Samuel Grayson Wilson

This case involves consolidated class action lawsuits by Thomas Domonoske and Victor Rivera against Bank of America alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act for failing to provide credit score disclosures to loan applicants "as soon as reasonably practicable." The parties reached a $9.95 million settlement after limited discovery and mediation, which the court preliminarily approved before providing class notice and holding a fairness hearing. The court decided to grant final approval of the settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) as fair, reasonable, and adequate, while also awarding class counsel $1,791,000 in attorney's fees via the percentage-of-the-common-fund method (with a lodestar cross-check), plus costs and incentive awards. The reasoning centered on the notice process, the unpredictability of liability and damages, the brevity of discovery, and application of relevant fee factors without challenges to the bank's updated procedures.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Leon Jermaine Winston's federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his three Virginia capital murder convictions and death sentences on the ground that he is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for execution under Atkins v. Virginia. Winston had defaulted the Atkins claim by not raising it at trial but asserted that his counsel's ineffective assistance excused the default. After an evidentiary hearing that included new evidence such as a 1997 IQ score of 66, the district court initially found the claim unexhausted and defaulted and denied relief, but on remand from the Fourth Circuit the court considered all evidence without deference under § 2254(d) to the state court's adjudication. The court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the outcome on the mental retardation issue. It therefore granted the writ, requiring Virginia either to conduct a trial on whether Winston is mentally retarded or to resentence him without the possibility of death.

criminal lawprocedure

This ERISA case involves plaintiff Michael Kenny, who has multiple sclerosis and associated mental disorders, seeking a declaratory judgment that defendant LINA wrongfully terminated a waiver of life insurance premiums under his employee benefit plan after determining he was no longer disabled. LINA had initially granted the waiver in 1997 but revoked it in 2009 based on medical reviews concluding Kenny could perform sedentary work. Both parties moved for summary judgment on a de novo review of the administrative record. The court granted Kenny's motion, finding he remains disabled under the plan's definition of inability to do any work for wage or profit, due to evidence of persistent and worsening symptoms including severe fatigability documented in physician notes, examinations, and Kenny's own records from 2006-2010.

labor & employmenthealthcare

This case is a declaratory judgment action by a tour bus company (Schrock, Inc.) and its owners, the Schrocks, against their company's motor vehicle liability insurer (Lancer), their personal auto insurer (Nationwide), and a rental car company (Hertz) to determine the amount of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage available for injuries sustained in a rental vehicle accident caused by a drunk driver. The court declared that Lancer provides no UIM coverage to the Schrocks, Nationwide provides $100,000 per person, and Hertz provides $25,000 per person subject to credits for payments from the tortfeasor's liability policy. The core reasoning is that Lancer's policy expressly excludes UIM coverage and Virginia Code § 38.2-2206 does not mandate such coverage for second-class insureds in unlisted, non-substitute rental vehicles, while the other policies' terms afford the stated limits.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involves a borrower suing a bank under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) seeking a declaratory judgment that he could rescind a 2007 mortgage refinancing loan more than two years after closing due to alleged disclosure violations. The plaintiff claimed the bank violated TILA by providing a postdated right-of-rescission confirmation form at closing and by failing to clearly specify the date of the final loan payment. The court granted the bank's motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part, ruling that the postdated form stated a plausible claim because it was inherently confusing to a reasonable borrower and thus did not meet TILA's clear and conspicuous disclosure standard, extending the rescission period to three years, while the payment-date allegation did not. The decision applied an objective standard to evaluate the disclosures without requiring perfect notice and focused on whether they would mislead borrowers about their rescission rights.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This diversity case involved plaintiff James Melton seeking a declaratory judgment that his employer's commercial auto insurer, Discover, was obligated to provide $1,000,000 in underinsured motorist coverage for injuries Melton sustained in a tractor-trailer accident, rather than lower limits. The court granted summary judgment to Discover and entered a declaratory judgment that the policy afforded only the minimum UM/UIM limits required by Virginia law ($25,000/$50,000 bodily injury and $20,000 property damage per accident). The core reasoning was that Fleetmaster's completed supplementary application form validly elected the statutory financial responsibility limits instead of the default coverage equal to the $1,000,000 liability limits, and that the resulting policy declarations and endorsements satisfied Virginia Code §§ 38.2-2206 and 46.2-472.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involves a student, William Roach, who was struck by a vehicle while crossing a highway after exiting a school bus, leading him to sue the other driver, the bus driver, route planners, and the Botetourt County School Board for gross negligence causing his injuries. The School Board and its employees moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting sovereign immunity. The court granted the motion as to the individual employees, finding they retained immunity, but denied it as to the School Board. The reasoning was that Virginia Code § 22.1-194 abrogates a school board's sovereign immunity when its insured vehicle is involved in an accident, and the bus here qualified because its operation was a proximate cause of the collision under the statute's terms.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a breach of contract dispute between Odyssey Imaging, LLC and Cardiology Associates of Johnston, LLC over a nuclear imaging services agreement that was extended in 2009. Odyssey sued in state court for breach after Cardiology Associates attempted to terminate the contract early and demanded removal of equipment or payment of storage fees; Cardiology Associates removed the case to federal court and asserted counterclaims for breach of a purported unilateral contract and unjust enrichment, along with nineteen affirmative defenses. The court granted Odyssey's motion to dismiss the counterclaims under Rule 12(b)(6), finding they failed to plead plausible claims because there was no mutual assent to form a new contract and the unjust enrichment claim lacked supporting facts under the Twombly/Iqbal standard. It also granted in part Odyssey's motion to strike under Rule 12(f), eliminating all but two of the affirmative defenses as either not true affirmative defenses or lacking contextual comprehensibility.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a lender, Wachovia Bank, suing borrower Preston Lake Homes and guarantor Richard Hine for breach of loan agreements related to a Virginia real estate development project, seeking damages and appointment of a receiver. Preston Lake counterclaimed that Wachovia breached the loan terms in multiple ways, including by not renewing the construction loan, breached fiduciary duties, and committed fraud, while seeking consequential and punitive damages. On Wachovia's motion to dismiss the counterclaims under Rule 12(b)(6), the court held that most of the contract claims could proceed but dismissed the renewal-related claim along with the fiduciary duty and fraud claims, and enforced the contractual waiver of consequential and punitive damages. The reasoning centered on the explicit loan language granting Wachovia sole discretion over renewals, the absence of a fiduciary relationship in an arm's-length lending deal, lack of particularized allegations for fraud, and the clear waiver provision in the agreements.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a petition for a writ of coram nobis filed by Rocky Mountain Corporation, a company wholly owned by members of a family facing drug trafficking charges, seeking to challenge its guilty plea to conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The corporation argued that its plea was involuntary due to government pressure on its president, that the imposed fine and $2,000,000 forfeiture judgment exceeded statutory limits and were excessive, and that it received ineffective assistance of counsel. The court determined that Rocky Mountain had knowingly and voluntarily waived its right to collaterally attack its plea and sentence in the plea agreement, that all claims fell within the scope of the waiver, and that the claims were also without merit. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition on those grounds.

criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves Gary Dean Wallace's federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he claimed the Virginia Department of Corrections wrongfully denied him 31 days of credit toward a revoked sentence for time spent in pretrial detention on charges that were later nolle prossed. The court granted the respondent's motion to dismiss, ruling that the petition was barred by AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) because it was filed more than one year after Wallace could have discovered the factual predicate of his claim through due diligence, even using the latest date he proposed. The court further held that the petition was procedurally defaulted because Wallace's earlier state habeas petition was dismissed as untimely under Virginia Code § 8.01-654(A)(2), an adequate and independent state procedural rule that was not properly filed for tolling purposes. The decision rested on the application of federal habeas timeliness rules and exhaustion requirements without reaching the merits of the jail credit claim.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case involved a Title VII retaliation claim brought by Marilyn Session, an African-American female employee of the Montgomery County Public Schools, against the Montgomery County School Board. Session alleged that the Board retaliated against her for filing an internal grievance claiming that Superintendent Tiffany Anderson made two racially derogatory comments creating a hostile work environment. The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing that Session could not establish a prima facie case because the comments did not constitute an actual violation of Title VII and she could not have reasonably believed they did. The court granted the motion, finding that the isolated comments were insufficient to create a racially hostile working environment or give rise to an objectively reasonable belief that Title VII had been violated.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case concerned an appeal by the United States Trustee from a bankruptcy court ruling that the means-testing provision of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) for dismissing abusive filings does not apply to cases converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, because the statute refers only to cases originally filed under Chapter 7. The district court examined its own jurisdiction sua sponte and held that the bankruptcy court's denial of the Trustee's motion to dismiss was not a final order. It therefore dismissed the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), reasoning that a final judgment generally ends the litigation on the merits and that, even under the more flexible bankruptcy standard, the absence of a discharge decision or other conclusive resolution left the order interlocutory and in need of certification for review. The bankruptcy court had not yet decided whether to grant the debtor a discharge.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this consolidated case, plaintiffs Thomas Domonoske and Victor Rivera sued Bank of America under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, alleging that the bank failed to provide required credit score disclosures "as soon as reasonably practicable" after their loan applications. The parties sought provisional certification of a settlement class of approximately 3.5 million individuals, along with a proposed settlement that included a gross payment of $9.95 million, incentive awards, attorney fees, procedural changes by the bank, and an "Injunction and Consent Order" purporting to deem the bank's future conduct compliant with the FCRA. The magistrate judge recommended partial approval with modifications, but the district court found the consent order provision material to the settlement because it attempted to bind non-class members and declare rights regarding future conduct outside the class period. The court therefore denied class certification and preliminary approval of the settlement as tendered.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves the United States moving to compel Abbott Laboratories to comply with two subpoenas issued under 18 U.S.C. § 3486 as part of an investigation into potential federal health care offenses stemming from Abbott's alleged off-label marketing of Depakote and other drugs. Abbott refused on grounds that the subpoenas were unreasonable and unduly burdensome, though the government offered to narrow them to emails of three specified individuals relating to Depakote and off-label marketing from 2002 to 2008, including restoration of certain backup tapes. The court granted the motion to enforce the subpoenas as limited, holding that they were authorized for a legitimate purpose, relevant to the inquiry, sufficiently specific, and not unreasonably burdensome under Fourth Amendment standards, as Abbott had not met its burden to show otherwise. The ruling emphasized that investigative subpoenas need only be reasonably tailored and that the requested records were preserved for other litigation.

criminal lawhealthcareprocedure

This case involves plaintiff Ron Jones's claims against the McDaniels and their LLC, CorAman Properties, arising from the 2006 foreclosure sale of his residence. Jones alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and various state law claims related to the foreclosure and subsequent eviction proceedings. The court granted summary judgment to the McDaniels on the FDCPA claims, finding no material factual disputes regarding the two alleged violations within the one-year statute of limitations. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, as they involved novel issues of Virginia law and predominated over the remaining federal claims.

procedureproperty

The case involved Earnest Robert Baxter, who pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Baxter objected to his classification as an armed career criminal under the ACCA based on prior convictions, specifically arguing that his 1976 Virginia statutory burglary conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense. The court overruled the objection, concluding that the conviction constituted generic burglary under the ACCA because the indictment and court records showed he pled guilty to breaking and entering a shop with intent to commit larceny, and Virginia law interprets "shop" as a building or structure. The decision relied on the modified categorical approach, examining reliable court documents to determine that the offense met the required elements.

criminal lawguns

In United States v. Jenkins, the defendant was charged with conspiracy and obstruction of justice offenses tied to efforts to conceal assets from creditors and the government through a sham church called the Church of Healing Arts and Sciences, in connection with both a civil lawsuit and related criminal proceedings against a former corporate president. After a jury acquitted Jenkins on one conspiracy count, hung on an obstruction count, and convicted him on another conspiracy count, the district court ruled that Counts Three and Five of the indictment were defective. The court dismissed those counts without prejudice because Count Five failed to allege an essential element of conspiracy—an agreement—and Count Three was too vague to identify the specific misleading testimony at issue. The court denied Jenkins's motion for acquittal, noting that double jeopardy does not bar retrial after dismissal of a defective indictment or a hung jury absent prosecutorial misconduct.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a former police officer suing his town, police chief, and town manager under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his termination and related discipline were retaliation for speaking about his demotion to a town council member and others, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the speech was not on a matter of public concern and was therefore unprotected, and raising additional defenses of qualified immunity and lack of final policymaking authority. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding that the individual officials were entitled to qualified immunity because whether the content, form, and context of the speech positioned it as protected was at least debatable, and that the town could not be held liable under § 1983 because neither official had final policymaking authority over the termination decision.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employment

Hinkle Oil & Gas sued its former law firm Bowles Rice and four individual attorneys for tortious interference, legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion after two attorneys formed a company to bid on Kentucky oil and gas wells that Hinkle sought to acquire in a bankruptcy proceeding. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants. It found that Hinkle could not establish it lost the wells due to the attorneys' conduct, an essential element of the tortious interference, malpractice, and fiduciary duty claims, and that the evidence did not support an actionable conversion claim under West Virginia law because the rights at issue were not merged in a document. The court allowed Hinkle leave to pursue any unrelated claims.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure