District Court, D. Rhode Island — appointed by Jimmy Carter

Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp.
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1997-07-31 · cited 5×
In this case, a minority shareholder in a closely held Rhode Island real estate corporation petitioned for judicial dissolution due to irreconcilable disagreements with the controlling shareholders. Rather than dissolve the company, the corporation elected under state law to purchase the plaintiff's shares at their fair value as of the election date, February 16, 1989, triggering an appraisal-style valuation process. After years of litigation involving a special master and multiple appeals, the court adopted the special master's valuations of the company's principal real estate assets, calculated the plaintiff's one-third interest accordingly, and ordered payment of that amount plus 11% compounded interest over a three-year period with quarterly minimum payments. The court further required the corporation to provide security through a mortgage on one property and a lien on all its real estate and certain escrow funds to protect the outstanding balance. These remedies were imposed pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 7-1.1-90 and 7-1.1-90.1 to ensure the plaintiff received full and fair value without forcing liquidation.
business & regulatory
In Re Fleet/Norstar Securities Litigation
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1997-07-28 · cited 3×
This supplemental opinion addresses the award of expert witness fees and expenses to plaintiffs' counsel in a settled securities fraud class action brought by purchasers of Fleet/Norstar stock against the company and individual defendants for alleged violations of securities laws. The court evaluates the requests under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) for fairness in the context of settlement approval, applying a reasonableness and necessity standard akin to that used for attorneys' fees. It approves reduced amounts for the two experts—one for liability and accounting analysis (75% of fees plus expenses) and one for damages analysis and exhibits (60% of fees and 25% of expenses)—due to issues like inadequate time records, duplication of work, premature efforts, and excessive use of high-rate personnel. The opinion emphasizes that these determinations are integral to finalizing the global settlement of the class and related derivative actions.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Perry v. Rhode Island
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1997-07-24 · cited 6×
In Perry v. Rhode Island, court clerks and labor organizations challenged the 1994 amendments to Rhode Island's Court Clerks’ Incentive Pay statute, which changed incentive payments from a percentage of salary to a fixed amount and limited eligibility to existing employees, alleging violations of substantive and procedural due process under the U.S. and Rhode Island Constitutions as well as interference with collective bargaining agreements. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, while defendants maintained the amendments were constitutional. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, holding that the statute did not create a protected property interest sufficient to trigger substantive due process protections and that plaintiffs received adequate notice through the legislative process and their own agreements, satisfying procedural due process requirements. The opinion noted that the amendments took effect only after existing collective bargaining agreements expired.
labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. City of Central Falls
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1997-07-11 · cited 2×
The case involved a dispute between Women’s Development Corporation (WDC) and the City of Central Falls over agreements for the development of affordable housing, under which the City was to provide land at below-market value and federal grant funds, with WDC to seek reimbursement for project costs. After a change in city officials, the City terminated the contracts and WDC sued in state court alleging breach of contract and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming deprivation of a federally protected property interest; the City removed the case to federal court. The court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, holding that the contracts’ termination-for-convenience clause meant WDC had no constitutionally protected property interest in continued performance that could support a due-process claim under § 1983. The federal claim was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the remaining state-law contract claims were remanded to Rhode Island state court.
civil rightspropertyprocedure
Fratus v. Republic Western Insurance
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1997-05-29 · cited 4×
This diversity action arose after a 1985 truck accident in Rhode Island that left plaintiff Joseph Fratus a paraplegic; a jury awarded substantial damages against driver Joseph Obert and his employer American Drywall, and plaintiffs later sued their insurer Republic Western to recover under six policies plus post-judgment interest on the full verdicts. The court held that only policy RL 01000 provided coverage, obligating the insurer to pay interest on the entire judgment amount from entry in 1988 until it tendered the $25,000 limit in 1994, while the remaining five policies afforded no coverage. Coverage under the other policies was unavailable either because their policy periods did not encompass the 1985 accident date or because the named insureds faced no liability imposed by law or assumed by contract, as previously determined by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The standard interest clause in RL 01000 required payment of interest beyond the policy limit until the limit was paid or tendered.
torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure
Kevin G. v. Cranston School Committee
District Court, D. Rhode Island · 1997-05-23 · cited 3×
This case involved a dispute over the appropriate school placement for Kevin G., an 11-year-old student with medical conditions requiring a full-time nurse and educational needs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The parents challenged the Cranston School Committee's decision to place him at Gladstone School, which has a full-time nurse, rather than his neighborhood Waterman School. The court decided that the proposed educational plan was appropriate and denied the appeal. The reasoning centered on the Act's requirement for a free appropriate public education, where the child's medical safety needs justified placement away from the neighborhood school, and the school system has discretion in assigning nurses without court interference in those decisions.
civil rightsfederal powerhealthcare