This case involves a proposed nationwide class action filed in New Jersey federal court by consumers alleging that Unilever's Breyers ice cream was deceptively labeled 'all natural' despite containing chemically processed alkalized cocoa, asserting claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, breach of warranty, and unjust enrichment. A nearly identical class action (Thurston v. Conopco) had been filed three days earlier in the Northern District of California, along with a related case involving another Unilever brand. Defendant Unilever moved to dismiss, stay, or transfer the New Jersey action under the first-filed rule and 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The court granted transfer to the Northern District of California, finding the actions substantially similar in parties, claims, and facts, that the first-filed rule applied, and that transfer served convenience and the interests of justice while granting plaintiffs leave to refile if the California action was dismissed on procedural grounds.
The case concerned independent truck owner-operators who leased their equipment and services to All Saints Express, Inc., and alleged that the company's leases violated multiple provisions of the Federal Truth in Leasing Regulations. After the court issued a 2010 permanent injunction requiring compliance, the plaintiffs sought contempt sanctions, claiming All Saints' proposed new leases remained non-compliant, particularly regarding insurance obligations and documentation. The court found that All Saints' proposed leases needed targeted revisions, such as explicit language stating the carrier's duty to maintain public liability insurance under 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(j)(1), but that the leases would satisfy the regulations once amended. It therefore ordered All Saints to execute revised leases meeting those standards by February 4, 2011, while deferring a final contempt ruling and setting briefing on an arbitration clause.
This case involved negligence claims by truck driver Bradley Flint against IMTT-Bayonne and fellow driver Jeffrey Jackson stemming from an incident in which a corrosive chemical was loaded into an aluminum trailer instead of a stainless steel one, became contaminated, and required an emergency transfer between trucks at a highway stop. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment to both IMTT and Jackson on the negligence claims. The court found IMTT had no liability for the loading process and determined that Flint's claim against Jackson was barred because both drivers qualified as employees of Langer Transport Corp. under New Jersey workers' compensation law. The court reached the employment conclusion by applying the control test and the relative nature of the work test, noting Langer's direction of routes and schedules as well as the drivers' exclusive work for the company. Langer's motion on cross-claims was denied as moot.
In Gudiel-Soto v. United States, the petitioner sought a writ of error coram nobis to vacate his 1998 conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin, arguing that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The court denied the petition, holding that although Padilla v. Kentucky established that such advice is required, the petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. The reasoning centered on the petitioner's admission of guilt, the overwhelming evidence against him, and the highly favorable sentence he received due to his cooperation, making it unlikely he would have proceeded to trial.
In United States v. Ward, defendant David James Ward, who had pled guilty in 1996 to kidnapping after abducting and repeatedly sexually assaulting a victim over several days across multiple states, moved pro se in 2010 to correct his 1997 sentence of 720 months' imprisonment and for the sentencing judge to recuse himself. The court denied both motions, holding that there was no authority under 28 U.S.C. § 452, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, or 18 U.S.C. § 3582 to reopen or reduce the sentence, particularly as Ward had been repeatedly warned during his plea that he faced up to life imprisonment and possible guideline departures for factors like multiple acts of sexual abuse. On recusal, the court found that Ward's filing of a commercial lien against the judge in state court did not establish bias under Third Circuit precedent. The opinion notes this was Ward's third post-conviction challenge to his sentence.
This case involves independent truck owner-operators who leased their equipment and driving services to All Saints Express, Inc., which in turn provided transportation services exclusively for St. George Warehouse, Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that their lease agreements violated the federal Truth in Leasing Regulations (49 C.F.R. § 376) by omitting required provisions on compensation amounts and documentation, lease duration, workers' compensation insurance, and charge-backs, and they sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 49 U.S.C. § 14704. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment, granting them in part and denying them in part after reviewing whether All Saints qualified as a motor carrier subject to the regulations and whether the agreements met the regulatory requirements. Core reasoning focused on the application of the regulations to the parties' arrangements, the content of the leases and any addenda, and the relationship between All Saints and St. George, including whether St. George was an affiliate exempt from certain obligations.