Donald West VanArtsdalen

This case involves qui tam relators seeking a share of a settlement in a False Claims Act action against SmithKline Beecham Corporation for allegedly submitting false claims to the government, particularly regarding automated chemistry tests. On remand, the district court determined that relator Robert J. Merena qualified as an "original source" under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) because he had direct and independent knowledge of the information and voluntarily provided it to the government prior to filing suit, entitling him to a portion of the approximately $241 million allocated to those claims. The court barred the other relators from recovery due to the first-to-file rule in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), which prevents subsequent actions based on the same underlying facts. The decision followed the Third Circuit's mandate requiring a claim-by-claim analysis of the relators' contributions to the settlement.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns qui tam actions brought under the False Claims Act against SmithKline Beecham Corporation and its lab subsidiary for alleged false billing claims related to medical testing services, which the government settled for approximately $334 million including interest. The primary issue is the amount of the settlement to be awarded as a share to relators Merena and Robinson, after deducting an agreed allocation to the Spear relators and payments to state Medicaid programs. The government contended that the relators were entitled to no share of the portion allocated to “automated chemistry” allegations because those claims had been publicly disclosed and the relators were not original sources, while also seeking dismissal of those portions of the complaints for lack of jurisdiction or failure to be first to file. The court’s analysis focuses on the statutory framework of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) for relator shares, the effect of the government’s prior unlimited intervention and settlement agreement, and the applicability of public-disclosure and original-source bars.

criminal lawhealthcareprocedure

In McGrenaghan v. St. Denis School, the plaintiff, a teacher and parent of a disabled child, sued her employer (a school and archdiocese) claiming discrimination under the ADA based on her association with a person with a disability, gender discrimination under Title VII, and state claims for breach of an implied employment contract and negligence. The court addressed the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, denying it on the ADA and Title VII claims because the plaintiff raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether her reassignment from full-time teacher to a split role constituted an adverse employment action under precedents like Torre v. Casio. The court granted summary judgment on the contract claims, finding no implied contract for continued full-time employment, and on the negligence claim, holding it was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act.

civil rightslabor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Argus Group 1700, Inc. and Arden Phoenix Group 1700, L.P. appealing the bankruptcy court's dismissal of their Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions and remand of a related state court lawsuit to state court. The bankruptcy court had dismissed the cases sua sponte after a hearing, finding that the debtors filed for bankruptcy in bad faith solely to remove the state court litigation involving claims of fraud, mismanagement, and breach of partnership agreement to federal court and avoid state jurisdiction. The district court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the filings lacked a legitimate bankruptcy purpose, as the debtors' only substantial asset was the property involved in the state dispute and their debts were minimal, primarily related to the ongoing litigation sanctions and fees. The court also affirmed the remand on equitable grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b) and noted alternative grounds for dismissal of one appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Guzewicz v. Eberle, shareholders of two corporations sued individual officers and directors alleging violations of federal securities laws and breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with proxy materials and a proposed sale of corporate stock or assets; the complaints named the corporations only as nominal defendants and sought damages solely from the individuals. Defendants moved to disqualify the plaintiffs' law firm, Blank Rome, on the ground that the firm had long served as corporate counsel to the defendant entities. The court denied the disqualification motion after an evidentiary hearing. It reasoned that the litigation was not adverse to the corporations (which were nominal parties only), that Blank Rome had ceased all representation of the corporations well before the suits were filed, and that the firm had obtained no confidential information that was not already known to the defendants.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute between Applied Bolting Technology Products, Inc., a manufacturer of direct tension indicators, and its insurer USF&G over whether a commercial general liability policy required the insurer to defend Applied in an underlying lawsuit. The underlying suit, brought by competitor J.M. Turner, Inc., alleged breach of contract, fraud, and false advertising under the Lanham Act based on Applied's claims that its products met certain industry standards. Applied moved for summary judgment seeking a declaration of coverage for an "advertising injury," while USF&G cross-moved arguing no duty to defend or indemnify existed. The court denied Applied's motion and granted USF&G's, holding that the false advertising claims did not fall within the policy's definition of "advertising injury" (specifically, they did not involve misappropriation of advertising ideas) and that the first-publication exclusion barred coverage because the advertising began before the policy period.

business & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over whether a commercial general liability insurance policy required General Accident to defend and indemnify Michael Carbone, Inc. for liability arising from a car accident caused by a company employee acting within the scope of his employment. The court granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that it had no duty to defend or indemnify under the policy. The core reasoning was that the policy's automobile exclusion unambiguously barred coverage for losses arising from the use of an auto by any insured, the separation of insureds clause did not render the exclusion inapplicable, and the employee's conduct was attributable to the employer under agency principles.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerns plaintiff Dolores Verde's claims of sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation while employed as a real estate clerk by the Board of Revision of Taxes of the City of Philadelphia, along with related claims by her husband. She asserted violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium against the City and several individual board officials in both individual and official capacities. On defendants' motion to dismiss portions of the complaint, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. It dismissed the Title VII count against the named defendants in their individual capacities, reasoning that Title VII imposes liability only on employers and not on individuals, drawing on precedents distinguishing official-capacity suits from personal-capacity suits and the statutory definition of employer. The court also addressed the viability of PHRA claims against the City and tort claims under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, while allowing certain counts to proceed.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involved plaintiff Jack-ey Griffiths suing his former employer CIGNA for retaliatory discharge after filing an EEOC complaint over a denied promotion, along with related discrimination and common-law claims under federal and Pennsylvania law. After the Third Circuit remanded for a new trial requiring proof that retaliation was the sole cause of discharge, the jury found for the plaintiff on the retaliation claim and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The court denied CIGNA's motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, holding that sufficient evidence supported the verdict and that subject-matter jurisdiction existed over the PHRA claim.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved claims by Omni Equities, Inc., as a debtor-in-possession, and later joined creditors, seeking to avoid alleged fraudulent transfers of Florida real estate and other assets to the Pearl S. Buck Foundation, which held them in trust, on grounds that the transfers were made to hinder creditors. The action was brought in federal court solely under diversity jurisdiction. After additional parties including the Gordons, Solaris Foundation, Magnacard, and Highland Realty were joined as plaintiffs or defendants, the court determined that complete diversity of citizenship was lacking between all plaintiffs and all defendants. The court held that it therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and dismissed the case, noting that the parties invoking jurisdiction failed to establish complete diversity despite bearing the burden of proof.

procedureproperty

The case concerned a candy box manufacturer's claims against a chocolate company owner for alleged breach of oral contracts, promissory estoppel, and loss of business opportunity after purchase orders for Valentine's Day boxes were placed by phone but later canceled when the chocolate business was sold to a competitor that made its own boxes. After the contract claims survived, the defendant moved to dismiss the promissory estoppel and loss-of-opportunity counts. Applying Pennsylvania's UCC statute of frauds via choice-of-law rules, the court held that promissory estoppel cannot avoid the writing requirement for sales of goods over a certain amount and that related damages theories were also unavailable.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Monzon v. Martinez, plaintiff Cesar Monzon, a pro se litigant, filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the chief counsel of the Delaware County Office of Child Support Enforcement, alleging that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act entitled him to have the state pay for private legal counsel in ongoing child support proceedings arising from his divorce and custody arrangements. The court considered cross-motions for summary judgment and found no genuine issue of material fact. It granted the defendant's motion and denied the plaintiff's, holding that Monzon had not formally requested OCSE assistance, that the support order was a net-effect arrangement under which he owed payments, and that the statute does not create an enforceable private right to state-funded representation in these circumstances. The court also rejected an incidental equal-protection claim as unsupported by facts.

family lawcivil rights

This case involved handicapped plaintiff Robert Pulcinella and his sister Jeanann Dobrikovic, who sought a zoning variance or special exception from Ridley Township to build a ground-floor wheelchair-accessible addition to the sister's narrow twin home, which was denied because it would violate the eight-foot side-yard requirement on a twenty-foot-wide lot. Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court under the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f), claiming the denial failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for Pulcinella's paraplegia and related medical needs, and moved for a preliminary injunction to allow construction. The court noted federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists under the FHAA even without exhausting state remedies, but observed that plaintiffs had not pursued available state-court review of the zoning board's decision and that the ordinance applied neutrally without evidence of discriminatory intent. The opinion examined whether the requested addition constituted a reasonable modification under the statute and addressed procedural and evidentiary issues related to the motion.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

The case involved a Title VII employment discrimination claim by a plaintiff against her former employer, a local union, and its international affiliate, alleging sexual harassment and termination based on sex. The court addressed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, focusing on whether the local union met the statutory requirement of having fifteen or more employees. After reviewing evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not establish that the local union had the requisite number of employees during the relevant periods, nor that the international union could be considered her employer under single entity or agency theories. Consequently, the court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Title VII.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation seeking declaratory relief and coverage from its comprehensive general liability insurers for over $750 million in costs to clean up PCB contamination along its natural gas pipeline, as required by EPA and state agencies. The litigation consolidated multiple actions and addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on issues including whether the contamination constituted an 'occurrence' under the policies, the scope of covered damages, applicability of the owned property and pollution exclusions, late notice, and the insurers' duty to defend. Applying primarily Texas law on insurance contract interpretation and burdens of proof, along with choice-of-law analysis for certain issues, the court examined facts regarding the company's knowledge of PCB releases and its delay in notifying carriers. The court concluded that many coverage claims failed due to policy exclusions, lack of an occurrence, and untimely notice, while rejecting arguments for unlimited indemnification even if a duty to defend existed.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned investors who purchased forward contracts in government securities through First Western Government Securities and relied on tax opinion letters prepared by the law firm Arvey Hodes to claim ordinary losses upon cancellation of one side of paired contracts. After the IRS disallowed the deductions and courts ruled the transactions were shams entered primarily for tax avoidance, the investors sued Arvey Hodes for violations of Rule 10b-5, RICO, and related state law claims. On the firm's motion for summary judgment, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that the investors could not establish reasonable reliance on the letters because of explicit disclaimers, the speculative nature of the program, and the absence of any duty to disclose additional facts.

business & regulatorytaxesprocedure

The case involved an inmate at Graterford prison who sued the superintendent's assistant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that being filmed by a television crew without warning or consent violated his constitutional right to privacy. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that no federal right had been deprived. Accepting the plaintiff's version of the facts, the court found that there was no protected liberty interest in avoiding being filmed while walking in a public prison corridor, nor did any prison directive create such a right enforceable under the Constitution. Therefore, the court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Daphne Butler's claims that her employer, Elwyn Institute, terminated her employment in December 1989 because of her race after denying her request for leave and citing her absence due to incarceration as the reason. Butler sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, alleging disparate treatment in the denial of leave and the discharge. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the Title VII and PHRA claims, finding that Butler had sufficiently alleged a prima facie case of discrimination and that the unemployment benefits ruling did not preclude the discrimination issues, and it also denied summary judgment without prejudice pending discovery. However, the court granted the motion to dismiss the § 1981 claim because, under Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, claims of discriminatory discharge are not cognizable under that statute. The decision rested on the standards for pleading and summary judgment under Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, along with the framework for proving intentional discrimination from McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In Baily v. Lewis, the plaintiff sought damages for physical and emotional injuries resulting from alleged sexual abuse by the defendant that occurred when the plaintiff was a minor between 1969 and 1974. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that all claims were barred by Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations. The court reasoned that the limitations period began running at the time of the abuse and was not tolled by the plaintiff's repressed memories or resulting mental disability, as the discovery rule under Pennsylvania law requires that the injury be one not reasonably discoverable at the time, which did not apply here. The plaintiff filed the complaint in 1990, more than fifteen years after the last incident.

criminal lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a personal injury lawsuit filed by Pennsylvania residents against a New Jersey corporation operating a motor inn in New Jersey, where the plaintiff was allegedly injured in 1988. The defendant moved to dismiss the action, which had been removed to federal court in Pennsylvania, for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court determined that it lacked both specific and general personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania, limited to mailing promotional brochures to about one thousand residents, were insufficient under due process standards. Rather than dismissing the case, the court transferred it to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, where jurisdiction and venue are proper, to serve the interests of justice by avoiding potential statute of limitations issues and duplicate filing costs.

proceduretorts & liability