Dudley W. Windes

In Korljan v. Johnson, the administratrix of a deceased patient's estate sued a licensed naturopathic physician for negligence, gross negligence, and wanton conduct in diagnosing and treating a blood clot in the patient's leg, alleging the care led to hospitalization, surgery, and death. After a jury trial, the trial court denied the defendants' motion for a directed verdict, granted the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on liability, and submitted only damages to the jury, which awarded $1,000; it later granted a new trial on damages alone. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that conflicting expert testimony on whether the treatment met accepted standards created a factual issue precluding a directed verdict on liability. The court also ruled that the trial judge erred in excluding testimony from a qualified naturopathic expert and a cardiovascular specialist whose opinions were based on facts supported by the record.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

The case involved a contract dispute in which Temp-Rite Engineering agreed to install heating units in homes built by Chesin Construction under a written agreement that set a per-unit price of $264 and referenced a specific house plan in a subdivision. After completing work on five houses and receiving payment, the defendants terminated the arrangement and refused to allow further installations, prompting the plaintiff to sue for lost profits on additional units while the defendants counterclaimed for faulty workmanship. The trial court found the contract divisible and terminable at will by either party without cause, ruled it unambiguous, and entered judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the contract language was indefinite and ambiguous regarding its scope and duration, and therefore the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the parties' intent. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial to admit extrinsic evidence on the meaning of the contract terms.

business & regulatory

In Nyberg v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District, the plaintiff sued the defendant district and its agents after depositing $10,000 for an option to purchase personal property, which lapsed without exercise, seeking return of the deposit based on claims of collusion and misrepresentations that the deposit was not binding. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the record showed no material factual dispute, as the plaintiff admitted no collusion occurred, was aware of the contract terms requiring forfeiture under certain conditions, and could not rely on any alleged post-execution statements by the district's president. The plaintiff failed to present evidence creating an issue that would allow recovery despite the contract language.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case was a personal injury lawsuit in which plaintiff Raphael G. Rocha sued defendant Mike Lee Layton for damages from a highway accident, resulting in a $25,000 jury verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's jury instruction on contributory negligence (which used the word "may" rather than "must" regarding a verdict for the defendant), a reference to insurance during cross-examination, and an instruction allowing general damages beyond those requested in the complaint. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, ruling that the state's constitution (Art. 18, § 5) makes contributory negligence a question of fact to be decided solely by the jury in all cases, so the court could not direct a mandatory verdict and the permissive instruction was not reversible error. The court also found no basis for mistrial from the insurance reference and upheld the damages instruction.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case was a personal injury action brought by plaintiff Emo Mantovani against defendants including Patrick George Green and Basil Le Cave after an incident in which Mantovani was allegedly injured due to negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and Mantovani appealed, claiming that jury instructions on the duty to observe dangers and on contributory negligence improperly commented on the evidence, assumed disputed facts, and were mandatory in nature. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the defendants, reasoning that the absence of a trial transcript required the court to presume the instructions rested on undisputed facts, that the instructions correctly stated the law on contributory negligence without compelling the jury, and that the plaintiff's other proposed instructions were unnecessary or inadequately justified.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a pedestrian plaintiff suing a driver defendant for personal injuries sustained when the defendant's car struck him at an intersection in Phoenix. The plaintiff had been walking against a red light while the defendant had a green light, and the trial court refused a jury instruction on the last clear chance doctrine, instructed on sudden emergency, and told the jury that the plaintiff's traffic violation constituted negligence as a matter of law. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the defendant, reasoning that last clear chance requires actual discovery of the plaintiff's peril by the defendant, which was not shown here, and that the jury instructions on sudden emergency and negligence per se were appropriate while still allowing the jury to decide issues of contributory negligence.

torts & liability

In State v. Hutton, the defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary and grand theft after breaking into a building and stealing a saddle from it. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of 14-15 years for burglary and 9-10 years for grand theft. The Arizona Supreme Court held that burglary and theft are separate crimes with distinct elements under A.R.S. § 13-1641, allowing punishment for both since the burglary is complete upon entry with intent and theft requires the additional act of taking the property, consistent with California precedent interpreting a similar statute. The court modified the sentences to run concurrently, however, determining that the aggregate maximum term was excessive.

criminal law

In Goff v. Guyton, the administratrix of a decedent's estate sued the Guytons to recover funds the decedent had deposited in a bank after selling property to them, claiming the money belonged to the estate; the Guytons asserted the decedent had given the funds to Mrs. Guyton as a gift inter vivos before his death. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants, finding a valid gift had occurred. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the state's Dead Man's Statute (A.R.S. § 12-2251) by allowing the Guytons to testify about transactions with the decedent, given corroborating evidence from another witness and the circumstances showing the decedent relinquished all control over the funds for three years. The court further held that the evidence supported the elements of a completed gift, including intent and delivery of possession and control.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the widow of a mining company employee who was killed in a car accident while returning from a mine site with a partner in the employing partnership. After filing and settling a wrongful death lawsuit against the partner's estate for $7,000, the widow applied for workers' compensation death benefits, asserting that her husband had been acting in the course of employment. The Industrial Commission denied the claim, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the prior lawsuit and settlement constituted an election of remedies that was inconsistent with a compensation claim because workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy against an employer for covered workplace injuries. The majority reasoned that the widow could not assert non-employment status to recover in tort and then claim employment status to obtain compensation benefits from the same incident.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Craft, the defendant was charged with and convicted of first-degree murder after shooting and killing his former wife in a restaurant following her statement that she intended to leave him; he had purchased a pistol earlier that day and was also wounded in the incident. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence on appeal. The court held that the evidence supported findings of malice aforethought and premeditation, that the trial court's jury instructions adequately covered the elements of first-degree murder without improper presumptions, and that an outburst by the victim's mother and the lack of a formal pretrial sanity hearing did not prejudice the defendant. It further found no reversible error in the giving of an additional instruction to the deadlocked jury. The ruling addressed issues of evidence sufficiency, jury instructions, courtroom disturbances, and procedural handling of mental competency.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between Oklahoma car dealers (plaintiffs) who sold a Lincoln automobile on a conditional sales contract and an Arizona car dealer (defendant Jones) who later purchased the vehicle from the original buyer. The plaintiffs delivered a title certificate falsely stating no liens existed, enabling the buyer to obtain an Oklahoma title without recording the encumbrance, after which the buyer sold the car to Jones. The trial court ruled for Jones, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs were estopped from asserting their title because they had clothed the buyer with indicia of clear ownership through their misrepresentation on the title assignment. The court applied the equitable principle that when two innocent parties must suffer a loss, it falls on the one whose act or omission made the loss possible, noting that proper disclosure of the lien would have prevented the subsequent sale.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned the constitutionality of Arizona statutes governing the placement of candidates' names on ballots. Section 16-533 required rotation of names on paper ballots to ensure equal positioning, but section 16-796 mandated alphabetical order without rotation on voting machines. A candidate whose surname placed him last alphabetically challenged the lack of rotation on machines as discriminatory under Article 2, section 13 of the Arizona Constitution, which prohibits unequal privileges or immunities. The trial court declared section 16-796 unconstitutional and ordered rotation on machines, a ruling affirmed on appeal. The court reasoned that the well-recognized advantage of top ballot positions, acknowledged by the legislature's rotation rule for paper ballots, created an unconstitutional disadvantage for some candidates when machines were used, infringing on the fundamental right to candidacy without good cause.

electionscivil rights

The case involved a car collision where Brainard sued the administrator of McLeod's estate for damages to his vehicle, alleging negligence, but without first presenting a claim to the administrator as required by statute, leading to dismissal of the complaint. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that statutes requiring presentation of claims to estate administrators (sections 14-570, 14-577, and 14-576) apply only to contract-based claims and not to unliquidated tort claims. The core reasoning relied on the statutory language limiting claims to those 'arising upon contract,' supported by precedents from California, Montana, and Oklahoma interpreting similar provisions, and distinguished a prior Arizona case as involving contractual obligations rather than torts.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned applicants who sought dispensing optician licenses from the Arizona State Board based on five years of experience or apprenticeship in non-licensing states under A.R.S. section 32-1683(d). The board declined to issue licenses without an examination and adopted a rule requiring exams for most out-of-state applicants, prompting the applicants to sue for a writ of mandamus in superior court, which ordered the licenses issued. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, ruling that mandamus could compel the board to exercise its discretion in evaluating qualifications but could not direct the result or allow the board to impose exam requirements not authorized by statute. The court reasoned that the statute committed the determination of minimum basic skills to the board's judgment based on the submitted evidence of experience, and that the board's rule amounted to unauthorized legislation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a real estate broker licensed in New Mexico but not Arizona who sued property owners for an unpaid commission on the sale of their Tucson property. The trial court awarded the broker $3,500, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. The court reasoned that the brokerage contract was formed and performed in New Mexico, so its validity is governed by New Mexico law rather than Arizona's licensing requirements for brokers operating within the state. The contract created a present obligation to pay the commission, which was not contingent on future events that did not occur.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved competing petitions to probate two alleged holographic wills of a decedent, with a sister contesting both and one petitioner contesting the other's will; after a mistrial due to a hung jury, the parties filed petitions for a special administrator. Petitioner Hendrickson moved for a change of judge based on an affidavit claiming newly discovered facts showing bias and prejudice that would prevent a fair retrial. The trial judge denied the motion as untimely without examining the facts or their discovery, proceeded with the hearing, and appointed an administrator. The Arizona Supreme Court held that when an affidavit of bias relies on after-discovered facts, its timeliness depends on when those facts were learned, and if its validity is challenged, a hearing must be held to determine whether the facts would cause a reasonable person to believe the judge is biased and whether they were subsequently discovered; until challenged, the affidavit is prima facie valid. The court issued a peremptory writ of prohibition barring further proceedings until the motion was properly resolved.

procedure

In this case, a licensed real estate broker sued property owners for breaching an exclusive listing agreement that authorized him to sell their land for $20,000 and entitled him to a five percent commission. The owners instead executed a sale contract and escrow with another buyer through a different agent, leading the trial court to enter judgment for the defendants on stipulated issues of whether a sale occurred and the measure of damages. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the binding escrow arrangement qualified as a sale that breached the exclusive agency and that the broker was entitled to recover the full $1,000 commission as damages without proving he had a ready buyer, since the owners' actions prevented performance.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a dispute between a real estate seller and its escrow agent over the seller's right to forfeit installment contracts for the sale of property after buyers missed payments. The contracts included 'time is of the essence' clauses, and the agent refused to release deeds held in escrow without additional steps to reinstate strict compliance and recalculate statutory forfeiture periods under A.R.S. § 33-741. The court held that accepting late payments before the statutory right to forfeiture had accrued did not waive the clause or require reinstatement notices, so the seller could proceed directly to forfeiture after the statutory period. However, where payments were accepted after the statutory right had accrued, creating a waiver, the seller was required to provide notice reinstating the clause, allow a reasonable cure period, and then calculate the statutory forfeiture time from the end of that period before issuing forfeiture notices. The trial court's judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part accordingly.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a petition for a writ of prohibition to stop a superior court judge from recognizing a plaintiffs' affidavit of bias and prejudice against him in a civil action seeking a receiver, injunctive relief, and an accounting. Plaintiffs had earlier requested that the initial assigned judge (Stevens) not hear the matter, and he recused without requiring a formal affidavit; after multiple reassignments, they later filed the statutory affidavit against Judge Thurman. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the informal request and acceptance of the first disqualification exhausted the one change of judge permitted under A.R.S. § 12-411, so the second affidavit was invalid and the judge must disregard it. The court reasoned that the statute's limit of one change applies whether exercised formally or informally to prevent delays and multiple substitutions, and the record should reflect such informal requests. The alternative writ was made peremptory.

procedure

The case involved an interpleader action by Best Cotton Company over $5,249.71 remaining from a joint crop loan and mortgage after sale of cotton grown by brothers Joe and Ed Lamb on separate leased farmland. Arizona Public Service Company claimed the full unpaid power bill of $3,918.93 via garnishment against Joe, while John Hay (assignee of Hanson Pump) and Ed Lamb asserted competing claims to the fund. The court held that the brothers' joint financing did not create a joint adventure or impose personal liability on Ed for Joe's debts, so Public Service took nothing; Ed and Hay's claims were to be satisfied pro rata from the fund after deducting the interpleader costs. The reasoning centered on the absence of shared profits, losses, or control between the brothers' independent operations, combined with equitable principles requiring proportional distribution when funds are insufficient.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure