
Fairchild v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-12-21 · cited 38×
This case involved Barry Lee Fairchild's conviction for the capital murder, kidnapping, robbery, and rape of Marjorie Mason in Lonoke County, Arkansas, for which he received a death sentence. Fairchild appealed on multiple grounds, including claims of an unfair jury selection process that excluded certain jurors, improper venue in Lonoke County rather than Pulaski County, the unconstitutionality of the Arkansas death penalty statute, and the admission of graphic photographs of the victim. The court reviewed the entire record and all raised issues under applicable procedural rules, finding no prejudicial errors in the jury selection, venue determination, evidentiary rulings, or constitutional challenges. It held that the death penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment, that the affirmative defense provision does not improperly shift the burden of proof, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. The court therefore affirmed the conviction and sentence.
criminal lawprocedure
Harbour v. NORTHWEST LAND CO. INC.
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-12-21 · cited 20×
The case concerned the enforceability of a restrictive covenant, incorporated by reference in a deed to unplatted property, that barred temporary structures such as trailers or mobile homes from being used for human habitation. The buyer placed a mobile home on the land and sought a declaratory judgment that the restriction was ineffective; the chancellor ruled that a general plan of development existed and enforced the covenant against her. On appeal, the court reversed, concluding that substantial inconsistencies in the restrictions appearing in other deeds for parcels in the same area demonstrated the absence of any uniform general plan, so the covenant could not be enforced.
property
Gaylor v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-12-17 · cited 21×
In Gaylor v. State, the appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, theft, and being a felon in possession of a firearm after police entered his home without a warrant, found incriminating evidence in plain view, and arrested him. The court affirmed the convictions and the denial of the motion to suppress the evidence. It held that the officers had probable cause for the arrest based on the suspect matching the description of a former employee who needed money shortly after an armed robbery of a former workplace. The court further found exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into the home, including the gravity of the offense, the recent timing of the crime, belief that the suspect was armed, and indications he was inside, allowing a search incident to the lawful arrest under state rules.
criminal lawprocedure
Miller's Mutual Insurance v. Keith Smith Co.
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-12-03 · cited 18×
The case involved Keith Smith Co. suing Miller's Mutual Insurance for damages to its chicken houses after a loss, initially claiming $95,000 and later amending the amount to $112,500 following a related test case decision. Miller's Mutual confessed judgment for the final amount but contested liability for the statutory 12% penalty and attorneys' fees under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-3238. The trial court awarded the penalty plus $38,000 in fees, which the Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed on appeal. The court affirmed the penalty and fees in principle, holding that the insurer had a reasonable opportunity to pay the correct amount earlier and thus could not avoid the statutory consequences by later confessing judgment, but it reversed the fee amount as excessive and reduced it to $14,904 plus $1,500 for appellate work based on hourly rates, time spent, and customary charges. The decision turned on strict construction of the penal statute and the requirement that plaintiffs recover the exact claimed amount to qualify for penalties.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Wilson v. Evans
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-11-19 · cited 15×
In Wilson v. Evans, a personal injury case arising from two automobile accidents, the plaintiff claimed damages from a second collision that occurred over five months after the first accident caused by the defendant, alleging the later incident resulted from blackout spells traceable to the initial crash. After a prior reversal and remand, the trial court awarded the plaintiff $35,000. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, ruling that the defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of the second accident's injuries because the extended time gap and the plaintiff's decision to continue driving despite known vertigo introduced an intervening cause. The court further held that evidence of the second accident was therefore inadmissible, as reasonable minds could not differ on the absence of proximate causation.
torts & liability
Rose v. Dunn
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-11-13 · cited 70×
The case involved heirs of Mills O. Pierce challenging the validity of his will, deed, and two trusts, alleging he lacked mental capacity and was subject to undue influence by neighbors Delma and Ann Dunn. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision upholding the documents as valid. The court reasoned that the challengers failed to prove lack of capacity or undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence, citing testimony from the drafting attorney, physician, and banker regarding Pierce's competence and independent decision-making, and found the deed supported by consideration through the promise and provision of care.
propertyfamily lawprocedure
Matter of Estate of Epperson
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-11-13 · cited 28×
The case concerned whether Carolyn Epperson, married to Buel Epperson for less than one year before his death, could elect dower rights against his preexisting will that left his estate to a trust benefiting his former spouse and children. The probate court had ruled that Ark. Stat. Ann. § 60-501, which bars a surviving spouse from taking against a will unless married for over a year, conflicted with other dower statutes, did not apply to predating wills, and violated equal protection. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed, holding that the statute is constitutional because it rationally furthers the legitimate goal of discouraging deathbed marriages, does not conflict with intestacy dower provisions, and applies regardless of when the will was executed. The court remanded for further proceedings on related issues not decided below.
family lawcivil rightsproperty
Baldwin-United Corp. v. Garner
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-10-22 · cited 5×
This case involves an appeal by Baldwin-United Corporation and D. H. Baldwin Company from an Arkansas circuit court order that approved a Plan of Rehabilitation for three insurance company subsidiaries and denied the parents' motion to amend it. The subsidiaries had been placed in rehabilitation after issuing single premium deferred annuities, with the plan including an injunction channeling all claims against their assets exclusively to the rehabilitation court and setting specific interest crediting rates for policyholders. The appellants contended that the court erred in asserting exclusive jurisdiction over claims and that the plan's rates overcompensated policyholders relative to what they would have received absent the companies' financial difficulties. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that centralized jurisdiction was essential to an orderly and efficient rehabilitation and that the crediting rates had a reasonable basis in the record and were not clearly erroneous.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Sellers v. West-Ark Construction Co.
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-10-08 · cited 8×
In this case, West-Ark Construction Co. sued Don Sellers and Carl Winn for fraud after completing an apartment project, alleging that the owners had promised to pay the full loan amount of $260,000 if the contractor rebated the $25,000 land cost, despite a lower written contract price. A jury awarded the contractor actual damages for misrepresentation, punitive damages, and additional compensation for site work. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, rejecting arguments that cashing a final payment check waived the fraud claim, that a higher burden of proof applied, that parol evidence was improperly admitted, and that other evidentiary and instructional errors occurred. The court held that waiver was not properly pled, the preponderance standard was correct for jury trials, parol evidence is admissible to prove fraud, and no prejudice was shown from excluded evidence, while quasi-contract recovery was permissible where the written contract was unclear.
business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure
Jackson v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-10-01 · cited 10×
The case involved appellant Billy Ray Jackson's convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of valium, and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use, for which he received consecutive sentences as a habitual offender. Jackson appealed the trial court's refusal to quash the search warrant, suppress the seized evidence (including five pounds of marijuana found in his vehicle), and compel disclosure of a confidential informant, arguing that the warrant affidavit was insufficient and based on an unreliable informant with minor date discrepancies. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the affidavit satisfied both the totality-of-the-circumstances test from Illinois v. Gates and the stricter Aguilar v. Texas two-pronged test due to the informant's past reliability in producing convictions and the corroboration from controlled purchases and surveillance. The court further held that disclosure of the informant was not required because the charges were limited to possession with intent rather than actual delivery and the informant had not participated in the charged offenses.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Brown
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-10-01 · cited 34×
The case involved a defendant charged with driving while intoxicated as a fourth offense under Arkansas Act 549 of 1983. The trial court suppressed evidence of three prior DWI convictions obtained without counsel, citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, refused to allow the state to amend the charge to a first offense, and dismissed the case. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the suppression because uncounseled misdemeanor convictions cannot be used to enhance punishment to a longer prison term, but reversed the denial of the amendment, interpreting the statute's bar on reducing charges as applying only to changes in the offense type such as to reckless driving rather than to the number of prior offenses, and noting that amendments are allowed when they do not alter the nature or degree of the alleged offense.
criminal lawprocedure
McQueen v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-09-17 · cited 19×
The case involved two defendants, McQueen and Kelly, who were separately tried and convicted in Arkansas state court on multiple counts of aggravated robbery and theft of property stemming from a series of armed robberies of convenience stores and gas stations in early 1983. McQueen appealed his convictions, arguing that his confession lacked sufficient corroboration by independent evidence, while Kelly challenged the admission of cash seized from his home during a search. The court affirmed both convictions, holding that the victims' testimony and circumstantial evidence such as recovered clothing, weapons, and a matching vehicle satisfied the corroboration requirement for McQueen's confession, and that the cash was properly admitted under the plain view doctrine because its incriminating nature was immediately apparent to officers executing a valid warrant.
criminal lawprocedure
Lair v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1984-09-17 · cited 11×
In Lair v. State, the defendant was convicted by a jury of burglary and attempted rape after forcing entry into a victim's home, assaulting her, and attempting to rape her before fleeing. On appeal, he challenged the denial of a mistrial motion based on a prosecutor's comment during voir dire about potential sentencing, the admission of his statement implying prior similar acts, and the trial court's refusal to give jury instructions allowing options like probation or fines. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the prosecutor's remark caused no prejudice, the statement was admissible as part of the res gestae and relevant to intent under the Price test, and sentencing options like probation are for the court rather than the jury under state statutes and precedent. The court found no abuse of discretion in the evidentiary or instructional rulings.
criminal lawprocedure