Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
The head-of-state immunity decision defers to the Executive Branch on foreign-relations grounds while the telemarketing-rule decision invalidates one agency provision, producing a modest net tilt toward deference. Habyarimana v. Kagame ↗ U.S. Security v. Federal Trade C… ↗
This case involved claims by the widows of two African presidents killed in a 1994 plane crash, who sued Rwandan President Paul Kagame and others for wrongful death, crimes against humanity, and torture, alleging Kagame ordered the downing of the aircraft. After the plaintiffs obtained a clerk's entry of default and moved for default judgment, Kagame appeared and sought to dismiss or stay the case, arguing lack of jurisdiction and immunity. The court recognized the United States Executive Branch's suggestion of immunity for Kagame as a sitting head of state, deferred to that determination on grounds of separation of powers and the Executive's authority over foreign relations, and dismissed the action. The court also addressed but did not resolve subsidiary issues such as service of process.
This case involves multiple plaintiffs, including James Bollinger, suing AT&T entities over alleged defects in U-verse bundled TV, voice, and internet services, asserting RICO claims and state-law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and related theories, while seeking class certification. BellSouth moved to compel arbitration of Bollinger's internet claims under the terms of service and to dismiss or transfer his TV/voice claims based on a forum-selection clause designating Texas courts. The court determined that the forum-selection clause was mandatory and enforceable under federal standards, requiring litigation of those claims in Texas, and analyzed the arbitration agreement's validity against challenges of procedural and substantive unconscionability, finding it binding as to covered claims while noting that arbitrability issues were for the arbitrator. The court treated venue and arbitration questions as dispositive and did not reach personal jurisdiction.
In this case, plaintiff Andrew Bundy sued Progressive Direct Insurance Company in Oklahoma state court for breach of an uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance policy, initially seeking damages under $75,000, then amending his complaint to add a tort claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing with a prayer for over $75,000 in actual damages plus punitive damages. Progressive removed the action to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, after which Bundy moved to dismiss his tort claim without prejudice and remand the case to state court on the ground that the amount in controversy no longer exceeded $75,000. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that subject-matter jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal and that subsequent events, including Bundy's attempted dismissal filed in state court after removal, cannot divest the federal court of jurisdiction that existed when removal occurred. The court also directed Bundy to clarify whether he would pursue or dismiss the tort claim and scheduled a hearing on pending discovery motions.
The case concerns the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and Chickasaw Nation's lawsuit against the State of Oklahoma to obtain certification and enforcement of an August 25, 2009 arbitration award interpreting their tribal-state gaming compacts. The Nations invoked the compacts' dispute-resolution procedures after the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enterprises that state courts could exercise jurisdiction over tort claims arising at tribal casinos. The court evaluates the Nations' motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, assessing whether the record shows no genuine issues of material fact and entitles the Nations to judgment as a matter of law. The analysis relies on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act's framework for Class III gaming compacts, the model compact approved by State Question 712, and the limited remedies and federal-court enforcement provisions in Part 12 of the compacts.
federal powertorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory
The case involved telemarketing service providers and their trade association challenging the Federal Trade Commission's Final Amended Telemarketing Sales Rule, which created a national do-not-call registry and imposed other restrictions such as on preacquired account information and predictive dialers. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their challenge to the do-not-call registry portion of the rule, holding it invalid, while granting the FTC's cross-motion and upholding all other challenged provisions of the rule. The core reasoning addressed the scope of the FTC's authority under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, the exclusion of certain entities from FTC jurisdiction, and whether the final rule was a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule satisfying notice-and-comment requirements.
The case involved plaintiff Mary L. Clair suing moving companies Allied, Emrick, and Flinn after her household goods were damaged by a fire in a trailer during an interstate shipment from Florida to Oklahoma. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that Clair's breach of contract and negligence claims were preempted by the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act and must be resolved under federal law. The court further held that the claims were barred because Clair failed to submit a timely, complete written claim within the required nine-month period, as her initial filing was vague and incomplete and later submissions occurred outside the deadline.