Webster Lee Hubbell

This case involved Barry Lee Fairchild's conviction for the capital murder, kidnapping, robbery, and rape of Marjorie Mason in Lonoke County, Arkansas, for which he received a death sentence. Fairchild appealed on multiple grounds, including claims of an unfair jury selection process that excluded certain jurors, improper venue in Lonoke County rather than Pulaski County, the unconstitutionality of the Arkansas death penalty statute, and the admission of graphic photographs of the victim. The court reviewed the entire record and all raised issues under applicable procedural rules, finding no prejudicial errors in the jury selection, venue determination, evidentiary rulings, or constitutional challenges. It held that the death penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment, that the affirmative defense provision does not improperly shift the burden of proof, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. The court therefore affirmed the conviction and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the enforceability of a restrictive covenant, incorporated by reference in a deed to unplatted property, that barred temporary structures such as trailers or mobile homes from being used for human habitation. The buyer placed a mobile home on the land and sought a declaratory judgment that the restriction was ineffective; the chancellor ruled that a general plan of development existed and enforced the covenant against her. On appeal, the court reversed, concluding that substantial inconsistencies in the restrictions appearing in other deeds for parcels in the same area demonstrated the absence of any uniform general plan, so the covenant could not be enforced.

property

In Gaylor v. State, the appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, theft, and being a felon in possession of a firearm after police entered his home without a warrant, found incriminating evidence in plain view, and arrested him. The court affirmed the convictions and the denial of the motion to suppress the evidence. It held that the officers had probable cause for the arrest based on the suspect matching the description of a former employee who needed money shortly after an armed robbery of a former workplace. The court further found exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into the home, including the gravity of the offense, the recent timing of the crime, belief that the suspect was armed, and indications he was inside, allowing a search incident to the lawful arrest under state rules.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Keith Smith Co. suing Miller's Mutual Insurance for damages to its chicken houses after a loss, initially claiming $95,000 and later amending the amount to $112,500 following a related test case decision. Miller's Mutual confessed judgment for the final amount but contested liability for the statutory 12% penalty and attorneys' fees under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-3238. The trial court awarded the penalty plus $38,000 in fees, which the Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed on appeal. The court affirmed the penalty and fees in principle, holding that the insurer had a reasonable opportunity to pay the correct amount earlier and thus could not avoid the statutory consequences by later confessing judgment, but it reversed the fee amount as excessive and reduced it to $14,904 plus $1,500 for appellate work based on hourly rates, time spent, and customary charges. The decision turned on strict construction of the penal statute and the requirement that plaintiffs recover the exact claimed amount to qualify for penalties.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Wilson v. Evans, a personal injury case arising from two automobile accidents, the plaintiff claimed damages from a second collision that occurred over five months after the first accident caused by the defendant, alleging the later incident resulted from blackout spells traceable to the initial crash. After a prior reversal and remand, the trial court awarded the plaintiff $35,000. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, ruling that the defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of the second accident's injuries because the extended time gap and the plaintiff's decision to continue driving despite known vertigo introduced an intervening cause. The court further held that evidence of the second accident was therefore inadmissible, as reasonable minds could not differ on the absence of proximate causation.

torts & liability

The case involved heirs of Mills O. Pierce challenging the validity of his will, deed, and two trusts, alleging he lacked mental capacity and was subject to undue influence by neighbors Delma and Ann Dunn. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision upholding the documents as valid. The court reasoned that the challengers failed to prove lack of capacity or undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence, citing testimony from the drafting attorney, physician, and banker regarding Pierce's competence and independent decision-making, and found the deed supported by consideration through the promise and provision of care.

propertyfamily lawprocedure