Dudley W. Windes

In Korljan v. Johnson, the administratrix of a deceased patient's estate sued a licensed naturopathic physician for negligence, gross negligence, and wanton conduct in diagnosing and treating a blood clot in the patient's leg, alleging the care led to hospitalization, surgery, and death. After a jury trial, the trial court denied the defendants' motion for a directed verdict, granted the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on liability, and submitted only damages to the jury, which awarded $1,000; it later granted a new trial on damages alone. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that conflicting expert testimony on whether the treatment met accepted standards created a factual issue precluding a directed verdict on liability. The court also ruled that the trial judge erred in excluding testimony from a qualified naturopathic expert and a cardiovascular specialist whose opinions were based on facts supported by the record.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

The case involved a contract dispute in which Temp-Rite Engineering agreed to install heating units in homes built by Chesin Construction under a written agreement that set a per-unit price of $264 and referenced a specific house plan in a subdivision. After completing work on five houses and receiving payment, the defendants terminated the arrangement and refused to allow further installations, prompting the plaintiff to sue for lost profits on additional units while the defendants counterclaimed for faulty workmanship. The trial court found the contract divisible and terminable at will by either party without cause, ruled it unambiguous, and entered judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the contract language was indefinite and ambiguous regarding its scope and duration, and therefore the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the parties' intent. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial to admit extrinsic evidence on the meaning of the contract terms.

business & regulatory

In Nyberg v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District, the plaintiff sued the defendant district and its agents after depositing $10,000 for an option to purchase personal property, which lapsed without exercise, seeking return of the deposit based on claims of collusion and misrepresentations that the deposit was not binding. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the record showed no material factual dispute, as the plaintiff admitted no collusion occurred, was aware of the contract terms requiring forfeiture under certain conditions, and could not rely on any alleged post-execution statements by the district's president. The plaintiff failed to present evidence creating an issue that would allow recovery despite the contract language.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case was a personal injury lawsuit in which plaintiff Raphael G. Rocha sued defendant Mike Lee Layton for damages from a highway accident, resulting in a $25,000 jury verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's jury instruction on contributory negligence (which used the word "may" rather than "must" regarding a verdict for the defendant), a reference to insurance during cross-examination, and an instruction allowing general damages beyond those requested in the complaint. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, ruling that the state's constitution (Art. 18, § 5) makes contributory negligence a question of fact to be decided solely by the jury in all cases, so the court could not direct a mandatory verdict and the permissive instruction was not reversible error. The court also found no basis for mistrial from the insurance reference and upheld the damages instruction.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case was a personal injury action brought by plaintiff Emo Mantovani against defendants including Patrick George Green and Basil Le Cave after an incident in which Mantovani was allegedly injured due to negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and Mantovani appealed, claiming that jury instructions on the duty to observe dangers and on contributory negligence improperly commented on the evidence, assumed disputed facts, and were mandatory in nature. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the defendants, reasoning that the absence of a trial transcript required the court to presume the instructions rested on undisputed facts, that the instructions correctly stated the law on contributory negligence without compelling the jury, and that the plaintiff's other proposed instructions were unnecessary or inadequately justified.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a pedestrian plaintiff suing a driver defendant for personal injuries sustained when the defendant's car struck him at an intersection in Phoenix. The plaintiff had been walking against a red light while the defendant had a green light, and the trial court refused a jury instruction on the last clear chance doctrine, instructed on sudden emergency, and told the jury that the plaintiff's traffic violation constituted negligence as a matter of law. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the defendant, reasoning that last clear chance requires actual discovery of the plaintiff's peril by the defendant, which was not shown here, and that the jury instructions on sudden emergency and negligence per se were appropriate while still allowing the jury to decide issues of contributory negligence.

torts & liability