Francis Joseph Boyle

In this case, a minority shareholder in a closely held Rhode Island real estate corporation petitioned for judicial dissolution due to irreconcilable disagreements with the controlling shareholders. Rather than dissolve the company, the corporation elected under state law to purchase the plaintiff's shares at their fair value as of the election date, February 16, 1989, triggering an appraisal-style valuation process. After years of litigation involving a special master and multiple appeals, the court adopted the special master's valuations of the company's principal real estate assets, calculated the plaintiff's one-third interest accordingly, and ordered payment of that amount plus 11% compounded interest over a three-year period with quarterly minimum payments. The court further required the corporation to provide security through a mortgage on one property and a lien on all its real estate and certain escrow funds to protect the outstanding balance. These remedies were imposed pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 7-1.1-90 and 7-1.1-90.1 to ensure the plaintiff received full and fair value without forcing liquidation.

business & regulatory

This supplemental opinion addresses the award of expert witness fees and expenses to plaintiffs' counsel in a settled securities fraud class action brought by purchasers of Fleet/Norstar stock against the company and individual defendants for alleged violations of securities laws. The court evaluates the requests under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) for fairness in the context of settlement approval, applying a reasonableness and necessity standard akin to that used for attorneys' fees. It approves reduced amounts for the two experts—one for liability and accounting analysis (75% of fees plus expenses) and one for damages analysis and exhibits (60% of fees and 25% of expenses)—due to issues like inadequate time records, duplication of work, premature efforts, and excessive use of high-rate personnel. The opinion emphasizes that these determinations are integral to finalizing the global settlement of the class and related derivative actions.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Perry v. Rhode Island, court clerks and labor organizations challenged the 1994 amendments to Rhode Island's Court Clerks’ Incentive Pay statute, which changed incentive payments from a percentage of salary to a fixed amount and limited eligibility to existing employees, alleging violations of substantive and procedural due process under the U.S. and Rhode Island Constitutions as well as interference with collective bargaining agreements. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, while defendants maintained the amendments were constitutional. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, holding that the statute did not create a protected property interest sufficient to trigger substantive due process protections and that plaintiffs received adequate notice through the legislative process and their own agreements, satisfying procedural due process requirements. The opinion noted that the amendments took effect only after existing collective bargaining agreements expired.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a dispute between Women’s Development Corporation (WDC) and the City of Central Falls over agreements for the development of affordable housing, under which the City was to provide land at below-market value and federal grant funds, with WDC to seek reimbursement for project costs. After a change in city officials, the City terminated the contracts and WDC sued in state court alleging breach of contract and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming deprivation of a federally protected property interest; the City removed the case to federal court. The court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, holding that the contracts’ termination-for-convenience clause meant WDC had no constitutionally protected property interest in continued performance that could support a due-process claim under § 1983. The federal claim was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the remaining state-law contract claims were remanded to Rhode Island state court.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

This diversity action arose after a 1985 truck accident in Rhode Island that left plaintiff Joseph Fratus a paraplegic; a jury awarded substantial damages against driver Joseph Obert and his employer American Drywall, and plaintiffs later sued their insurer Republic Western to recover under six policies plus post-judgment interest on the full verdicts. The court held that only policy RL 01000 provided coverage, obligating the insurer to pay interest on the entire judgment amount from entry in 1988 until it tendered the $25,000 limit in 1994, while the remaining five policies afforded no coverage. Coverage under the other policies was unavailable either because their policy periods did not encompass the 1985 accident date or because the named insureds faced no liability imposed by law or assumed by contract, as previously determined by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The standard interest clause in RL 01000 required payment of interest beyond the policy limit until the limit was paid or tendered.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the appropriate school placement for Kevin G., an 11-year-old student with medical conditions requiring a full-time nurse and educational needs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The parents challenged the Cranston School Committee's decision to place him at Gladstone School, which has a full-time nurse, rather than his neighborhood Waterman School. The court decided that the proposed educational plan was appropriate and denied the appeal. The reasoning centered on the Act's requirement for a free appropriate public education, where the child's medical safety needs justified placement away from the neighborhood school, and the school system has discretion in assigning nurses without court interference in those decisions.

civil rightsfederal powerhealthcare

In Vingi v. Rhode Island, plaintiff Deborah Vingi, a radio dispatcher for the state Department of Environmental Management, sued the State of Rhode Island and its governor alleging that repeated denials of her applications to the State Police Training Academy from 1983 to 1994 constituted employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the federal equal protection clause, and related state laws, based on her gender, purported sexual orientation, ethnicity, familial associations, and in retaliation for prior administrative charges. The U.S. District Court adopted the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation in full and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all six counts of the complaint. The core reasoning was that Vingi failed to produce evidence creating genuine issues of material fact on her disparate impact, disparate treatment, and retaliation claims; that the 1991 written examination cutoff score was not shown to be arbitrary or discriminatory; that background investigations did not violate equal protection; and that state constitutional and statutory claims were either barred by alternative remedies or unsupported by evidence of discrimination.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a patent infringement dispute between Summer Infant and Playskool over designs for baby bouncer chairs. Summer Infant claimed its patent for a disassemblable bouncer with releasably insertable frame members was infringed by Playskool's foldable bouncer under the doctrine of equivalents. A jury found infringement, but the court granted judgment as a matter of law to Playskool. The court reasoned that no reasonable jury could find the connectors equivalent because Playskool's design used permanent attachments and a folding mechanism rather than allowing disassembly of frame members.

property

The case involved consolidated class action and shareholder derivative suits alleging that Fleet/Norstar Financial Group and its officers violated securities laws by materially misrepresenting the company's financial condition and loan portfolio health amid a decline in New England real estate values, which inflated stock prices and caused losses for purchasers. The suits claimed violations of sections 10(b), 20(a), and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, along with common law claims of mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23.1 and 23(e), the court reviewed and approved the parties' proposed settlement agreement resolving both actions, while also determining awards of attorney fees to plaintiffs' counsel and directing payment of the guardian ad litem's remaining fees from the derivative action settlement fund.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Gill v. State of Rhode Island, unsuccessful independent candidates challenged numerous Rhode Island election statutes as unconstitutional for allegedly discriminating against unaffiliated and minor-party candidates in favor of Democrats and Republicans. The court narrowed review to seven representative provisions on canvassing authorities, nomination papers, primaries, ballot listings, matching public funds, and the definition of a political party. Applying the flexible standard from Burdick v. Takushi, the court held that the laws imposed only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights that were justified by legitimate state interests in fair and orderly elections, accurate ballot access, and avoiding voter confusion. Accordingly, the court declared the challenged laws constitutional and entered judgment for the defendants.

electionscivil rights

This case involved a constitutional challenge by a former employee of The Salvation Army to provisions of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and the Rhode Island Employment Security Act that exempt churches and religious organizations from paying state unemployment taxes. The plaintiff claimed the exemptions violated the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article I, § 3 of the Rhode Island Constitution. The court rejected procedural objections under the Tax Injunction Act and abstention doctrines, confirmed standing, and upheld the statutes as constitutional. It reasoned that the exemptions have a secular purpose within the unemployment compensation framework, neither advance nor inhibit religion as their primary effect, and avoid excessive government entanglement with religious organizations, consistent with longstanding historical practice.

religious libertycivil rightsfederal powertaxes

This case involved a claim under ERISA by a former Raytheon employee alleging that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, as plan administrator, wrongfully terminated her long-term disability benefits after an initial period of payments stemming from injuries in a 1991 car accident. The court first determined that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied due to the plan's grant of discretion to the administrator. Applying that standard, the court held that MetLife's termination decision was not arbitrary and capricious because it was supported by reviews from consulting physicians who found insufficient objective medical evidence of total disability, despite conflicting opinions from the plaintiff's treating doctors, and because the plaintiff repeatedly failed to provide the requested objective documentation. Judgment was entered for the defendants.

labor & employmenthealthcare

In Sousa v. North Central Life Insurance, plaintiffs John and Barbara Sousa sued the defendant insurance company under the federal RICO statute, alleging it engaged in a scheme to defraud by routinely retaining unearned premiums on credit life and disability insurance policies when borrowers paid off loans early, instead of providing automatic refunds or credits as required by the policy terms and state law. The plaintiffs also asserted several related state-law claims including fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the RICO claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that the complaint failed to allege facts showing a sufficient scheme to defraud, as there was no indication North Central had knowledge of the loan payoffs or intentionally concealed information. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims because the amount in controversy was too low for diversity jurisdiction and all federal claims had been eliminated. Final judgment was entered for the defendant.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc., the current owner of a Rhode Island site contaminated by trichloroethylene in 1969, and Kayser-Roth Corporation, the prior owner and operator at the time of the spill. After the United States sued both parties under CERCLA to recover cleanup costs, Hydro settled via a 1990 Partial Consent Decree and later sought reimbursement and contribution from Kayser-Roth in federal court. The court dismissed the complaint, holding that Hydro's claim constituted an action for contribution under CERCLA § 9613(f) rather than cost recovery under § 9607 because Hydro was itself a potentially responsible party as site owner. The action was time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations triggered by the 1990 judicially approved settlement, with the suit filed in 1994.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiffs Roma Construction Co. and developer Peter Zanni alleged that town officials in Johnston, Rhode Island, demanded and received bribes totaling $40,000 in exchange for approving permits and other actions related to residential development projects, including Oak Hill Estates and Belknap Farms; the plaintiffs had joined a partnership with the original developers and participated in making the bribe payments before filing suit. They brought federal claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with related state-law claims, seeking damages for diminished property value and other relief. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the plaintiffs' active participation in the bribery scheme broke any causal link to their alleged injuries and barred recovery under doctrines such as in pari delicto. The court also dismissed the § 1983 claim for lack of sufficient causation tied to official action independent of the plaintiffs' conduct and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. No Rule 11 sanctions were imposed.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, a shareholder sued to liquidate a Rhode Island corporation under state law after the corporation elected to buy her one-third interest at fair value, leading to a court-ordered valuation process and interim monthly payments of $10,000 to the plaintiff for her support, to be credited against the eventual purchase price. A magistrate judge later entered an order redirecting the payments into an escrow account due to liens claimed by the plaintiff's former attorneys and the IRS, but the district court granted the plaintiff's motion to vacate that order. The court held that the magistrate lacked authority to issue the escrow directive without following required procedures for a report and recommendation, that the original 1990 payment order remained in effect and could only be altered by the district judge, and that disbursement of the funds was subject to the court's determination of the stock purchase terms under the statute.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved the United States seeking reimbursement from the Rhode Island Insurers' Insolvency Fund for Medicare payments made to three beneficiaries for injuries covered by policies from an insolvent insurer. The court granted the United States' motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied the Fund's motion. The core reasoning was that the federal Medicare Secondary Payer statute preempts conflicting provisions in the state Fund Act, which required exhaustion of Medicare benefits before Fund payments and allowed deductions for Medicare amounts, because the federal law mandates that insurance entities like the Fund act as primary payers and reimburse Medicare.

healthcarefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a shareholder's action to liquidate a Rhode Island real estate corporation in which she held one-third of the stock; the corporation elected to purchase her shares instead under state law, leading to appointment of a Special Master to determine their fair value as of January 1989. After the Special Master issued an Initial Report valuing the shares at $4,413,466 and the court directed reconsideration of three properties in light of Rhode Island Supreme Court precedent on valuation methods, the Master submitted a Supplemental Report addressing those issues along with objections regarding income approaches, zoning, and comparable sales. The court accepted and adopted both reports, finding the valuations appropriate, but declined to adjust for potential tax liabilities from the buyout because no funding plan had yet been presented and such consequences remained speculative. The court further ordered the parties to brief the appropriate compound interest rate and directed the corporation to submit a detailed proposal for funding and satisfying the purchase price within 30 days.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved a Brown University medical student, Sarah Boyle, who sued the university and individual administrators alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act after she was referred to the Impaired Medical Students Committee and placed on leave of absence amid concerns about her behavior and emotional stability, without initially disclosing her chronic fatigue syndrome diagnosis; she also asserted due process violations and state-law claims for breach of confidentiality and defamation. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted the Brown defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing the federal claims and the pendent state-law claims. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff presented no evidence Brown was a government actor subject to the Due Process Clause, her ADA claim lacked merit on the record, and once the federal claims were eliminated the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.

civil rightshealthcareprocedure

This case arose from a bankruptcy adversary proceeding in which debtor Leo Tellier sought to enjoin Fleet National Bank from foreclosing on a mortgage on an apartment complex he had sold without notice to the bank, while also asserting lender liability claims against Fleet and requesting sanctions; Fleet countered with a motion for relief from the automatic stay. The Bankruptcy Court ruled for Fleet on the stay relief and lender liability issues but imposed sanctions on the bank. On appeal, the District Court sustained Fleet's challenge to the sanctions, holding that Tellier's undisclosed sale of the property constituted a default under the loan documents, that Fleet was not a fiduciary, and that continuation of foreclosure proceedings did not violate the automatic stay. The court dismissed Tellier's cross-appeal because he failed to provide a trial transcript, leaving no adequate record to review the Bankruptcy Court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard, and remanded for entry of judgment in Fleet's favor.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure