Lee Roy West

This case involved claims by the widows of two African presidents killed in a 1994 plane crash, who sued Rwandan President Paul Kagame and others for wrongful death, crimes against humanity, and torture, alleging Kagame ordered the downing of the aircraft. After the plaintiffs obtained a clerk's entry of default and moved for default judgment, Kagame appeared and sought to dismiss or stay the case, arguing lack of jurisdiction and immunity. The court recognized the United States Executive Branch's suggestion of immunity for Kagame as a sitting head of state, deferred to that determination on grounds of separation of powers and the Executive's authority over foreign relations, and dismissed the action. The court also addressed but did not resolve subsidiary issues such as service of process.

federal powercivil rightscriminal law

This case involves multiple plaintiffs, including James Bollinger, suing AT&T entities over alleged defects in U-verse bundled TV, voice, and internet services, asserting RICO claims and state-law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and related theories, while seeking class certification. BellSouth moved to compel arbitration of Bollinger's internet claims under the terms of service and to dismiss or transfer his TV/voice claims based on a forum-selection clause designating Texas courts. The court determined that the forum-selection clause was mandatory and enforceable under federal standards, requiring litigation of those claims in Texas, and analyzed the arbitration agreement's validity against challenges of procedural and substantive unconscionability, finding it binding as to covered claims while noting that arbitrability issues were for the arbitrator. The court treated venue and arbitration questions as dispositive and did not reach personal jurisdiction.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Andrew Bundy sued Progressive Direct Insurance Company in Oklahoma state court for breach of an uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance policy, initially seeking damages under $75,000, then amending his complaint to add a tort claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing with a prayer for over $75,000 in actual damages plus punitive damages. Progressive removed the action to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, after which Bundy moved to dismiss his tort claim without prejudice and remand the case to state court on the ground that the amount in controversy no longer exceeded $75,000. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that subject-matter jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal and that subsequent events, including Bundy's attempted dismissal filed in state court after removal, cannot divest the federal court of jurisdiction that existed when removal occurred. The court also directed Bundy to clarify whether he would pursue or dismiss the tort claim and scheduled a hearing on pending discovery motions.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerns the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma and Chickasaw Nation's lawsuit against the State of Oklahoma to obtain certification and enforcement of an August 25, 2009 arbitration award interpreting their tribal-state gaming compacts. The Nations invoked the compacts' dispute-resolution procedures after the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enterprises that state courts could exercise jurisdiction over tort claims arising at tribal casinos. The court evaluates the Nations' motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, assessing whether the record shows no genuine issues of material fact and entitles the Nations to judgment as a matter of law. The analysis relies on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act's framework for Class III gaming compacts, the model compact approved by State Question 712, and the limited remedies and federal-court enforcement provisions in Part 12 of the compacts.

federal powertorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved telemarketing service providers and their trade association challenging the Federal Trade Commission's Final Amended Telemarketing Sales Rule, which created a national do-not-call registry and imposed other restrictions such as on preacquired account information and predictive dialers. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their challenge to the do-not-call registry portion of the rule, holding it invalid, while granting the FTC's cross-motion and upholding all other challenged provisions of the rule. The core reasoning addressed the scope of the FTC's authority under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, the exclusion of certain entities from FTC jurisdiction, and whether the final rule was a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule satisfying notice-and-comment requirements.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved plaintiff Mary L. Clair suing moving companies Allied, Emrick, and Flinn after her household goods were damaged by a fire in a trailer during an interstate shipment from Florida to Oklahoma. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that Clair's breach of contract and negligence claims were preempted by the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act and must be resolved under federal law. The court further held that the claims were barred because Clair failed to submit a timely, complete written claim within the required nine-month period, as her initial filing was vague and incomplete and later submissions occurred outside the deadline.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

In this case, the U.S. Small Business Administration, acting as receiver for Investment Capital, Inc., sued former director James J. Wasson for claims including fraudulent conveyance, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, unjust enrichment, RICO violations, and failure to maintain books and records. The court addressed the defendant's motion for summary judgment asserting that the claims were time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2415. The court held that the quasi-contractual claims for fraudulent conveyance and unjust enrichment, as well as the contractual claims for breach of fiduciary duty and related failures, were governed by the six-year limitations period under § 2415(a) and thus timely, while the negligence and RICO claims were subject to the three-year period under § 2415(b) and barred because the plaintiff failed to show grounds for tolling. The decision rested on the nature of the remedies sought and the characterization of the duties involved as arising from contract or quasi-contract rather than tort.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involves a dispute over coverage under directors' and officers' liability insurance policies issued to a failed bank, where American Casualty sought a declaration that its 1984 policy provided no coverage for FDIC claims against former directors and officers due to exclusions and notice requirements, while the defendants counterclaimed for coverage under either the 1984 policy or the prior 1981 policy's 12-month discovery period on grounds that the 1984 policy was a non-renewal. The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on these coverage issues. The court denied American's motion regarding the 1984 policy and denied the defendants' motions regarding both policies, reasoning that the plaintiff's waiver of certain defenses for trial purposes did not amount to an admission of non-renewal and that genuine issues of material fact remained unresolved.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerns a motion by former directors and officers of an insolvent bank to dismiss FDIC claims alleging ordinary negligence in counts I, II, and VI of the complaint. The defendants argued that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) establishes gross negligence as the minimum standard for such suits and preempts state laws allowing lesser degrees of fault. The court denied the motion, holding that the statute's savings clause preserves the FDIC's rights under other applicable law, including state common law permitting ordinary negligence claims. The decision rested on the plain language of the provision, which the court found did not create an exclusive federal standard or impair preexisting state-law causes of action.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved a dispute over the computation of federal estate taxes for the estate of Hallie I. Travis. The personal representative reported prior adjusted taxable gifts based on values from timely filed gift tax returns, but the IRS revalued those gifts (and additional unreported gifts) at higher amounts when auditing the estate tax return, resulting in a deficiency notice. The plaintiff argued that the three-year limitations period under the gift tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code barred such revaluation for estate tax purposes, while the government contended the limitation applied only to gift tax calculations. The court granted partial summary judgment to the United States, holding that the statutory language limits the gift tax valuation rule to gift tax computations under Chapter 12 and does not extend to estate tax rate calculations under the estate tax provisions, which use a hypothetical "would have been payable" credit that permits revaluation.

taxes

The plaintiff sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, claiming inability to work since 1974 due to back pain from prior surgeries. After two administrative hearings, the ALJ found the plaintiff not disabled, determining he could not perform his past machinist work but had the residual functional capacity for other unskilled sedentary jobs that existed in significant numbers in the economy, as shown by vocational expert testimony. The district court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the Secretary's decision, including the plaintiff's limited medical treatment history, inconsistent testimony about pain and daily activities, and the lack of objective evidence establishing disabling pain under applicable standards.

healthcare

This case involves former directors and officers of a failed bank seeking a declaratory judgment that two successive director and officer liability insurance policies cover negligence claims brought against them by the FDIC. The court denied summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims that the insurer failed to give proper notice of non-renewal of the 1981 policy and breached the implied covenant of good faith, finding genuine issues of material fact over whether the 1984 policy constituted a renewal. The court granted summary judgment to the insurer on claims under the 1984 policy, holding that its regulatory exclusion and insured-versus-insured exclusion unambiguously bar coverage for the FDIC action and are enforceable under Oklahoma law and federal statutes such as FIRREA.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a habeas corpus petition by a Cuban national detained as an excludable alien after arriving in the Mariel boatlift and later committing crimes in the US. The petitioner challenged his indefinite detention on statutory, due process, and international law grounds. The court denied the petition, holding that excludable aliens lack constitutional rights regarding admission and that the government has broad statutory authority to detain such individuals pending exclusion or repatriation. The court reasoned that congressional power over immigration is plenary and that international law does not override controlling domestic law or executive actions.

immigrationcivil rightsfederal power

This case involves a lawsuit brought by the Federal Trade Commission against the defendants for injunctive relief and civil penalties based on alleged violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). The defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, contending that a two-year statute of limitations applied to the action, while the FTC argued that a five-year period governed. The court denied the motion, ruling that the five-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to FTC enforcement actions under Section 704 of the ECOA. The decision rests on the statute's plain language, which confines the two-year limit to actions under Section 706, with legislative history deemed insufficient to override that text.

civil rightsprocedurefederal power

The case involved plaintiff Micro Consulting, Inc. suing its former president and employee Zubeldia and his new competing company Medex over claims of copyright infringement, trade secret misappropriation, and trademark violations related to the Claimnet electronic insurance claims processing software that Zubeldia had developed while working for Micro Consulting. Zubeldia filed a counterclaim, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial. The court ruled for the defendants, finding no liability on any claim. Its reasoning centered on the absence of evidence showing substantial similarity in any protectable expression or algorithms between Claimnet and the defendants' Uniclaim software, insufficient proof of likelihood of confusion for the Lanham Act claim, and preemption or lack of merit for the trade secret allegations.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a private bookstore suing the Board of Regents of Oklahoma State University under the Sherman Act, alleging that the university bookstore's practice of extending credit to students for textbook purchases created an unlawful monopoly. The court dismissed the complaint, holding that the Board's actions were exempt from federal antitrust laws under the state action immunity doctrine established in Parker v. Brown. The reasoning centered on the Oklahoma Constitution and statutes creating the Board as a state sovereign entity with broad authority to operate the university system, including providing necessary services like textbook credit, making the conduct an act of government rather than private anticompetitive behavior. The court emphasized that the policy was clearly articulated in state law and did not require further active supervision analysis for this state entity. Because state action immunity applied, the court did not address the defendant's Eleventh Amendment defense.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In Turley v. Mewbourne Oil Co., surface owners challenged an Oklahoma Corporation Commission order allowing additional oil and gas wells on their land, claiming that 52 O.S. § 87.2 violated due process and equal protection by denying them notice and a hearing in spacing proceedings while permitting what they viewed as a taking of their property. The court denied the requested declaratory and injunctive relief. It reasoned that the Oklahoma Surface Damages Act provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy of monetary compensation for any surface impact, so procedural due process does not require notice or participation at the spacing stage. The court further held that surface owners and mineral owners are not similarly situated, and the statute's exclusion of surface owners from spacing protests satisfies rational-basis review by promoting efficient oil and gas conservation.

propertyprocedure

This case is a declaratory judgment action brought by insurers against an insured company, seeking a ruling that their policies do not cover response and clean-up costs incurred by the EPA under CERCLA for environmental contamination. The court denied the insurers' motions for summary judgment. Oklahoma law requires insurance policy terms to be given their plain and ordinary meaning rather than a technical legal distinction between law and equity, and the policies here did not limit "damages" to exclude equitable relief or costs from property damage. The dictionary definition of damages encompasses monetary compensation for injury without such a distinction, so CERCLA clean-up expenses qualify as covered sums the insured must pay as damages resulting from property damage.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing by Amarex, Inc., which later filed over 250 adversary proceedings seeking to recover alleged preferential payments to operators of jointly owned oil and gas wells under 11 U.S.C. § 547. After confirmation of a reorganization plan merging Amarex into Temex Energy, Inc., the bankruptcy court consolidated the cases and resolved common issues including Temex's authority to pursue the claims, the applicability of the former 45-day rule in § 547(c)(2), the timing of transfers by check for the 90-day preference period, and whether operators extended new value under § 547(c)(4) by paying third-party vendors. On appeal, the district court conducted de novo review and affirmed the bankruptcy court's rulings, holding that the reorganization plan and subsequent orders preserved and authorized Temex to enforce the claims, the 45-day rule did not apply, transfers occurred upon receipt of checks, and new value was provided when operators made payments to vendors. The appeals and cross-appeal were dismissed.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with federal drug and racketeering offenses who moved to declare the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and its guidelines unconstitutional before trial. The court examined two challenges: whether Congress had improperly delegated its power to set criminal penalties to the United States Sentencing Commission, and whether the Act's placement of the Commission in the judicial branch with mandatory service by federal judges violated separation of powers. The court rejected the delegation argument, finding sufficient congressional guidance, but concluded that the Commission's location and judicial membership assigned nonjudicial functions to the judiciary in a manner that could not be severed from the statute. It therefore granted the motion in part and invalidated the guidelines on separation-of-powers grounds.

criminal lawfederal power