The case involved a dispute between South Carolina National Bank and defendant Darmstadter over a December 1978 secured loan used to finance the purchase of railroad boxcars as part of a business venture with NRUC, where the defendant alleged securities law violations and breach of fiduciary duty by the bank. The court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment, holding that the loan transaction and secured note did not constitute a security and that the bank was not a participant in any securities sale or issuance by NRUC. It further found no breach of fiduciary duties, as the bank fulfilled its obligations in an arm's length commercial loan to a sophisticated borrower. The core reasoning was that the transaction was a standard financing arrangement negotiated by the management group, with the bank's involvement limited to normal lending functions rather than investment or distribution activities under securities laws.
In Witt v. South Carolina National Bank, the plaintiff sued the defendant bank under the federal RICO statute, alleging that the bank's trust department engaged in a scheme of mail fraud by failing to disclose the true market value of assets in her revocable trust and an associated income common trust fund from 1973 to 1984. The court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment on the RICO claim. The core reasoning was that RICO requires the defendant to be distinct from the alleged enterprise, but here the trusts were administered as part of the bank's own corporate operations by its employees, creating an impermissible identity between the RICO person and the enterprises, consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent in U.S. v. Computer Sciences Corp. The plaintiff's amended complaint, which adjusted the enterprise allegations, did not overcome this issue, leading to dismissal of the federal claim and the pendent state claims without prejudice.
The case involved defendant Harold Sullivan's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' civil claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for failure to state a claim, arguing that such claims require prior criminal convictions of the predicate acts and a separate racketeering injury. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants conspired to operate an enterprise through a pattern of mail and wire fraud to deprive them of waste acid shipments and related payments. The court denied the motion, holding that the plain language of RICO, which must be liberally construed, does not impose those additional requirements and that courts lack authority to add elements not specified by Congress.
This case arose after the death of a three-year-old child from abuse by his mother's live-in boyfriend; the plaintiff sued the state and county boards of social services, claiming they violated constitutional rights by failing to adequately train protective service caseworkers to locate and investigate families suspected of child abuse, as required by state law. The court converted the defendants' motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment and granted them in favor of the boards. The core reasoning was that the state had no affirmative constitutional duty under the Due Process Clause to protect the child from private violence absent a special custodial relationship, that any alleged failure to train did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference creating liability under § 1983, and that distinctions from cases like Martinez v. California supported immunity or lack of a viable claim here.
This case involved claims of legal malpractice by plaintiffs who were stockholders and trust beneficiaries in Turner Lumber Company against defendants who were Tennessee attorneys previously retained as corporate counsel. The plaintiffs alleged errors in documents prepared for the sale of company real estate and distribution of mineral rights in South Carolina and other states. The court held that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the South Carolina long-arm statute because the attorneys had transacted business and performed contracts in the state over many years, including attending meetings and handling the 1976 transaction. However, the court dismissed the complaints of the two out-of-state plaintiffs for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), as neither they nor the defendants resided in South Carolina and the claim did not arise there.
In this case, homeowners Bobby Earl Kerr and Mildred Kellett Kerr sued State Farm after their South Carolina home was destroyed by arson in 1980, seeking recovery under a fire insurance policy covering the dwelling, contents, and living expenses. State Farm denied the claim, asserting defenses of arson involvement by the insureds and intentional submission of false claims regarding personal property losses. A jury found that the Kerrs had no role in setting the fire but had misrepresented material facts about their personal property losses. The court denied the Kerrs' post-trial motions and held that the policy's concealment-or-fraud provision did not void coverage for the real property, because South Carolina law requires a causative connection between the misrepresentation and the specific loss at issue, and the real-property loss was predetermined and distinct from the personal-property claims.