Dale Price

This case involved two 13-year-old girls charged as juvenile delinquents for bringing a handgun onto school property in violation of Arkansas criminal statutes. The girls argued they could not be guilty because the pistol was missing parts including the hammer and firing pin, rendering it inoperable and outside the statutory definition of a handgun as one capable of firing rimfire or centerfire ammunition. The juvenile court found both girls guilty, with one adjudicated for the felony of possessing a handgun on school property and the other for the misdemeanor of a minor in possession. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute's definition turns on whether the firearm was designed to fire the specified ammunition rather than whether it was immediately operable at the time of possession. The court reasoned that the legislature's clear intent to promote school safety would be undermined by requiring current operability, as missing parts could be readily replaced.

gunscriminal law

The case concerned whether a prior federal court judgment against David Taylor on his oil and gas lease claims operated as res judicata to bar his participation in a later Arkansas state class action suit seeking similar relief on those and related leases. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that Taylor's claims were barred, reversing the chancellor's denial of summary judgment to the gas companies and ruling that he could not participate in the class settlement. The court reasoned that res judicata precludes not only issues actually litigated but also those that could have been raised in the federal action, noting that twelve of Taylor's leases were directly at issue there and the thirteenth (Stubblefield) existed and was producing at the time yet was omitted. The opinion applied the doctrine to prevent claim-splitting, drawing on precedents and the Restatement of Judgments.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

This case was a medical malpractice action brought by George Taylor against oral surgeon James Phillips alleging negligent care and treatment of a jaw fracture that occurred in September 1987, including failure to properly advise about healing issues and to treat according to accepted standards. The trial court dismissed the October 1989 suit as barred by Arkansas's two-year statute of limitations, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, applying the continuous treatment doctrine. The court reasoned that because Phillips continued to treat and monitor Taylor's jaw condition, including brace adjustments and consultations through December 1987, the limitations period did not begin to run until that course of treatment ended.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

Kenneth Traylor was convicted of breaking or entering, theft of property, and felon in possession of a firearm, and sentenced to a $20,000 fine plus 60 years in prison as a habitual offender based on prior felony convictions. On appeal, he challenged the use of his prior convictions both to establish the felon-in-possession offense and to enhance his sentence, the state's amendment of the information on the day of trial to add the habitual-offender allegation, the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence linking him to the crimes, and the denial of his request to testify before the jury during the sentencing phase. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the habitual-offender statute does not create double jeopardy, that Traylor received adequate notice and showed no prejudice from the amendment, that the bolt-cutter and sales evidence constituted substantial evidence of guilt, and that the statute expressly requires the hearing on prior convictions to occur outside the jury's presence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Ruth Anderson's lawsuit against First National Bank, the executor of her late husband's estate, alleging breach of fiduciary duty for failing to hire the will's drafter as attorney, refusing to defend the will against a contest, pressuring her into a family settlement agreement, and tortious interference with her inheritance. The trial court granted summary judgment to the bank, finding no genuine issues of material fact. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that Anderson failed to meet proof with proof on key elements such as the existence of any agreement to retain a specific attorney or evidence of coercion by the bank, as bank officials' affidavits went unrebutted and she acknowledged understanding and benefiting from the settlement. The court also noted that the bank had addressed the inheritance interference claim in its summary judgment filings.

family lawpropertyproceduretorts & liability

In Fariss v. State, the appellant was charged with incest after a juvenile court proceeding in which the Arkansas Department of Human Services failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his adopted daughter was dependent-neglected due to sexual abuse. The appellant moved to dismiss the criminal information, arguing that the prior civil adjudication barred prosecution under double jeopardy, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the civil dependent-neglect proceeding was not essentially criminal and thus did not implicate double jeopardy protections against multiple punishments or successive prosecutions. The court further reasoned that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the two actions involved the same claims, parties or privies, or that any factual issues essential to the incest charge had been decided in the prior proceeding, as no transcript of the civil hearing was provided.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over ownership of mineral rights to 280 acres in Pope County, Arkansas, where the Killam family claimed superior title based on an unrecorded 1943 deed compared to the Cosden family's later recorded interest, and sought to hold oil companies TXO and Mueller liable for trespass after they leased from the Cosdens. The court affirmed the chancellor's ruling that the Killams owned the mineral rights and that TXO and Mueller were not bona fide purchasers without notice because their title search revealed a prior deed and tax payments by the Killams, making them trespassers. Damages were awarded to the Killams in the form of back royalties rather than working interest, with six percent prejudgment interest from the date the suit was filed, as the amount became ascertainable then. The appeals regarding laches, estoppel, and other issues were rejected or deemed moot.

propertytorts & liability

In Kastl v. State, a 17-year-old was adjudicated delinquent for being a minor in possession of alcohol after officers found beer cans and a six-pack in the hatch of a parked vehicle where she was a passenger, resulting in a one-year driver's license suspension. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the conviction without addressing the constitutional challenge to Act 93 of 1989. The court held that the evidence failed to prove actual or constructive possession, as the beer belonged to another passenger, the appellant was not seen with it or shown to have knowledge or control of it, and the statute explicitly states that alcohol in a minor's body is not possession; mere proximity, odor, and joint occupancy were insufficient under precedents requiring an additional link between the accused and the contraband.

criminal law

In State v. Sherman, the defendant pled guilty to theft by receiving, a Class C felony, but received a 30-year sentence as a habitual offender based on prior convictions not disclosed at the plea hearing. The court of appeals reduced the sentence to the 10-year maximum for the offense, prompting the state to seek review on whether appeals from guilty pleas are allowed. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that state law and rules generally prohibit appeals from guilty pleas except in narrow circumstances not present here, such as under Rule 24.3(b), and distinguished prior cases involving post-trial motions to correct sentences. The court dismissed the appeal, noting alternative remedies like motions under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111 or Rule 37.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hooks v. State, Donald Ray Hooks was convicted of delivery of the controlled substance Dilaudid and sentenced to life in prison as a habitual offender. On appeal, Hooks challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction as a principal or accomplice and claimed error in the jury instruction on accomplice liability. The court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of joint participation, including Hooks' presence during the transaction, the exchange of high-fives with the seller, his flight from police, and his possession of part of the buy money. The court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and held that it was substantial enough for the jury to conclude Hooks acted as an accomplice without resort to speculation. Because the evidence supported the conviction on accomplice grounds, the court found no error in the jury instruction.

criminal law

In Riddle v. State, the appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and theft by receiving a stolen vehicle, receiving consecutive sentences of 10 and 25 years. He appealed only the theft conviction, arguing the evidence was insufficient to show he had possession or control of the car. The court affirmed, holding that while mere presence as a passenger is not enough, the combination of his presence in the stolen vehicle, flight from police, and shooting at the pursuing officer established constructive possession and knowledge that the property was stolen under Arkansas statutes. The decision relied on precedents allowing inference of guilt from flight and similar out-of-state cases with comparable facts.

criminal law

In King v. Jackson, the plaintiff sued the defendants for back injuries sustained when she tripped over shoes and cane poles on their porch after visiting to inquire about purchasing adjacent land. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the plaintiff was a licensee rather than an invitee because her visit was for her own purposes and conferred no benefit on the defendants. As such, the defendants owed her only a duty to refrain from willful or wanton conduct, which was not alleged, and had no duty to warn of the visible obstructions on the porch, which were not hidden dangers.

torts & liabilityproperty

In Cherry v. State, the appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after being charged with capital felony murder in the death of Jimmie Pendergrass during a burglary attempt. On appeal, he challenged the warrantless search of his vehicle that uncovered a .45 pistol, the admissibility of testimony from certain officers, the jury selection process from voter rolls, and the use of a prior out-of-state conviction to enhance his sentence as a habitual offender. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the search was lawful based on the appellant's implied consent from signing a parole notice authorizing warrantless searches upon reasonable grounds, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Griffin v. Wisconsin. The court rejected the remaining claims by applying established Arkansas precedents on witness competency, jury pools, and judicial notice of sentencing ranges for prior felonies, finding no error after reviewing the record under Rule 11(f).

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a bank's attempt to enforce a promissory note and foreclose on a deed of trust securing a loan to a husband, where the wife's signature on the documents for their homestead property was forged by the husband. The bank sought recovery from the wife on unjust enrichment grounds after the loan proceeds paid family debts and alternatively to foreclose on the husband's interest in the property. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the wife was not unjustly enriched because she was unaware of the forgery and the loan, the deed of trust was invalid under the homestead statute requiring spousal joinder, and a validation statute did not cure the defect since the transaction occurred after its enactment.

propertyfamily law

This case involves a dispute over permanent custody of a child between the mother and the maternal grandmother after multiple proceedings in chancery, county, and juvenile courts. The juvenile court awarded custody to the grandmother without making any finding that the mother was an unfit parent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that when a third party seeks custody, that party must first prove the natural parent is unfit or incompetent, and that specific statutory findings are required before placing the child outside the parent's home.

family law

This case concerned whether a creditor's acceptance of partial payment from a hospital lien filed in a personal injury settlement operated as an accord and satisfaction that extinguished a separate judgment debt for medical expenses. The trial court ruled that the acceptance of $990 from the lien proceeds in the personal injury action satisfied the full $6,199.05 judgment obtained in the earlier collection case. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, holding that extinguishment of the lien did not extinguish the underlying debt and that there was no evidence of a meeting of the minds required for accord and satisfaction, as the creditor accepted the funds only as partial satisfaction of the lien claim. The court therefore reinstated the summary judgment with credit for the $990 received.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved a truck-train collision at an unusual railroad crossing in Palestine, Arkansas, where plaintiff Lenon White was seriously injured while driving a dump truck; White and his wife sued the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company and obtained a $668,000 jury verdict. The railroad appealed, primarily arguing that a new trial was required due to juror misconduct, as three jurors had independently visited the crossing during or after trial, observed conditions like visibility, and discussed their findings with other jurors during deliberations. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, ruling that the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in denying the new-trial motion under ARCP Rule 59(a) because the railroad failed to show a reasonable possibility of prejudice from the visits, especially since the jurors had not been specifically admonished against them and the actions were less extensive than in a prior precedent where prejudice was found.

proceduretorts & liability

In Shamlin v. Shuffield, plaintiff Linda Shuffield sued defendant C.J. Shamlin for entering her land, cutting timber, and causing property damage, after Shamlin had contracted with adjacent landowner Leon Garot to cut timber but may have crossed boundaries. The trial court awarded Shuffield $9,986 in actual damages, trebled to $29,958, and the appellate court affirmed the judgment. The court found no error in evidentiary rulings on hearsay or the best evidence rule, held that Shamlin waived his directed-verdict challenge by introducing his own testimony confirming he cut the timber, and upheld the damages award including restoration costs under precedent and the treble-damages statute, while rejecting unpreserved arguments on intent and ownership interest.

propertytorts & liability

In Tarentino v. State, the appellant was convicted of first-degree battery after entering the victim's home at night and striking him three times in the head with a baseball bat, causing a fractured skull and requiring extended hospitalization. Tarentino appealed the denial of his directed verdict motion, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove he acted with the purpose of causing serious physical injury or that such an injury actually occurred. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that substantial evidence supported the jury's findings on both the requisite mental state—shown by the circumstances including repeated blows to the head—and the existence of serious physical injury as defined by statute, which includes protracted impairment of health.

criminal law