District Court, D. Arizona — appointed by Ronald Reagan
Grant v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
District Court, D. Arizona · 2000-04-03 · cited 11×
In this case, plaintiff Nannette Grant alleged that her silicone gel breast implants caused various local and systemic health problems, including chronic fatigue syndrome and autoimmune symptoms, and brought multiple product liability claims against the manufacturer. The defendants moved to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs' six expert witnesses under the Daubert standard and sought partial summary judgment on the issue of scientific causation for systemic injuries, as well as on punitive damages. The court applied the Daubert factors, including reliability, peer review, testing, and general acceptance in the scientific community, and found that the experts' opinions lacked a reliable scientific basis and were developed primarily for litigation rather than independent research. As a result, the court excluded the expert testimony, granted summary judgment on the lack of causation for systemic disease claims, and dismissed the related punitive damages request because no viable underlying claim remained.
torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare
Gerlaugh v. Stewart
District Court, D. Arizona · 1999-02-02
This case involved a death row inmate in Arizona who filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that his execution after nearly 18 years on death row would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The court dismissed the petition, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the filing constituted a successive habeas application under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) without the required authorization from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The reasoning centered on AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), which mandate circuit approval for second or successive petitions and allow exceptions only for new retroactive constitutional rules or newly discovered evidence of innocence; the court rejected the argument that a "Lackey" claim based on execution delay was exempt like a competency claim, noting that similar arguments had been denied in prior Ninth Circuit cases such as Ceja v. Stewart and Gretzler v. Stewart, and that the petitioner could have raised the issue in his initial petition.
criminal lawprocedure
Gerlaugh v. Lewis
District Court, D. Arizona · 1995-07-10 · cited 23×
Darriek Leonard Gerlaugh filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Arizona convictions for armed robbery, kidnapping, and first-degree murder, along with his death sentence, asserting fifty constitutional claims related to the guilt phase, direct appeal, post-conviction proceedings, and sentencing. The case reached the federal district court after multiple state post-conviction relief efforts and stays tied to developments in death penalty law, such as Adamson v. Ricketts and Walton v. Arizona. Respondents moved for summary judgment, and the court addressed the claims by examining the state court record, denying requests for additional evidentiary hearings where findings had already been made, and rejecting challenges to the application of aggravating factors and other constitutional issues based on controlling Supreme Court precedent.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedurefederal power
United States v. Crumby
District Court, D. Arizona · 1995-07-07 · cited 30×
In United States v. Crumby, the defendant, charged with bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 2, sought to introduce results from a polygraph examination he passed to support his claim of innocence. The court held that polygraph evidence is admissible in limited circumstances under Federal Rules of Evidence 608(a) and 702, allowing testimony about the defendant's character for truthfulness only if his credibility has been impeached, and permitting general expert testimony on polygraphy but prohibiting details on specific questions, responses, or physiological data. The ruling drew on the evolution of Ninth Circuit precedent from per se inadmissibility in Brown v. Darcy, recognized improved reliability rates especially for truthful results, and imposed restrictions such as permitting the government to conduct its own examination to minimize prejudice while serving the interests of justice in this specific case.
criminal lawprocedure
Luckette v. Lewis
District Court, D. Arizona · 1995-03-27 · cited 19×
In Luckette v. Lewis, a prisoner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Arizona prison officials, claiming that prison rules substantially burdened his religious practices as an Ambassador/Priest in the Freedom Church of Revelation, specifically by denying a Kosher diet, a vow of poverty, uncut hair, and a permitted headcovering, in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The district court evaluated the plaintiff's motions for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order under the Ninth Circuit's sliding-scale standard, which weighs likelihood of success on the merits against the possibility of irreparable harm or the balance of hardships. Applying RFRA's requirement that any substantial burden on religious exercise must further a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means, the court granted the preliminary injunction in part and denied it in part.
religious libertycivil rightscriminal law
Smith v. ITT Corp.
District Court, D. Arizona · 1995-03-25 · cited 1×
In Smith v. ITT Corp., plaintiff Cynthia A. Smith sued her former employer, a defense contractor, alleging sexual harassment and gender discrimination under the Arizona Civil Rights Act, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and infliction of emotional distress, based on incidents including threats from subordinates after disciplinary actions, obscene graffiti, and her subsequent layoff during a company restructure. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to present specific evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on whether the harassment was based on gender or that the termination was pretextual for discrimination, as the employer had responded adequately to incidents and other male supervisors faced similar issues; the non-sexual incidents were unrelated to gender, the supervisor's comment did not establish harassment, and no evidence showed a policy or practice of discriminatory layoffs or demotions.
labor & employmentcivil rights