This case involves consolidated class action lawsuits by Thomas Domonoske and Victor Rivera against Bank of America alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act for failing to provide credit score disclosures to loan applicants "as soon as reasonably practicable." The parties reached a $9.95 million settlement after limited discovery and mediation, which the court preliminarily approved before providing class notice and holding a fairness hearing. The court decided to grant final approval of the settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) as fair, reasonable, and adequate, while also awarding class counsel $1,791,000 in attorney's fees via the percentage-of-the-common-fund method (with a lodestar cross-check), plus costs and incentive awards. The reasoning centered on the notice process, the unpredictability of liability and damages, the brevity of discovery, and application of relevant fee factors without challenges to the bank's updated procedures.
The case involved Leon Jermaine Winston's federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his three Virginia capital murder convictions and death sentences on the ground that he is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for execution under Atkins v. Virginia. Winston had defaulted the Atkins claim by not raising it at trial but asserted that his counsel's ineffective assistance excused the default. After an evidentiary hearing that included new evidence such as a 1997 IQ score of 66, the district court initially found the claim unexhausted and defaulted and denied relief, but on remand from the Fourth Circuit the court considered all evidence without deference under § 2254(d) to the state court's adjudication. The court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the outcome on the mental retardation issue. It therefore granted the writ, requiring Virginia either to conduct a trial on whether Winston is mentally retarded or to resentence him without the possibility of death.
This ERISA case involves plaintiff Michael Kenny, who has multiple sclerosis and associated mental disorders, seeking a declaratory judgment that defendant LINA wrongfully terminated a waiver of life insurance premiums under his employee benefit plan after determining he was no longer disabled. LINA had initially granted the waiver in 1997 but revoked it in 2009 based on medical reviews concluding Kenny could perform sedentary work. Both parties moved for summary judgment on a de novo review of the administrative record. The court granted Kenny's motion, finding he remains disabled under the plan's definition of inability to do any work for wage or profit, due to evidence of persistent and worsening symptoms including severe fatigability documented in physician notes, examinations, and Kenny's own records from 2006-2010.
This case is a declaratory judgment action by a tour bus company (Schrock, Inc.) and its owners, the Schrocks, against their company's motor vehicle liability insurer (Lancer), their personal auto insurer (Nationwide), and a rental car company (Hertz) to determine the amount of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage available for injuries sustained in a rental vehicle accident caused by a drunk driver. The court declared that Lancer provides no UIM coverage to the Schrocks, Nationwide provides $100,000 per person, and Hertz provides $25,000 per person subject to credits for payments from the tortfeasor's liability policy. The core reasoning is that Lancer's policy expressly excludes UIM coverage and Virginia Code § 38.2-2206 does not mandate such coverage for second-class insureds in unlisted, non-substitute rental vehicles, while the other policies' terms afford the stated limits.
This case involves a borrower suing a bank under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) seeking a declaratory judgment that he could rescind a 2007 mortgage refinancing loan more than two years after closing due to alleged disclosure violations. The plaintiff claimed the bank violated TILA by providing a postdated right-of-rescission confirmation form at closing and by failing to clearly specify the date of the final loan payment. The court granted the bank's motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part, ruling that the postdated form stated a plausible claim because it was inherently confusing to a reasonable borrower and thus did not meet TILA's clear and conspicuous disclosure standard, extending the rescission period to three years, while the payment-date allegation did not. The decision applied an objective standard to evaluate the disclosures without requiring perfect notice and focused on whether they would mislead borrowers about their rescission rights.
This diversity case involved plaintiff James Melton seeking a declaratory judgment that his employer's commercial auto insurer, Discover, was obligated to provide $1,000,000 in underinsured motorist coverage for injuries Melton sustained in a tractor-trailer accident, rather than lower limits. The court granted summary judgment to Discover and entered a declaratory judgment that the policy afforded only the minimum UM/UIM limits required by Virginia law ($25,000/$50,000 bodily injury and $20,000 property damage per accident). The core reasoning was that Fleetmaster's completed supplementary application form validly elected the statutory financial responsibility limits instead of the default coverage equal to the $1,000,000 liability limits, and that the resulting policy declarations and endorsements satisfied Virginia Code §§ 38.2-2206 and 46.2-472.