that the surgeon’s CTS constituted a disease or sickness, not an accidental bodily injury, because it resulted from cumulative work-related stress rather than a sudden external event. The decision rested on state appellate precedents distinguishing accidental injuries (which typically involve external trauma) from illnesses or conditions caused by repetitive occupational activities, which fall under the sickness category with shorter benefit periods.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Jeff Tracy, Inc. held a directors and officers liability insurance policy from U.S. Specialty Insurance Company. During the policy period, employees filed a class action lawsuit alleging failures to pay prevailing wages and other wage law violations on public works projects, and the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement issued related civil wage assessments. After the insurer denied coverage, Jeff Tracy sued for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The court granted the insurer's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Jeff Tracy's summary judgment motion, holding that the claims were excluded under the policy's Exclusion F for actions brought by or on behalf of the insured organization or its employees and did not qualify as covered Loss because the policy excluded wages, fines, penalties, and similar matters.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a proposed class action by plaintiff Don Saulic against Symantec Corporation and Digital River, Inc., alleging that their use of online credit card forms requiring personal identifying information (PII) such as address and phone number violates California's Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, Civil Code § 1747.08. The plaintiff sought class certification for consumers who downloaded products online using credit cards and were required to provide PII, along with civil penalties, an injunction, and fees. The court denied the motion for class certification, concluding that the Act does not apply to online transactions because they involve distinct fraud prevention concerns not addressed by the statute, which primarily targets in-person transactions to prevent misuse of PII for marketing purposes. The decision analogized online sales to excluded refund transactions due to similar verification needs, and the court also denied the parties' requests for judicial notice.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, federal inmate Mohammad Salman P. Qureshi filed a pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prisons' refusal to immediately transfer him to a community corrections center or halfway house. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal after the petitioner was released from BOP custody on April 7, 2008, rendering the request for injunctive relief moot. The district court adopted the recommendation and dismissed the action as moot, holding that no live controversy remained under Article III because the petitioner was no longer in custody and the capable-of-repetition exception did not apply. The court noted that the petition did not allege any collateral consequences from the denial of earlier placement.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a plaintiff's claims against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and related defendants for long-term disability benefits under an employee benefits plan governed by the plan's terms for both the initial 'own occupation' period and the subsequent 'any occupation' period. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendants approved and paid benefits with interest for the 'own occupation' period through February 22, 2006, but had not yet decided the claim for the 'any occupation' period. The court treated the defendants' post-answer motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) and granted it, finding that payment of the approved benefits rendered that portion of the claims moot while the undecided portion was premature because the plaintiff had not exhausted the plan's required administrative appeal procedures. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment without prejudice on the same grounds. The reasoning emphasized that a claimant must complete the plan's internal review process before bringing suit in federal court, even where no final decision has been issued.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a federal habeas corpus petition by Fernando Sanchez, who was convicted in 1989 of second-degree murder and sentenced to 16 years to life in prison. After the California Board of Prison Terms granted him parole following a 2002 hearing, the Governor reversed that decision. The court reviewed the record de novo and adopted the magistrate judge's findings, concluding that the Governor's reversal lacked the required 'some evidence' support under California law and thus violated due process. It therefore granted the petition, entered judgment for Sanchez, and ordered his immediate release on parole.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Sanchez v. Ryan, Victor Sanchez, convicted in state court of carjacking and robbery and sentenced to over nineteen years in prison, filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that a jury instruction on consciousness of guilt (CALJIC No. 2.04) violated his federal due process rights. The district court accepted the magistrate judge's report recommending dismissal, finding that the claim had been denied by the California Supreme Court on procedural grounds citing In re Dixon because it could have been but was not raised on direct appeal. The court determined that the Dixon rule constitutes an adequate and independent state ground that bars federal review, as it is well-established and not interwoven with federal law, and the petitioner did not show cause and prejudice or actual innocence to overcome the default. The petition was therefore denied and the action dismissed with prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

In Berry v. American Express Publishing, Corp., the plaintiff filed a class action complaint in California state court seeking injunctive relief to stop the defendants' alleged practice of charging credit card holders for unsolicited magazine subscriptions without affirmative consent, in violation of California Civil Code sections 1584.5, 1770(a)(14), and 1770(a)(19). The defendants removed the case to federal district court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), which allows aggregation of class claims to meet a $5,000,000 amount-in-controversy threshold for diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff moved to remand, asserting that the complaint sought only injunctive relief and did not meet the jurisdictional amount, while the defendants argued that the value of the requested injunction or potential damages exceeded $5,000,000. The court granted the motion for remand, holding that the defendants failed to demonstrate the amount in controversy because any valuation of the injunctive relief—whether based on lost profits to defendants or benefits to the class—was speculative and insufficient to satisfy the CAFA threshold.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved defendant John Seljan's motion to suppress evidence from three Customs searches of his FedEx packages sent from California to the Philippines, which uncovered pedophilia-related materials during operations targeting unreported currency exports. The court denied the motion to suppress. The core reasoning was that the inspections occurred at the functional equivalent of the international border under the border search exception, requiring no warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, and that Seljan had consented to inspections by signing the FedEx air waybills.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a trademark infringement action under the Lanham Act in which plaintiff Duncan McIntosh Co. claimed ownership of the service marks "Newport Boat Show" and "Newport In The Water Boat Show" based on thirty years of producing an annual boat show in Newport Beach. Defendants Newport Dunes Marina LLC and the Southern California Marina Association began using similar names for a competing event at the same marina location after terminating their prior agreement with the plaintiff. The court granted the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the marks had acquired secondary meaning through extensive advertising and public recognition, that there was a likelihood of consumer confusion supported by evidence of actual confusion and defendants' intent, and that the plaintiff faced irreparable harm including loss of exhibitor sign-ups and goodwill.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Foley v. Allied Interstate, Inc., a pro se plaintiff sued four debt collection agencies in California state court alleging violations of state and federal law related to unfair debt collection practices. One defendant removed the case to federal court, and the others, including Allied Interstate, joined in the removal notice through its general counsel. The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that Allied's joinder was invalid and that Allied had waived its removal rights by filing an answer and engaging in discovery in state court. The court denied the motion, finding that the general counsel was authorized to consent to removal and that Allied's state court actions did not waive the right to remove because they did not seek adjudication on the merits and lacked clear intent to waive. The court emphasized that removal statutes are strictly construed but that the evidence supported valid joinder and no waiver under the circumstances.

procedure

In this criminal case, defendants Brande and Pharr were convicted by a jury on drug and related charges and appealed on grounds of alleged improper ex parte contact between a juror and court personnel concerning the juror's religious beliefs about judging others. Following a limited remand from the Ninth Circuit, the district court held an evidentiary hearing with stipulations, juror testimony, and an FBI agent's report, ultimately finding that no contact with court personnel occurred, that any internal juror discussions were not brought to the court's attention, and that no note was sent to the judge on the issue. The court therefore concluded that defendants' substantial rights were unaffected and that the verdicts should stand, with no new trial warranted on the remanded issue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Synergy Staffing, Inc., formerly Personnel Connection, Inc., filing suit against the United States seeking a refund of federal Form 941 payroll taxes assessed and paid for the four quarters of 1997. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion. The court reasoned that IRS certificates of assessment constitute prima facie evidence of tax liability and are presumed correct, so the taxpayer bears the burden of proving an overpayment by showing the correct liability with competent admissible evidence, which the plaintiff failed to do.

taxesprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned an application for a temporary restraining order by plaintiffs, including the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, to prevent the INS from removing certain nonimmigrants who entered under the Visa Waiver Program, registered under the Special Registration Procedure for Certain Non-immigrants, and had pending applications for lawful status, as well as from making warrantless arrests of registrants without individualized determinations of flight risk. The court denied the application after a hearing. It identified serious jurisdictional questions under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and concluded that plaintiffs had not shown the INS lacked broad discretionary authority to remove out-of-status aliens or that agents failed to make required individual assessments before arrests. Plaintiffs had not challenged the registration program itself and did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable injury justifying the injunction.

immigrationprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who sued Ameriquest Mortgage Co. in California state court, alleging that the company's mortgage documents imposed prepayment penalties exceeding limits set by the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act and unfair business practices law. The defendant removed the action to federal district court, arguing that the claims were completely preempted by the federal Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand the case to state court, ruling that federal question jurisdiction was absent because the Parity Act does not completely preempt state-law claims and that any preemption defense must be decided on the merits in state court. The court also awarded the plaintiff $3,600 in attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) due to the lack of legal basis for removal.

federal powerbusiness & regulatoryproperty

The case involved petitioner Christopher Morgan's federal habeas corpus challenge to his 1997 California state conviction for soliciting lewd and lascivious conduct with a 14-year-old under Penal Code sections 653f(c) and 288(c), arising from a police sting operation in which he responded to an escort service ad and arranged a sexual encounter with an undercover officer posing as offering services from a minor. The district court reviewed the magistrate judge's report and recommendation de novo, along with Morgan's objections. The court approved and adopted the report, denied the habeas petition on the merits, and dismissed the action with prejudice, finding no basis to overturn the conviction or sentence of probation and jail time. The core reasoning centered on the validity of the state court's interpretation and application of the solicitation statute to the facts of the sting without violating constitutional protections such as due process fair warning requirements.

criminal law

The case involved plaintiff Becka suing his former employer APCOA/Standard Parking after his position was eliminated, he was transferred and demoted with reduced pay, and he ultimately retired, alleging the actions stemmed from age discrimination in violation of California Government Code section 12941 along with claims for breach of an oral contract to maintain his compensation and benefits and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims. Applying the burden-shifting framework used for age discrimination claims, the court found that even assuming a prima facie case, the employer offered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions and the plaintiff did not produce evidence showing those reasons were pretextual. The contract and implied covenant claims failed because written employment agreements executed in 1997 superseded any alleged oral promises and did not include terms for perpetual compensation at a set level.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved a defendant indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 876 for knowingly mailing a threatening communication addressed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation that contained a threat to injure Moon Unit Zappa. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1). The court held that an agency of the federal government is not a "person" within the meaning of the statute's requirement that the communication be addressed to "any other person," based on the statutory text, the Dictionary Act's definition in 1 U.S.C. § 1, legislative history, relevant case law such as Chapman, and principles of statutory construction that do not extend "person" to governmental entities in this context. The court rejected the government's arguments that the threat itself was directed at a natural person or that common sense required including the FBI as an addressee.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Callaway Golf Corporation, a Delaware company based in California, suing the Royal Canadian Golf Association (RCGA), a Canadian non-profit governing body for amateur golf, over claims including trade libel, defamation, interference with contract and prospective economic advantage, and violation of California's Unfair Competition Act. The dispute arose after RCGA announced it would bar certain Callaway clubs, such as the ERC Forged Titanium Driver, from its tournaments, aligning with a prior U.S. Golf Association decision on non-conforming equipment. The court granted RCGA's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The core reasoning was that RCGA's limited and non-targeted contacts with California, including a single website announcement and minimal online sales, did not satisfy the requirements for either specific or general jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory