Dale Price

This case involved two 13-year-old girls charged as juvenile delinquents for bringing a handgun onto school property in violation of Arkansas criminal statutes. The girls argued they could not be guilty because the pistol was missing parts including the hammer and firing pin, rendering it inoperable and outside the statutory definition of a handgun as one capable of firing rimfire or centerfire ammunition. The juvenile court found both girls guilty, with one adjudicated for the felony of possessing a handgun on school property and the other for the misdemeanor of a minor in possession. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute's definition turns on whether the firearm was designed to fire the specified ammunition rather than whether it was immediately operable at the time of possession. The court reasoned that the legislature's clear intent to promote school safety would be undermined by requiring current operability, as missing parts could be readily replaced.

gunscriminal law

The case concerned whether a prior federal court judgment against David Taylor on his oil and gas lease claims operated as res judicata to bar his participation in a later Arkansas state class action suit seeking similar relief on those and related leases. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that Taylor's claims were barred, reversing the chancellor's denial of summary judgment to the gas companies and ruling that he could not participate in the class settlement. The court reasoned that res judicata precludes not only issues actually litigated but also those that could have been raised in the federal action, noting that twelve of Taylor's leases were directly at issue there and the thirteenth (Stubblefield) existed and was producing at the time yet was omitted. The opinion applied the doctrine to prevent claim-splitting, drawing on precedents and the Restatement of Judgments.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

This case was a medical malpractice action brought by George Taylor against oral surgeon James Phillips alleging negligent care and treatment of a jaw fracture that occurred in September 1987, including failure to properly advise about healing issues and to treat according to accepted standards. The trial court dismissed the October 1989 suit as barred by Arkansas's two-year statute of limitations, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, applying the continuous treatment doctrine. The court reasoned that because Phillips continued to treat and monitor Taylor's jaw condition, including brace adjustments and consultations through December 1987, the limitations period did not begin to run until that course of treatment ended.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

Kenneth Traylor was convicted of breaking or entering, theft of property, and felon in possession of a firearm, and sentenced to a $20,000 fine plus 60 years in prison as a habitual offender based on prior felony convictions. On appeal, he challenged the use of his prior convictions both to establish the felon-in-possession offense and to enhance his sentence, the state's amendment of the information on the day of trial to add the habitual-offender allegation, the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence linking him to the crimes, and the denial of his request to testify before the jury during the sentencing phase. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the habitual-offender statute does not create double jeopardy, that Traylor received adequate notice and showed no prejudice from the amendment, that the bolt-cutter and sales evidence constituted substantial evidence of guilt, and that the statute expressly requires the hearing on prior convictions to occur outside the jury's presence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Ruth Anderson's lawsuit against First National Bank, the executor of her late husband's estate, alleging breach of fiduciary duty for failing to hire the will's drafter as attorney, refusing to defend the will against a contest, pressuring her into a family settlement agreement, and tortious interference with her inheritance. The trial court granted summary judgment to the bank, finding no genuine issues of material fact. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that Anderson failed to meet proof with proof on key elements such as the existence of any agreement to retain a specific attorney or evidence of coercion by the bank, as bank officials' affidavits went unrebutted and she acknowledged understanding and benefiting from the settlement. The court also noted that the bank had addressed the inheritance interference claim in its summary judgment filings.

family lawpropertyproceduretorts & liability

In Fariss v. State, the appellant was charged with incest after a juvenile court proceeding in which the Arkansas Department of Human Services failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his adopted daughter was dependent-neglected due to sexual abuse. The appellant moved to dismiss the criminal information, arguing that the prior civil adjudication barred prosecution under double jeopardy, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the civil dependent-neglect proceeding was not essentially criminal and thus did not implicate double jeopardy protections against multiple punishments or successive prosecutions. The court further reasoned that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the two actions involved the same claims, parties or privies, or that any factual issues essential to the incest charge had been decided in the prior proceeding, as no transcript of the civil hearing was provided.

criminal lawprocedure