William Walter Wilkins

The case involved a dispute between South Carolina National Bank and defendant Darmstadter over a December 1978 secured loan used to finance the purchase of railroad boxcars as part of a business venture with NRUC, where the defendant alleged securities law violations and breach of fiduciary duty by the bank. The court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment, holding that the loan transaction and secured note did not constitute a security and that the bank was not a participant in any securities sale or issuance by NRUC. It further found no breach of fiduciary duties, as the bank fulfilled its obligations in an arm's length commercial loan to a sophisticated borrower. The core reasoning was that the transaction was a standard financing arrangement negotiated by the management group, with the bank's involvement limited to normal lending functions rather than investment or distribution activities under securities laws.

business & regulatory

In Witt v. South Carolina National Bank, the plaintiff sued the defendant bank under the federal RICO statute, alleging that the bank's trust department engaged in a scheme of mail fraud by failing to disclose the true market value of assets in her revocable trust and an associated income common trust fund from 1973 to 1984. The court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment on the RICO claim. The core reasoning was that RICO requires the defendant to be distinct from the alleged enterprise, but here the trusts were administered as part of the bank's own corporate operations by its employees, creating an impermissible identity between the RICO person and the enterprises, consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent in U.S. v. Computer Sciences Corp. The plaintiff's amended complaint, which adjusted the enterprise allegations, did not overcome this issue, leading to dismissal of the federal claim and the pendent state claims without prejudice.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved defendant Harold Sullivan's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' civil claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for failure to state a claim, arguing that such claims require prior criminal convictions of the predicate acts and a separate racketeering injury. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants conspired to operate an enterprise through a pattern of mail and wire fraud to deprive them of waste acid shipments and related payments. The court denied the motion, holding that the plain language of RICO, which must be liberally construed, does not impose those additional requirements and that courts lack authority to add elements not specified by Congress.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose after the death of a three-year-old child from abuse by his mother's live-in boyfriend; the plaintiff sued the state and county boards of social services, claiming they violated constitutional rights by failing to adequately train protective service caseworkers to locate and investigate families suspected of child abuse, as required by state law. The court converted the defendants' motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment and granted them in favor of the boards. The core reasoning was that the state had no affirmative constitutional duty under the Due Process Clause to protect the child from private violence absent a special custodial relationship, that any alleged failure to train did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference creating liability under § 1983, and that distinctions from cases like Martinez v. California supported immunity or lack of a viable claim here.

civil rightsfamily lawprocedure

This case involved claims of legal malpractice by plaintiffs who were stockholders and trust beneficiaries in Turner Lumber Company against defendants who were Tennessee attorneys previously retained as corporate counsel. The plaintiffs alleged errors in documents prepared for the sale of company real estate and distribution of mineral rights in South Carolina and other states. The court held that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the South Carolina long-arm statute because the attorneys had transacted business and performed contracts in the state over many years, including attending meetings and handling the 1976 transaction. However, the court dismissed the complaints of the two out-of-state plaintiffs for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), as neither they nor the defendants resided in South Carolina and the claim did not arise there.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, homeowners Bobby Earl Kerr and Mildred Kellett Kerr sued State Farm after their South Carolina home was destroyed by arson in 1980, seeking recovery under a fire insurance policy covering the dwelling, contents, and living expenses. State Farm denied the claim, asserting defenses of arson involvement by the insureds and intentional submission of false claims regarding personal property losses. A jury found that the Kerrs had no role in setting the fire but had misrepresented material facts about their personal property losses. The court denied the Kerrs' post-trial motions and held that the policy's concealment-or-fraud provision did not void coverage for the real property, because South Carolina law requires a causative connection between the misrepresentation and the specific loss at issue, and the real-property loss was predetermined and distinct from the personal-property claims.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify its policyholders in a state court lawsuit arising from an automobile accident. The accident occurred when Andrew Dawkins, the son of the named insureds living in their household, drove their car without a license or permission and struck a moped, injuring two people. The court held that Andrew qualified as an insured under South Carolina law because he was a resident relative, but ruled that the policy's exclusion for intentional acts was valid and did not violate the state's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act. The decision rested on the Act's requirement to cover only "accidents," which generally exclude intentional acts, and the public policy against insuring intentional harm. The case was set for trial on whether the act was intentional.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved Prudential Property & Casualty Co. challenging the constitutionality of the amended Plan of Operation for South Carolina's Reinsurance Facility, which apportions profits and losses among auto insurers required to cover high-risk drivers under the 1974 Automobile Reparation Reform Act. The plaintiff argued that the plan's use of facility utilization (weighted at 80%) combined with market penetration (20%) to distribute losses violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the Contracts Clause, and constituted an improper delegation of legislative power. The court rejected all claims, holding that the plan provided a reasonable mechanism for sharing the costs of insuring bad risks without creating unconstitutional disparities or other violations. It emphasized deference to the Insurance Commission's interpretations and findings, including that the plaintiff's own low rates contributed to its losses rather than the plan itself.

business & regulatorycivil rights

In this diversity action, plaintiff Singleton, an electrician employed by Huntington, sued Stevens for injuries from an electrical shock sustained while repairing high-voltage power lines at Stevens' textile mill under a contract between the two companies. Stevens moved for summary judgment on its defense that Singleton was its statutory employee under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, making that the exclusive remedy and barring the common-law suit. The court granted summary judgment to Stevens after finding no genuine factual disputes, holding that the electrical maintenance was essential to the mill's operation and thus part of Stevens' trade, business, or occupation, and that the work was not casual given the longstanding repair relationship between Huntington and Stevens. As a result, the action was dismissed with prejudice.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a personal injury claim by plaintiff Monroe, who lost his left arm in 1978 while operating a Gamble Cutter machine at a South Carolina plant. He sued Monsanto and its affiliate Hale for negligent design of the machine, after receiving workers' compensation benefits from Fovil, the plant operator at the time of the injury. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the workers' compensation bar under South Carolina law applied because Fovil, Hale, and Monsanto were essentially a single entity. The court granted the motion as to Monsanto (which the plaintiff did not oppose) but denied it as to Hale, finding based on corporate records and operations that Fovil and Hale were distinct entities with separate management, functions, and identities, so the compensation benefits from Fovil did not bar the suit against Hale.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In this case, a movie theater owner challenged the constitutionality of a South Carolina statute imposing a 20% admissions tax on X-rated and unrated films while applying only a 4% tax to Motion Picture Association of America-rated films, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (the Tax Injunction Act) barred federal jurisdiction because the plaintiff had an adequate remedy in state court. The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that no plain, speedy, and efficient state remedy existed under South Carolina's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The case was dismissed without prejudice, with instructions allowing refiling in federal court if state remedies proved unsuccessful. The decision emphasized Congress's intent to defer to state courts in tax matters and noted the availability of state procedures to challenge the tax.

civil rightstaxesfederal powerprocedure

This case involves a dispute between insurance agencies over the termination of an agency relationship and unpaid commissions under the South Carolina Automobile Reparation Act of 1974. Plaintiff, a South Carolina corporation, sued defendants in state court, after which defendants removed the action to federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that one defendant was also a South Carolina corporation, destroying complete diversity, while that defendant countered that it had been fraudulently joined solely to prevent removal. The court examined the plaintiff's claims for statutory violations and conversion under state law, determined there was an arguably reasonable basis for liability against the resident defendant, and concluded the joinder was not fraudulent. Because complete diversity was lacking, the court lacked jurisdiction and remanded the case to state court while denying plaintiff's request for costs.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved two individuals subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury who moved to require the government to affirm or deny the use of illegal wiretapping, based on their suspicions arising from hearing strange noises and clicking sounds on their phones over the past year. The court held that the government's response, consisting of inquiries to the relevant DEA, IRS, and U.S. Attorney's Office personnel who denied any wiretap evidence, satisfied the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3504, and ordered the witnesses to testify as directed. The core reasoning applied a balancing test between the need for efficient grand jury proceedings and deterring governmental misconduct, concluding that unsubstantiated and identical general allegations warranted only a conclusory government denial rather than exhaustive affidavits from all agencies.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved South Carolina National Bank, as loss payee on an automobile insurance policy issued by Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company to lessee Barry Bowen, seeking to recover after the leased Mercedes was wrecked in an accident. The insurer argued the policy had been properly cancelled for nonpayment of premiums before the accident, but the court found that no notice of cancellation was ever sent to the bank. The court held the insurer liable because it failed to prove the notice was mailed and, even if mailed, actual receipt by the lienholder was required where the policy did not specify the method of notice. Damages were calculated based on the car's fair market value immediately before the accident, minus salvage and other adjustments, resulting in a judgment for the bank of $10,736.60.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure