In Conover v. Aetna US Healthcare, Inc., the plaintiff participated in an employer-sponsored long-term disability insurance plan administered by the defendant, received benefits after a 1997 car accident, and then had those benefits terminated in 1999 following a functional capacity evaluation that found her able to work. The case, removed from state court, centered on whether ERISA preempts the plaintiff's Oklahoma state-law claims for bad faith denial of benefits and whether a jury trial is permitted. The court examined the impact of the Supreme Court's UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward decision on Tenth Circuit precedent in Gaylor v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., noting that Oklahoma's Christian bad faith tort is limited to insurance contracts and meets common-sense and McCarran-Ferguson criteria for regulating insurance, potentially placing it within ERISA's saving clause rather than being preempted.
This case involves a dispute over title to and payment for a custom Vogue motor home that Mitchell Coach Manufacturing sold to dealer WW, Inc., which then contracted to sell it to buyer Ronny Stephens, with TexStar National Bank involved as a secured party. Mitchell sought summary judgment asserting it retained ownership or a possessory lien because WW failed to pay the balance, while Stephens and TexStar moved for summary judgment claiming Stephens was an innocent purchaser who obtained clear title. The court granted the defendants' motion and denied Mitchell's, holding that under the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code the motor home's certificate of origin and invoice transferred title to WW, which passed good title to Stephens as a buyer in ordinary course without notice of any lien; Mitchell had not properly perfected or asserted any statutory lien and could not reclaim the vehicle from an innocent purchaser.
In Cowan v. United States, a plaintiff suffering from a terminal illness filed pleadings seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction to obtain access to an unapproved medical treatment without completing the FDA's Investigational New Drug application process. The district court conducted de novo review of the magistrate judge's recommendation to deny relief, first addressing jurisdictional challenges regarding the absence of a formal complaint and the plaintiff's standing. The court determined that the supplementary application minimally satisfied pleading requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and invoked declaratory relief authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, but found that standing and authority to grant exemptions from federal drug regulations were lacking, as only Congress or regulatory agencies could provide such relief. Citing precedents like United States v. Rutherford, the court concluded that individuals must pursue approval through proper administrative channels rather than judicial intervention. It overruled the objections and adopted the recommendation to deny all injunctive relief.
The case concerned Prudential Securities' filing of an amended Uniform Termination Notice (U-5) after settling a client's NASD claim alleging unsuitable investments and supervisory failures involving former employee John Dalton. Dalton initiated NASD arbitration asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with economic advantage, arguing the U-5 was misleading. The arbitration panel dismissed Dalton's claims on Prudential's motion without an evidentiary hearing. Prudential moved to confirm the award and Dalton moved to vacate it. The court vacated the award and remanded for a full hearing, holding that the panel had denied Dalton a fundamentally fair opportunity to present evidence under the NASD Arbitration Code and that defenses such as absolute privilege or statutes of limitations did not justify dismissal at that stage.
business & regulatorylabor & employmentproceduretorts & liability
The case involved an appeal by the United States from a Bankruptcy Court order in Laura Parmele's Chapter 13 case that reduced the IRS's secured claim for unpaid taxes from 1984-1988 by roughly $8,000. The Bankruptcy Court had exempted certain property under 26 U.S.C. § 6334 and further reduced the claim by the amount of Parmele's estimated 1993 taxes. The District Court reversed, holding that § 6334 addresses only administrative levies and does not limit the attachment or value of a federal tax lien under § 6321, consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent in United States v. Barbier. It further held that no provision of the Bankruptcy Code authorized reducing the claim to account for future tax liabilities.
The case concerned whether the IRS was required to file a new notice of tax lien against RMC after property subject to an existing lien against MAKO was transferred to RMC through a confirmed bankruptcy plan of which the IRS had notice. The bankruptcy court ruled that under 26 U.S.C. § 6323 the IRS must refile to preserve its lien's validity against subsequent parties, allowing the debtors to avoid the lien via 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) and reducing the IRS to an unsecured claim. On appeal, the district court affirmed, holding that the IRS's failure to refile after learning of the transfer meant the lien was not valid against judgment lien creditors, drawing on precedents requiring refiling when a taxpayer's name changes. The court rejected the IRS's argument that no additional filing was needed once the original lien attached.
