The case concerns the admissibility of a government survey of the prefabricated house industry in a pending antitrust action against National Homes Corporation, where the survey was intended to define the relevant line of commerce and support claims that acquisitions may lessen competition or create a monopoly. The court noted the need to relax ordinary evidentiary rules in complex antitrust cases tried by a judge and found the survey necessary and generally well-administered, with a high response rate and adequate universe coverage. However, due to ambiguity in the term "prefabricated house" among respondents, the court ruled that only questionnaires providing sufficient objective follow-up data for independent verification of answers could be admitted, while those with no further responses or only minimal answers to an ambiguous question must be excluded for lack of trustworthiness.
The case involved a claim by an employee against his employer for wrongful discharge under an employment contract for work in Cambodia, where the plaintiff alleged he was fired for exposing payroll irregularities rather than for the stated reason. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the suit was barred by a two-year contractual limitation period after the claim was filed, despite the plaintiff having filed a prior identical suit in Ohio that was dismissed without prejudice. The court denied the motion, holding that Indiana's Journey's Account statute applied to extend the time for refiling, even though the first suit was in another state, because the statute's liberal purpose is to allow diligent suitors to reach a merits decision and Indiana courts construe it broadly.
This case involved a refinery company's lawsuit against a union and its officers under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act for allegedly breaching a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement by engaging in a work stoppage, with related claims for individual liability and injunctive relief. The court vacated its prior order and ruled that Count I against the union for contract breach could proceed in federal court despite potential overlaps with National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. It dismissed Count II, holding that union officers could not be held individually liable for inducing the breach, drawing on Supreme Court precedent treating unions like corporations under Section 301(b) and general corporate law principles. For Count III, the court found that the dispute fell under the Norris-LaGuardia Act but affirmed the employer's right to sue for breach of the no-strike promise in exchange for arbitration, while denying a stay of proceedings pending grievance arbitration since the issues were distinct.
This case involved a petition by the NLRB Regional Director for a temporary injunction against a union's ongoing picketing of a hotel, alleging that the picketing constituted an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the National Labor Relations Act because the union had not filed a petition for certification within thirty days. The court denied the request for injunctive relief after a hearing, finding that the union had not engaged in unfair labor practices. The core reasoning was that the picketing truthfully informed the public of the strike without disrupting deliveries or services, that a prior state-conducted representation election and resulting collective bargaining agreement should be given effect despite changes in hotel ownership and management, and that applying the Act's certification requirement would unfairly exclude striking employees from any new election process.
The case involved a lawsuit by the family of Sam Ein and other passengers against Goodyear after a bruised tubeless tire on their Ford car caused a blowout, leading to an accident that killed Ein and injured the others. Plaintiffs claimed negligence for failing to warn that tubeless tires are more prone to blowouts after bruising than tube-type tires, along with breach of written and implied warranties. The court dismissed both paragraphs of the complaint, holding that manufacturers have no duty to warn about differences in tire qualities absent a defect or inherent danger, and that Illinois law provided no basis for liability on these theories. It noted that implied warranties require proof of unfitness for intended use, while any express warranty claim was undermined by inconsistent allegations and lack of specific details in the pleading, though amendment was permitted.
This case involves a personal injury lawsuit brought by an Illinois resident against two Indiana corporations in the Northern District of Indiana under diversity jurisdiction, stemming from an accident that occurred in the Southern District of Indiana. The defendants moved to dismiss or transfer the case, arguing that venue was improper in the Northern District. The court granted the motion, holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), domestic corporations are not subject to suit in any judicial district within their state of incorporation but only in the district where they maintain their principal place of business. The reasoning centered on interpreting the venue statute's terms "licensed to do business" and "is doing business" as not applying to these defendants, who had no operations in the Northern District, and relying on Supreme Court precedents that limit corporate residence for venue to the district of their headquarters.