Ponder v. Cartmell
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1990-02-26 · cited 16×
The case involved Dorothy Ponder's personal injury claim against bus driver Don Cartmell and bus owner Ozark Coaches after a bus accident for which liability was admitted, leaving only damages to be determined at trial. The jury awarded Ponder $25,000, but she appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the defense to introduce a letter from one of her doctors questioning the link between the accident and her breast surgery, as well as expert testimony criticizing her treating physician's decision to perform neck surgery as unnecessary. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the defense improperly introduced and used collateral evidence about the breast injury that Ponder had not placed at issue, and that expert testimony attacking the necessity of the surgery violated the rule that a plaintiff's damages are not reduced due to a treating physician's choice of treatment so long as the plaintiff exercised reasonable care in selecting the physician. The court reasoned that such evidence could improperly lead the jury to limit recovery based on whether the procedures were the best or most approved methods.
proceduretorts & liability
Smith v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1990-02-20 · cited 25×
The case involved Ronald Shane Smith, who was convicted of second-degree murder and sought permission after his notice of appeal to file a motion for a new trial in the trial court based on newly discovered evidence suggesting others were responsible for the victim's death. The court denied the motion, explaining that Arkansas Criminal Procedure Rule 37 had been abolished, that motions for new trials on newly discovered evidence must be filed within 30 days of judgment, and that a writ of coram nobis does not generally apply to newly discovered evidence except in limited circumstances like a third-party confession after trial. The court clarified that the petitioner's request was untimely and did not meet the criteria for available post-conviction relief.
criminal lawprocedure
Pickens v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1990-02-05 · cited 51×
This case involves Edward Charles Pickens's third appeal of a death sentence for a 1975 murder after prior sentences were vacated on grounds including ineffective assistance of counsel and improper limitation of mitigating circumstances. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the latest death sentence, holding that the standard jury instructions and forms for capital sentencing (AMCI 1509) are constitutional and distinguishable from the defective Maryland forms invalidated in Mills v. Maryland, as they permit consideration of non-unanimous mitigating factors. The court also upheld the exclusion of certain jurors during voir dire under the Wainwright v. Witt standard and rejected challenges to the statutory $1,000 attorney fee cap for indigent capital cases, directing that the fee be reduced to that limit while finding no due process or ineffective assistance violation on these facts. Other claims regarding jury selection and sentencing procedures were deemed meritless, with the sentence found proportionate upon review.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Brooks
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1990-02-05 · cited 10×
In State v. Brooks, the trial judge amended a forgery felony charge against the defendant to the misdemeanor offense of theft of property over the state's objection. The state appealed under a statute allowing review of such actions, seeking a declaration of error. The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed to review the matter as important to the administration of justice and declared error, reasoning that the state constitution reserves the duty of charging felonies to the grand jury or prosecutor, and the judge's amendment violated the separation of powers by encroaching on executive authority. The court cited supporting precedent emphasizing that charging decisions belong exclusively to the executive branch.
criminal lawprocedure
Hart v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1990-01-29 · cited 34×
In Hart v. State, Jimmy Hart appealed his conviction for theft by receiving and his 28-year sentence as a habitual offender, arguing that the state failed to provide sufficient independent evidence to corroborate his out-of-court statements to police as required by Arkansas law. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the trial court's denial of a directed verdict, holding that under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-111(d), corroboration of a confession requires only proof that the offense occurred (the corpus delicti), not evidence connecting the defendant to the specific crime of theft by receiving. The court distinguished this standard from the stricter corroboration needed for accomplice testimony and reasoned that the state's independent proof of the theft satisfied the requirement to prevent conviction for a nonexistent crime, without needing to establish every element like the defendant's knowledge that the property was stolen. The opinion also addressed and rejected claims regarding the admissibility of certain statements and jury instructions on sentencing ranges.
criminal lawprocedure
J. M. Mulligan's Grille, Inc. v. Aultman
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1989-12-11 · cited 10×
In this slip and fall case, Yana L. Aultman sued J. M. Mulligan's Grille after falling where a tile floor met a wooden stairway while leaving a job interview at the recently opened restaurant. Her claim rested solely on her testimony that the floor was inherently slippery due to some coating, with no evidence of defective materials or foreign substances. The trial court denied the restaurant's motion for a directed verdict, but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and dismissed, holding that Aultman failed to present substantial evidence of negligence. The court reasoned that the mere fact of slipping does not imply negligence, that possible causes are insufficient without probable ones, and that the restaurant had no duty to use any particular flooring so long as it was reasonably safe, distinguishing the case from precedents involving evidence of improper wax or treatments.
torts & liability