Hubert Irving Teitelbaum

The case involved a civil rights lawsuit brought by the mother of Ronald P. Lach, Jr., who drowned in the Monongahela River after fleeing from university security officers and municipal police following a traffic stop. The plaintiff alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers, their employers, and supervisors for failing to rescue Lach, along with related state law claims for wrongful death and survival. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal claims, holding that there is no constitutional right to police protection absent a special relationship, which was not present here as the officers did not create the danger or have knowledge of a special danger to Lach individually. The pendent state law claims were dismissed without prejudice due to the elimination of federal claims and Eleventh Amendment considerations.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

In this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff Harold E. Brown alleged that defendants Charles B. Johnston and his attorney conspired with the district attorney to refile forgery charges against him, knowing Brown was innocent and that the prior nolle-prossed charges barred a successful second prosecution. The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that no violation of Brown's civil rights had occurred. The court denied the motion because genuine issues of material fact remained, including whether the refiling met the elements of malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law (such as favorable termination consistent with innocence) or constituted abuse of process, and whether an unlawful conspiracy with state actors existed. These factual disputes precluded judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

In this case, Rita Geibel sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for medical malpractice, alleging that a VA physician negligently increased her dosage of blood pressure medication, causing physical injuries and emotional harm. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for the United States. The decision rested on findings that the plaintiff's expert witness was unqualified due to limited review of records and potential bias, that her emotional issues predated the relevant treatment, and that claimed damages for future psychiatric care were too speculative because she had declined such treatment and showed no intent to pursue it.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involves the owners of a contaminated scrap metal site suing manufacturers and suppliers of electrical components containing PCBs under CERCLA and state tort law to recover cleanup costs and damages from spills and dioxin pollution. The court addressed multiple motions to dismiss, granting them in part by dismissing products liability and failure-to-warn claims against manufacturers because the recycling and dismantling of junk components was not a reasonably foreseeable use of their new products. It denied dismissal of claims against suppliers and rejected the unclean hands defense at the pleading stage, as the complaint alleged the plaintiffs were innocent victims and external records raised only factual issues. The core reasoning focused on the requirement of foreseeable use for tort liability under Restatement § 402A and § 388, along with construing allegations favorably to plaintiffs on CERCLA defenses.

environmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission suing the City of Mt. Lebanon over two disability benefit plans that allegedly discriminated based on age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The court granted summary judgment to the city on the claim regarding the former plan (R16-73) because it was time-barred under the ADEA's two-year statute of limitations for non-willful violations. On the claim regarding the current MEIT plan, the court also granted summary judgment to the city, finding that the plan qualified as a statutorily exempt bona fide employee benefit plan with a valid business purpose that did not constitute a subterfuge to evade the ADEA or force involuntary retirement.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this case, plaintiff LaVern Pettibon sued his former employers, Pennzoil Products Company and Pennzoil Company, alleging that his termination was due to age discrimination in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and adding a pendent state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress seeking punitive damages. Defendants moved under Rule 12(b) to dismiss the emotional distress claim, arguing that it would improperly expand remedies beyond those authorized by the ADEA. The court denied the motion, holding that the ADEA does not preempt state tort claims and that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties supported exercising discretion to hear the pendent claim alongside the federal claim. The court noted that Pennsylvania law on intentional infliction of emotional distress was sufficiently developed for federal courts to apply and that the state claim arose from the same nucleus of facts as the ADEA claim.

labor & employmentcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability

The EEOC sued United States Steel under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, claiming that the 1982 layoff of 52-year-old project analyst John Bales during a reduction in force was a willful violation of the statute. Because the suit was filed more than two years after the layoff, it was time-barred unless the employer had acted willfully, which would extend the limitations period to three years. The court granted USS summary judgment, finding no genuine dispute that the decision rested on a legitimate, non-discriminatory evaluation of Bales’s performance as a design draftsman rather than on age. Although Bales established a prima facie case by showing that younger employees were retained, the EEOC offered no evidence that the performance assessment was pretextual or that USS knew its conduct violated the ADEA.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved the EPA's motion for civil contempt against Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation for alleged violations of emission standards in a consent decree amendment governing operations at its Follansbee, West Virginia coke plant, including door emissions during charging and coking processes as well as pushing emissions. The court interpreted the consent decree as a contract and ruled that the company's door emission compliance demonstration was valid despite lower production rates, since the decree did not expressly require testing at normal maximum rates, and rejected EPA's implied terms argument. However, the court found Wheeling-Pitt liable for pushing emission violations for 57 days due to inadequate maintenance and repairs of the emission control system. The court ordered the company to hire a full-time environmental engineer, pay a $10,000 civil penalty for prior violations, and submit a proposed judgment on stipulated penalties, while declining to impose additional contempt or Clean Air Act penalties.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

In Met-Coil Systems Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., the plaintiff patent owner sold machines that formed integral flanges for metal duct connections and also sold matching corner pieces, while the defendant sold compatible corner pieces only to buyers of those machines; Met-Coil sued for contributory and induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271. The court granted summary judgment to Korners, holding there was no direct infringement by the machine purchasers and thus no liability for Korners. The reasoning relied on Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Univis Lens Co. and a similar district court case, which establish that sale of an essential, uncompleted component of a patented combination grants purchasers an implied license to finish and practice the invention, including obtaining unpatented parts from other sources; the court distinguished contrary authority as inapplicable to sales of incomplete articles.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In Todd v. United States, plaintiffs sought a refund of federal income taxes after the IRS disallowed most of a claimed $353,000 charitable deduction for a perpetual scenic easement granted to the Western Pennsylvania Conservancy on 104 acres of land used as a country estate, assessing deficiencies of over $150,000 for 1979 and 1980. The court entered judgment for the government, finding that the IRS valuation of the easement at $31,000 was correct. The core reasoning was that the taxpayers' expert appraisal was unreliable because it assumed the highest and best use of the property was residential subdivision, contrary to deed restrictions limiting subdivision and requiring the land to remain an undivided estate, and even the alternative post-easement valuation was implausible and unsupported.

taxespropertyenvironment

This products liability case arose when 16-month-old Isaac Fraust choked on Peter Pan peanut butter spread on bread, suffering severe brain damage; plaintiffs claimed the product was defective due to the absence of a warning against feeding it to children under four, given its texture and young children's swallowing abilities. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the product was not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law because the danger was or should have been known to the mother and was generally recognized. The court denied the motion, holding that it could not determine as a matter of law that the danger was obvious or known, so the lack of warning could render the product defective under Pennsylvania strict liability standards from Azzarello v. Black Brothers and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. The court reasoned that the social policy threshold for allowing a jury to impose liability on inadequate-warning claims is met here, as adding a warning would not detract from the product's utility and the cost is outweighed by the risk of harm.

torts & liability

This case involves fee petitions filed by attorneys seeking compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) for representing successful Social Security disability claimants in federal court proceedings. The court accepted the attorneys' reported hours and rates as accurate since they were undisputed but disallowed time spent on administrative matters before the agency, preparing the fee petitions themselves, and excessive correspondence on routine tasks. It applied a 20% negative quality multiplier to account for the excessive time spent on simple, routine activities despite the attorneys' experience. The court awarded reduced fees of $980 and $1,285 in two of the cases based on the adjusted lodestar calculations.

procedurefederal power

This case involves petitions for attorney's fees in social security disability cases where claimants prevailed in court after prevailing before the agency. The court addressed whether district courts are authorized to award fees for services before the Social Security Administration and whether the requested fees were reasonable. It concluded that under 42 U.S.C. § 406, district courts lack authority to award fees for administrative-level services, which is reserved for the Secretary, and may only award fees for representation before the court. The petitions were denied without prejudice because they lacked the detailed information needed to evaluate reasonableness under the Lindy criteria, such as itemized hours and rates.

federal powerprocedure

This diversity case involves a breach of contract claim by Pennsylvania-based Allegheny Ludlum Steel against California-based Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) over the alleged wrongful cancellation of an order for stainless steel condenser tubing to be used in a California power plant. PG&E moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute or, alternatively, to transfer the case. The court found that PG&E lacked sufficient continuous and substantial contacts for general jurisdiction and that specific jurisdiction would likely violate due process because the relevant negotiations occurred in California, the contract did not invoke Pennsylvania law, and litigating there would be unfair. Rather than dismiss, the court transferred the action to the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) as the more convenient forum.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this diversity action, plaintiff George Hansrote sued his former employer, Amer Industrial Technologies, claiming that his termination breached an employment contract for a specific or reasonable term and constituted wrongful discharge in violation of public policy because he refused to improperly influence a bid from his prior employer. The jury found for Hansrote, and the court denied Amer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court reasoned that the written contract did not clearly establish at-will employment, allowing parol evidence of the parties' intent for a reasonable term, and that a public policy claim was viable under either Pennsylvania or Delaware law since evidence showed the discharge was due to Hansrote's refusal to engage in commercial bribery, which is criminal under both states' laws.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorycriminal law

The case involved whether the City of Pittsburgh could impose a business privilege tax on fees received by a federal court reporter for preparing official transcripts of court proceedings. The United States and the reporter filed suit in federal district court seeking a declaration that the tax was unconstitutional as applied because it interfered with federal functions. The court first determined it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar the action, and that the United States was a real party in interest. It then held that federal court reporters function as instrumentalities or arms of the federal judiciary under 28 U.S.C. § 753 when producing official transcripts, making taxation of those fees a direct interference with essential governmental operations in violation of the Supremacy Clause.

taxesfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute between Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Home Insurance Company over responsibility for payments made to settle and defend a personal injury lawsuit stemming from a child's burns caused by flammable pajamas manufactured by Stone and sold by Murphy, with fabric from Lowenstein. Liberty Mutual, which insured Stone and Murphy, sought full recovery from Home, which insured Lowenstein and provided vendor endorsements covering Stone and Murphy for fabric-related losses. The court entered judgment for Liberty Mutual in the amount of $88,494.31 plus 6% interest from April 9, 1981, and awarded attorney fees, after a jury found Home acted in bad faith. The reasoning centered on the policies' other-insurance clauses requiring contribution by equal shares or limits, the priority of Home's specific vendor endorsement coverage, Pennsylvania contract law mandating prejudgment interest on liquidated amounts, and allowance of fees where an insurer unreasonably refuses to defend.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved the imposition of jury costs on attorneys in a civil lawsuit after the parties settled shortly before the scheduled jury selection without providing the required advance notice. The court had a standing policy, communicated at the pretrial conference, requiring settlement notice at least two working days before jury selection or else counsel would each be assessed half of one day's jury costs. After the case settled one hour before selection, incurring $590.22 in expenses, a hearing was held at which counsel failed to show good cause, leading the court to assess $295.11 against each attorney. The ruling distinguished contrary precedent because here the attorneys had prior notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the assessment was limited to actual costs rather than an arbitrary fine, with the goal of reducing unnecessary burdens on the court, jurors, and taxpayers from late settlements.

procedure

The case involved a plaintiff suing Eli Lilly and Company for cancer allegedly caused by in utero exposure to the drug DES. The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations under New York law, which the court was required to apply. The court granted the motion, holding that under New York precedents, a cause of action for exposure to drugs or chemicals accrues at the time of exposure rather than when injury is discovered. Because the plaintiff's exposure ended at her birth in 1952, the limitations period expired in 1976 even after tolling for minority, making the 1983 lawsuit untimely. The court distinguished a contrary intermediate appellate decision as involving a foreign object rather than a drug or chemical.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Grecco v. Spang and Co., the plaintiff sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) for alleged age discrimination, seeking recovery of past and future lost wages along with other relief. The defendant moved to exclude evidence of damages occurring after the trial date. The court granted the motion, holding that prospective damages are not recoverable under the ADEA. The reasoning was that the ADEA incorporates the remedies of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which does not provide for such damages beyond those explicitly listed, and that reinstatement, which is available under the statute, would prevent further losses, avoiding double recovery.

civil rightslabor & employment