Darrell Hickman

The case involved Dorothy Ponder's personal injury claim against bus driver Don Cartmell and bus owner Ozark Coaches after a bus accident for which liability was admitted, leaving only damages to be determined at trial. The jury awarded Ponder $25,000, but she appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the defense to introduce a letter from one of her doctors questioning the link between the accident and her breast surgery, as well as expert testimony criticizing her treating physician's decision to perform neck surgery as unnecessary. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the defense improperly introduced and used collateral evidence about the breast injury that Ponder had not placed at issue, and that expert testimony attacking the necessity of the surgery violated the rule that a plaintiff's damages are not reduced due to a treating physician's choice of treatment so long as the plaintiff exercised reasonable care in selecting the physician. The court reasoned that such evidence could improperly lead the jury to limit recovery based on whether the procedures were the best or most approved methods.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved Ronald Shane Smith, who was convicted of second-degree murder and sought permission after his notice of appeal to file a motion for a new trial in the trial court based on newly discovered evidence suggesting others were responsible for the victim's death. The court denied the motion, explaining that Arkansas Criminal Procedure Rule 37 had been abolished, that motions for new trials on newly discovered evidence must be filed within 30 days of judgment, and that a writ of coram nobis does not generally apply to newly discovered evidence except in limited circumstances like a third-party confession after trial. The court clarified that the petitioner's request was untimely and did not meet the criteria for available post-conviction relief.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves Edward Charles Pickens's third appeal of a death sentence for a 1975 murder after prior sentences were vacated on grounds including ineffective assistance of counsel and improper limitation of mitigating circumstances. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the latest death sentence, holding that the standard jury instructions and forms for capital sentencing (AMCI 1509) are constitutional and distinguishable from the defective Maryland forms invalidated in Mills v. Maryland, as they permit consideration of non-unanimous mitigating factors. The court also upheld the exclusion of certain jurors during voir dire under the Wainwright v. Witt standard and rejected challenges to the statutory $1,000 attorney fee cap for indigent capital cases, directing that the fee be reduced to that limit while finding no due process or ineffective assistance violation on these facts. Other claims regarding jury selection and sentencing procedures were deemed meritless, with the sentence found proportionate upon review.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Brooks, the trial judge amended a forgery felony charge against the defendant to the misdemeanor offense of theft of property over the state's objection. The state appealed under a statute allowing review of such actions, seeking a declaration of error. The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed to review the matter as important to the administration of justice and declared error, reasoning that the state constitution reserves the duty of charging felonies to the grand jury or prosecutor, and the judge's amendment violated the separation of powers by encroaching on executive authority. The court cited supporting precedent emphasizing that charging decisions belong exclusively to the executive branch.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hart v. State, Jimmy Hart appealed his conviction for theft by receiving and his 28-year sentence as a habitual offender, arguing that the state failed to provide sufficient independent evidence to corroborate his out-of-court statements to police as required by Arkansas law. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the trial court's denial of a directed verdict, holding that under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-111(d), corroboration of a confession requires only proof that the offense occurred (the corpus delicti), not evidence connecting the defendant to the specific crime of theft by receiving. The court distinguished this standard from the stricter corroboration needed for accomplice testimony and reasoned that the state's independent proof of the theft satisfied the requirement to prevent conviction for a nonexistent crime, without needing to establish every element like the defendant's knowledge that the property was stolen. The opinion also addressed and rejected claims regarding the admissibility of certain statements and jury instructions on sentencing ranges.

criminal lawprocedure

In this slip and fall case, Yana L. Aultman sued J. M. Mulligan's Grille after falling where a tile floor met a wooden stairway while leaving a job interview at the recently opened restaurant. Her claim rested solely on her testimony that the floor was inherently slippery due to some coating, with no evidence of defective materials or foreign substances. The trial court denied the restaurant's motion for a directed verdict, but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and dismissed, holding that Aultman failed to present substantial evidence of negligence. The court reasoned that the mere fact of slipping does not imply negligence, that possible causes are insufficient without probable ones, and that the restaurant had no duty to use any particular flooring so long as it was reasonably safe, distinguishing the case from precedents involving evidence of improper wax or treatments.

torts & liability

The case involved Construction Engineers, Inc. (CEI), the lowest bidder on a municipal water treatment plant expansion contract operated by Conway Corporation, suing the Corporation, its directors, manager, and engineer after the contract was awarded to the second-lowest bidder. CEI alleged the rejection violated competitive bidding laws and constituted tortious interference with its business expectancy. The trial court found the rejection arbitrary and in bad faith, awarding CEI lost profits and other relief. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and dismissed, holding that the evidence showed the Corporation had discretion to reject the lowest bid based on concerns about CEI's past performance and ability to complete the project on time, and that the decision was made in good faith rather than arbitrarily.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned whether Mid-South Beverages' complaint adequately stated a claim for the tort of interference with contractual relationships or business expectancies against Forrest City Grocery. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, reasoning that no contract existed between the two companies. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, explaining that the complaint alleged the required elements—an exclusive bottling agreement with Pepsi, the defendant's knowledge and willful sales in the territory inducing customer loss, and resulting damages—and that no direct contractual tie between the parties was necessary. The court further held that even if dismissal were warranted, it should not have been with prejudice.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Brandon v. State, the defendant, who was serving a suspended sentence for a prior burglary, was charged with new burglary and theft offenses involving the home of Mr. and Mrs. A. B. Heard; the state also sought to revoke the suspended sentence. After a hearing, the trial court found that Brandon had violated a condition of his suspension and imposed a twenty-year prison term. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the revocation, holding that a preliminary revocation hearing was not required because Brandon had been arrested for committing a new criminal offense, that other procedural claims were either unpreserved or without merit, and that the evidence was sufficient to prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Rick Logan appealing his life sentence for raping a 17-year-old mentally retarded student at the Sunshine School where Logan worked as an employee. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting eight claims including requests for change of venue due to publicity, challenges to the victim's competency to testify, disputes over jury panel selection and peremptory challenges, and objections to expert testimony on the victim's condition. The court relied on its prior rulings in related cases against Logan, held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in voir dire and jury matters, and found no evidence that jurors were biased or unable to follow instructions on burden of proof. The dissent argued that one juror should have been excused for cause due to her statements shifting the burden of proof.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a professional malpractice claim by Ford's Inc. and related parties against their accounting firm, Russell Brown & Company, alleging that erroneous advice on a tax-free corporate liquidation in 1974 led to an IRS assessment of over $648,000 in additional taxes and interest. The trial court granted summary judgment to the accountants, ruling that the suit was barred by Arkansas's three-year statute of limitations under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed. The court held that the limitations period began running no later than the date of the erroneous advice in August 1974, or at the latest when the clients received notice of the deficiency in January 1978; even assuming fraudulent concealment until the accountants conceded the error in September 1978, the September 1981 filing remained untimely. The opinion rejected arguments for delaying accrual until the final IRS assessment in October 1978 and noted that the plaintiffs had not properly pleaded concealment in their complaint.

torts & liabilitytaxesprocedurebusiness & regulatory

Quinn Companies, Inc. sued Herring-Marathon Group, Inc. after being discharged from two property management contracts for a hotel and office complex, alleging that the discharge involved willful and malicious conduct amounting to tortious breach of contract and seeking damages. A jury awarded Quinn $236,806, but the trial court set the verdict aside on the grounds that it lacked evidentiary support and rested on speculative damages. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the state does not recognize a tortious breach of contract cause of action and declines to extend the tort of bad faith beyond insurance contracts, because a breach of contract—even if motivated by malice—remains a contract claim rather than an independent tort.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned Johnny Lee Hill's conviction for first-degree murder in the strangulation death of Gary Sturdivant, whose body was found bound in his mobile home with several items and his car missing. Hill challenged the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence linking him to the crime and the validity of a vehicle search that uncovered the victim's belongings. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and life sentence, reasoning that Hill's possession of the victim's car shortly after the murder, his inconsistent statements about acquiring it, and his use of the victim's credit card provided substantial evidence from which the jury could conclude he committed or participated in the murder. The court also found the search lawful based on consent and probable cause from license plate discrepancies.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was the second appeal in a medical malpractice action against a doctor and clinic, in which the plaintiff challenged the trial court's use of AMI 1501 to instruct the jury on a physician's duty of care. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the defense verdict, holding that the objection was barred by the law of the case doctrine. The court reasoned that the medical malpractice statute had been in effect at the first trial, so the plaintiff could have raised the alleged conflict with the model instruction then but did not, and all issues that were or could have been presented in the initial appeal are precluded in later appeals.

torts & liabilityprocedure

Taxpayers of Sewer Improvement District #142 sued the district's commissioners to recover funds they claimed were wrongfully spent on two contracts in 1980. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by the statute of limitations, but the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal on other grounds. The court noted that the statute might have been tolled due to the commissioners' delayed filing of required expenditure reports, which could amount to constructive fraud, yet held that the claims were precluded because the issues about the commissioners' interest in the contracts had already been litigated or could have been raised in two prior lawsuits between the same parties. The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata therefore prevented relitigation of those issues.

procedurepropertytaxes

The case involved Dorsey McRae White's convictions on six counts of marijuana possession with intent to deliver and one count of criminal use of a sawed-off shotgun. White appealed, arguing he was entrapped by an undercover operation in which a confidential informant and officer induced the sales through a story about needing marijuana for a sick preacher. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that entrapment was a factual question for the jury under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-209(b) and that evidence of White's multiple sales and predisposition supported the jury's rejection of the defense. The court also upheld the intent-to-deliver finding on the small quantity of marijuana seized, based on White's other transactions and testimony that the drugs were not for personal use.

criminal law

Arthur Jurney was convicted of second-degree battery and rape of his mother and sentenced to six years imprisonment plus a fine and life imprisonment. On appeal he challenged the convictions on four grounds: the lack of a record of two pretrial hearings, the denial of a court-appointed psychiatrist to evaluate the victim's competency, the refusal to release him on his own recognizance during a fourteen-month pretrial detention, and the admission of the victim's testimony about his prior violent acts. The court affirmed both convictions, holding that the record was properly settled after remand, the defendant presented no evidence to support a psychiatric examination, the speedy-trial period was not exceeded and no prejudice was shown, and the defense obtained the relief it requested when objections to the testimony were sustained.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a civil lawsuit arising from an automobile collision in which the plaintiff Oxford was injured by a truck driven by defendant Hamilton, a dealer for Snap-On Tools. The jury apportioned negligence 90% to Oxford and 10% to Hamilton, leading to a verdict for the defendants, after which Oxford appealed several evidentiary rulings and the dismissal of Snap-On on summary judgment. The court affirmed the verdict, holding that Oxford's blood alcohol test result was admissible because it was not a confidential communication protected by the physician-patient privilege under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, that his medical records regarding alcoholism were relevant to assessing life expectancy for damages, and that a mistrial was not required for a single remark about a witness threat. The summary judgment issue was deemed moot given the jury's finding of no liability for Hamilton.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved John Russell Lee, who was convicted in Arkansas of manufacturing a controlled substance, specifically methamphetamine, and sentenced to 40 years imprisonment and a $75,000 fine after a laboratory was discovered in his sister's house following a fatal incident. Lee appealed on multiple grounds, including alleged improper prosecutorial comments in closing arguments, restrictions on a character witness's testimony about a prior conviction, and the amendment of the charging information to allege complicity with another individual. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding all arguments meritless due to procedural defaults such as failure to abstract relevant portions of the record, lack of timely objections, and the trial court's appropriate exercise of discretion under evidentiary rules. The court also noted that amendments to the information were permissible as they did not change the nature of the offense or prejudice the defendant.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a civil battery claim in which plaintiff Smith sued defendant Whitlock after Whitlock struck him in the face during an altercation at a bar in Dallas, fracturing Smith's cheekbone and causing him to miss work. A jury awarded Smith $24,414 in damages after finding the blow was unprovoked, and Whitlock appealed on three grounds. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial judge's limited questions to an eyewitness did not constitute an improper comment on the evidence under the Arkansas Constitution, that the case was purely one of battery rather than negligence so no comparative-fault instruction was required, and that the argument about a verdict by lot could not be reviewed because the verdict form was not included in the abstract. The decision rested on established precedents regarding judicial discretion in witness examination, the distinction between intentional torts and negligence, and appellate procedural rules.

torts & liabilityprocedure