Roger Gordon Strand

In this case, plaintiff Nannette Grant alleged that her silicone gel breast implants caused various local and systemic health problems, including chronic fatigue syndrome and autoimmune symptoms, and brought multiple product liability claims against the manufacturer. The defendants moved to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs' six expert witnesses under the Daubert standard and sought partial summary judgment on the issue of scientific causation for systemic injuries, as well as on punitive damages. The court applied the Daubert factors, including reliability, peer review, testing, and general acceptance in the scientific community, and found that the experts' opinions lacked a reliable scientific basis and were developed primarily for litigation rather than independent research. As a result, the court excluded the expert testimony, granted summary judgment on the lack of causation for systemic disease claims, and dismissed the related punitive damages request because no viable underlying claim remained.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

This case involved a death row inmate in Arizona who filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that his execution after nearly 18 years on death row would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The court dismissed the petition, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the filing constituted a successive habeas application under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) without the required authorization from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The reasoning centered on AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), which mandate circuit approval for second or successive petitions and allow exceptions only for new retroactive constitutional rules or newly discovered evidence of innocence; the court rejected the argument that a "Lackey" claim based on execution delay was exempt like a competency claim, noting that similar arguments had been denied in prior Ninth Circuit cases such as Ceja v. Stewart and Gretzler v. Stewart, and that the petitioner could have raised the issue in his initial petition.

criminal lawprocedure

Darriek Leonard Gerlaugh filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Arizona convictions for armed robbery, kidnapping, and first-degree murder, along with his death sentence, asserting fifty constitutional claims related to the guilt phase, direct appeal, post-conviction proceedings, and sentencing. The case reached the federal district court after multiple state post-conviction relief efforts and stays tied to developments in death penalty law, such as Adamson v. Ricketts and Walton v. Arizona. Respondents moved for summary judgment, and the court addressed the claims by examining the state court record, denying requests for additional evidentiary hearings where findings had already been made, and rejecting challenges to the application of aggravating factors and other constitutional issues based on controlling Supreme Court precedent.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedurefederal power

In United States v. Crumby, the defendant, charged with bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 2, sought to introduce results from a polygraph examination he passed to support his claim of innocence. The court held that polygraph evidence is admissible in limited circumstances under Federal Rules of Evidence 608(a) and 702, allowing testimony about the defendant's character for truthfulness only if his credibility has been impeached, and permitting general expert testimony on polygraphy but prohibiting details on specific questions, responses, or physiological data. The ruling drew on the evolution of Ninth Circuit precedent from per se inadmissibility in Brown v. Darcy, recognized improved reliability rates especially for truthful results, and imposed restrictions such as permitting the government to conduct its own examination to minimize prejudice while serving the interests of justice in this specific case.

criminal lawprocedure

In Luckette v. Lewis, a prisoner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Arizona prison officials, claiming that prison rules substantially burdened his religious practices as an Ambassador/Priest in the Freedom Church of Revelation, specifically by denying a Kosher diet, a vow of poverty, uncut hair, and a permitted headcovering, in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The district court evaluated the plaintiff's motions for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order under the Ninth Circuit's sliding-scale standard, which weighs likelihood of success on the merits against the possibility of irreparable harm or the balance of hardships. Applying RFRA's requirement that any substantial burden on religious exercise must further a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means, the court granted the preliminary injunction in part and denied it in part.

religious libertycivil rightscriminal law

In Smith v. ITT Corp., plaintiff Cynthia A. Smith sued her former employer, a defense contractor, alleging sexual harassment and gender discrimination under the Arizona Civil Rights Act, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and infliction of emotional distress, based on incidents including threats from subordinates after disciplinary actions, obscene graffiti, and her subsequent layoff during a company restructure. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to present specific evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on whether the harassment was based on gender or that the termination was pretextual for discrimination, as the employer had responded adequately to incidents and other male supervisors faced similar issues; the non-sexual incidents were unrelated to gender, the supervisor's comment did not establish harassment, and no evidence showed a policy or practice of discriminatory layoffs or demotions.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Riely v. Reno, three plaintiffs who had engaged in protests, sidewalk counseling, and physical obstruction outside abortion clinics sued to challenge the constitutionality of the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), which criminalizes the use of force, threats, or physical obstruction to interfere with access to reproductive health services. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their First Amendment speech and assembly rights, due process and equal protection, the Eighth Amendment, the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and they sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the claims were not ripe for review or failed to state a claim, and denied the injunction as moot. The core reasoning was that FACE regulates unprotected conduct rather than speech, is neither vague nor overbroad, imposes punishments that do not violate the Eighth Amendment, and does not infringe other constitutional protections.

abortionfree speechcriminal lawfederal power

The case involved Darryleen Kelley, a City of Mesa employee, who alleged she developed chemical sensitivities after workplace exposures during a police building construction project, leading to her termination after she stopped working and exhausted her worker's compensation benefits. She sued under the Arizona Civil Rights Act for handicap discrimination, claiming the City failed to accommodate her condition, along with related claims including wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The court denied summary judgment on the discrimination claim (Count I), the public policy claim (Count II), and one other count (IV), finding factual issues regarding whether her condition qualified as a handicap under state law despite its tie to a temporary workers' compensation claim. It granted summary judgment on the remaining counts, including those against individual defendants on some grounds, and on punitive damages due to lack of evidence of an evil mind. The decision rested on statutory interpretation of Arizona's handicap definition and qualified immunity standards.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved three consolidated lawsuits by sheet metal workers alleging personal injuries from occupational exposure to asbestos-containing products manufactured by Owens-Corning Fiberglass (OCF). The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of sufficient exposure to its products to establish causation under Arizona law, which defines proximate cause as any cause that in a natural and continuous sequence produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. The court found that the plaintiffs' evidence only showed the presence of OCF products at some jobsites without linking it to actual exposure or inhalation of fibers, and rejected a market share liability theory as inappropriate for asbestos cases under Ninth Circuit precedent. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of OCF against all three plaintiffs.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction filed by Marie Claire Meredith seeking the return of her daughter Christina, whom she alleged had been wrongfully removed from Birmingham, England, to Phoenix, Arizona by the child's father, Steven Meredith. The court found that the parents' 1990 Arizona divorce proceedings resulted in a valid custody decree awarding the child to the father, that the mother had received proper notice but failed to participate, and that the child had never become a habitual resident of England. The core reasoning was that the child's habitual residence remained Arizona throughout the relevant period, so the father's actions did not constitute a wrongful removal or retention under the Convention, and the mother could not invoke its protections to override the existing Arizona custody order. The court therefore denied the petition and directed that any further custody matters be addressed in Arizona state court.

family law

The case involved several Presbyterian and Lutheran churches suing the United States, INS, and Department of Justice over undercover informants who attended and recorded worship services and church activities while investigating the Sanctuary Movement for possible immigration violations. The churches alleged violations of their First Amendment rights to free exercise, speech, belief, and association, as well as Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless surveillance. On remand from the Ninth Circuit, which had addressed standing and sovereign immunity, the district court considered the churches' motion for partial summary judgment seeking declaratory relief. The court examined whether plaintiffs met their burden under Rule 56, assessed the likelihood of future surveillance for standing and mootness purposes, applied precedents such as United States v. Aguilar and Employment Division v. Smith, and evaluated whether the government's investigative methods violated constitutional rights.

immigrationfree speechreligious libertycriminal law

This case challenged Arizona’s procedures for handling challenges to absentee ballots in the 1988 general election, specifically whether voters whose ballots were disqualified were entitled to notice and a hearing under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs, whose absentee votes were rejected without prior notice or opportunity to respond, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against portions of Arizona Revised Statute § 16-552 and related rules. The court first determined that plaintiffs had standing, as their alleged injury was the denial of procedural safeguards rather than the underlying eligibility decision, and residency need not be proven before due process protections apply. On the merits, the court ruled that the statute’s lack of any post-deprivation notice or chance for voters to make a record violated procedural due process. It granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in part, denied defendants’ cross-motions, and limited relief to prospective effect after 90 days without awarding damages or individualized equitable relief.

electionscivil rightsprocedure

This case involves a dispute over coverage under a financial institution bond issued to United Bank by USF&G, following alleged fraudulent loans made by bank executive Paul Milus to two borrowers to prevent defaults and protect the value of his stock ahead of the bank's sale. Standard Chartered Bank, as successor, sought to recover loan losses from USF&G under the bond's fidelity provision, which covers employee dishonesty but requires collusion with borrowers for loan-related losses and excludes normal employee benefits. USF&G moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing lack of collusion, no qualifying financial benefit, and exclusion of stock option gains. The court granted the motion, holding there was no evidence that the borrowers knew of or intended to further Milus's personal scheme regarding the bank sale, and thus no collusion or conspiracy could be inferred under the standard from Direct Sales v. United States.

business & regulatory

The case concerned the Havasupai Tribe's challenge to the Forest Service's approval of a uranium mining plan of operations on federal land in the Kaibab National Forest, which the tribe viewed as a sacred site. Plaintiffs claimed the approval infringed their First Amendment free exercise rights, aboriginal access rights, the government's fiduciary duties to the tribe, and NEPA requirements due to an allegedly inadequate Environmental Impact Statement. The court rejected all claims and upheld the approval, reasoning that the mining activities would not prevent tribal access or substantially burden religious practices, that any fiduciary obligations were satisfied through consultation, and that the EIS sufficiently analyzed relevant environmental impacts including groundwater risks. The decision emphasized that the Forest Service had followed required procedures and considered tribal input in the administrative record.

religious libertyenvironmentcivil rightsfederal power

This case involved healthcare providers in Arizona who sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the Department of Health and Human Services negligently oversaw the AHCCCS program—an experimental Medicaid alternative—by failing to properly monitor and fund prime contractors, three of which went bankrupt and left the providers with over $35 million in uncompensated services. The court dismissed the second amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It reasoned that the Secretary's actions in approving, funding, and regulating the demonstration project fell within the discretionary function exception of the FTCA (28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)), as they involved policy judgments rather than mandatory duties, and that federal procurement regulations did not apply to the state contracts at issue.

healthcarefederal powerproceduretorts & liability

This case involved Newbery, a debtor in possession in bankruptcy, seeking to avoid as preferences under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) payments it made to trade creditors in the 90 days before filing, on the theory that the payments indirectly benefited its surety, Fireman's Fund, by reducing the surety's potential liability on payment and performance bonds for construction subcontracts. The bankruptcy court had dismissed the claim without leave to amend. The district court held that such payments generally do not constitute avoidable preferences to the extent they are supported by new value in the form of an equitable subrogation lien under Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Co., as explained in In re Fegert, because they do not diminish the estate. However, the court found the claim viable where some bonded contracts operated at a loss and there were insufficient contract proceeds to satisfy the full equitable lien, as the release of an unsecured indemnity claim would not qualify as new value under § 547(c)(1); it therefore vacated the dismissal and remanded for amendment of the complaint.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Hoylake Investments Ltd., a Bermuda corporation, seeking a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Arizona's Insurance Holding Company Systems Act in connection with its proposed takeover of B.A.T. Industries, whose subsidiary indirectly controls an Arizona domestic insurer. Hoylake argued that the Act's application to a foreign transaction violated the Commerce Clause, Due Process Clause, and other constitutional provisions by regulating extraterritorial activity without sufficient nexus to Arizona. The court denied the injunction, holding that Hoylake failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits because the McCarran-Ferguson Act authorizes states to regulate the business of insurance and the acquisition had a sufficient connection to Arizona through its impact on a domestic insurer.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involves a lawsuit under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act challenging the at-large voting system for electing members to the Holbrook Unified School District No. 3 Board, with the plaintiff alleging that the system, combined with racially polarized voting, prevents Native American voters (who comprise about 42% of the district) from electing their preferred candidates. The court addressed pending motions, including defendants' motions to dismiss the request for a preliminary injunction and motions in limine seeking to define the evidentiary and analytical standards. The court denied the motions to dismiss, ruled that the three-prong test from Thornburg v. Gingles must be satisfied as a threshold before considering the broader totality-of-circumstances factors from Zimmer v. McKeithen, and limited admissible evidence of election results to those involving precincts within the school district. This framework follows Ninth Circuit precedent in Gomez v. City of Watsonville, which prioritizes the Gingles preconditions to establish that the electoral device itself impedes minority voting.

electionscivil rights

The case concerned whether the Town of Parker could enforce its building codes on lands owned by the Colorado River Indian Tribes and held in trust by the United States inside the town boundaries. The Tribes moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 1908 Act creating the townsite did not disestablish or diminish the reservation. The court applied the Solem v. Bartlett framework, examining the Act's statutory language (which lacked any explicit cession or termination of reservation status), the circumstances of its passage, and later treatment of the land, and found no clear congressional intent to remove the area from the reservation. It therefore held that Parker lacked authority under state law to regulate building activities on the trust lands.

federal powerproperty

Grand Metropolitan filed a federal complaint seeking a declaration that Arizona's Acquisition of Control Act violated the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause, along with an injunction against its enforcement in connection with Grand Metropolitan's tender offer to acquire Pillsbury shares; Pillsbury had filed a parallel state court action to enforce the Act because one of its subsidiaries held Arizona liquor licenses. The district court granted Pillsbury's motion to dismiss and vacated its prior temporary restraining order. The court held that Younger abstention required dismissal because the state proceeding was ongoing and implicated important state interests in regulating liquor licenses under the Twenty-First Amendment, the federal constitutional claims could be raised in state court, the proceedings began at essentially the same time, and no exceptional circumstances such as bad faith or patent unconstitutionality justified federal intervention.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure