This case involves qui tam relators seeking a share of a settlement in a False Claims Act action against SmithKline Beecham Corporation for allegedly submitting false claims to the government, particularly regarding automated chemistry tests. On remand, the district court determined that relator Robert J. Merena qualified as an "original source" under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) because he had direct and independent knowledge of the information and voluntarily provided it to the government prior to filing suit, entitling him to a portion of the approximately $241 million allocated to those claims. The court barred the other relators from recovery due to the first-to-file rule in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), which prevents subsequent actions based on the same underlying facts. The decision followed the Third Circuit's mandate requiring a claim-by-claim analysis of the relators' contributions to the settlement.
This case concerns qui tam actions brought under the False Claims Act against SmithKline Beecham Corporation and its lab subsidiary for alleged false billing claims related to medical testing services, which the government settled for approximately $334 million including interest. The primary issue is the amount of the settlement to be awarded as a share to relators Merena and Robinson, after deducting an agreed allocation to the Spear relators and payments to state Medicaid programs. The government contended that the relators were entitled to no share of the portion allocated to “automated chemistry” allegations because those claims had been publicly disclosed and the relators were not original sources, while also seeking dismissal of those portions of the complaints for lack of jurisdiction or failure to be first to file. The court’s analysis focuses on the statutory framework of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) for relator shares, the effect of the government’s prior unlimited intervention and settlement agreement, and the applicability of public-disclosure and original-source bars.
In McGrenaghan v. St. Denis School, the plaintiff, a teacher and parent of a disabled child, sued her employer (a school and archdiocese) claiming discrimination under the ADA based on her association with a person with a disability, gender discrimination under Title VII, and state claims for breach of an implied employment contract and negligence. The court addressed the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, denying it on the ADA and Title VII claims because the plaintiff raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether her reassignment from full-time teacher to a split role constituted an adverse employment action under precedents like Torre v. Casio. The court granted summary judgment on the contract claims, finding no implied contract for continued full-time employment, and on the negligence claim, holding it was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act.
The case involved Argus Group 1700, Inc. and Arden Phoenix Group 1700, L.P. appealing the bankruptcy court's dismissal of their Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions and remand of a related state court lawsuit to state court. The bankruptcy court had dismissed the cases sua sponte after a hearing, finding that the debtors filed for bankruptcy in bad faith solely to remove the state court litigation involving claims of fraud, mismanagement, and breach of partnership agreement to federal court and avoid state jurisdiction. The district court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the filings lacked a legitimate bankruptcy purpose, as the debtors' only substantial asset was the property involved in the state dispute and their debts were minimal, primarily related to the ongoing litigation sanctions and fees. The court also affirmed the remand on equitable grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b) and noted alternative grounds for dismissal of one appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
In Guzewicz v. Eberle, shareholders of two corporations sued individual officers and directors alleging violations of federal securities laws and breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with proxy materials and a proposed sale of corporate stock or assets; the complaints named the corporations only as nominal defendants and sought damages solely from the individuals. Defendants moved to disqualify the plaintiffs' law firm, Blank Rome, on the ground that the firm had long served as corporate counsel to the defendant entities. The court denied the disqualification motion after an evidentiary hearing. It reasoned that the litigation was not adverse to the corporations (which were nominal parties only), that Blank Rome had ceased all representation of the corporations well before the suits were filed, and that the firm had obtained no confidential information that was not already known to the defendants.
This case involved a dispute between Applied Bolting Technology Products, Inc., a manufacturer of direct tension indicators, and its insurer USF&G over whether a commercial general liability policy required the insurer to defend Applied in an underlying lawsuit. The underlying suit, brought by competitor J.M. Turner, Inc., alleged breach of contract, fraud, and false advertising under the Lanham Act based on Applied's claims that its products met certain industry standards. Applied moved for summary judgment seeking a declaration of coverage for an "advertising injury," while USF&G cross-moved arguing no duty to defend or indemnify existed. The court denied Applied's motion and granted USF&G's, holding that the false advertising claims did not fall within the policy's definition of "advertising injury" (specifically, they did not involve misappropriation of advertising ideas) and that the first-publication exclusion barred coverage because the advertising began before the policy period.