Thomas Rutherford Brett

In Conover v. Aetna US Healthcare, Inc., the plaintiff participated in an employer-sponsored long-term disability insurance plan administered by the defendant, received benefits after a 1997 car accident, and then had those benefits terminated in 1999 following a functional capacity evaluation that found her able to work. The case, removed from state court, centered on whether ERISA preempts the plaintiff's Oklahoma state-law claims for bad faith denial of benefits and whether a jury trial is permitted. The court examined the impact of the Supreme Court's UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward decision on Tenth Circuit precedent in Gaylor v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., noting that Oklahoma's Christian bad faith tort is limited to insurance contracts and meets common-sense and McCarran-Ferguson criteria for regulating insurance, potentially placing it within ERISA's saving clause rather than being preempted.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryfederal powertorts & liability

This case involves a dispute over title to and payment for a custom Vogue motor home that Mitchell Coach Manufacturing sold to dealer WW, Inc., which then contracted to sell it to buyer Ronny Stephens, with TexStar National Bank involved as a secured party. Mitchell sought summary judgment asserting it retained ownership or a possessory lien because WW failed to pay the balance, while Stephens and TexStar moved for summary judgment claiming Stephens was an innocent purchaser who obtained clear title. The court granted the defendants' motion and denied Mitchell's, holding that under the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code the motor home's certificate of origin and invoice transferred title to WW, which passed good title to Stephens as a buyer in ordinary course without notice of any lien; Mitchell had not properly perfected or asserted any statutory lien and could not reclaim the vehicle from an innocent purchaser.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Cowan v. United States, a plaintiff suffering from a terminal illness filed pleadings seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction to obtain access to an unapproved medical treatment without completing the FDA's Investigational New Drug application process. The district court conducted de novo review of the magistrate judge's recommendation to deny relief, first addressing jurisdictional challenges regarding the absence of a formal complaint and the plaintiff's standing. The court determined that the supplementary application minimally satisfied pleading requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and invoked declaratory relief authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, but found that standing and authority to grant exemptions from federal drug regulations were lacking, as only Congress or regulatory agencies could provide such relief. Citing precedents like United States v. Rutherford, the court concluded that individuals must pursue approval through proper administrative channels rather than judicial intervention. It overruled the objections and adopted the recommendation to deny all injunctive relief.

healthcarefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned Prudential Securities' filing of an amended Uniform Termination Notice (U-5) after settling a client's NASD claim alleging unsuitable investments and supervisory failures involving former employee John Dalton. Dalton initiated NASD arbitration asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with economic advantage, arguing the U-5 was misleading. The arbitration panel dismissed Dalton's claims on Prudential's motion without an evidentiary hearing. Prudential moved to confirm the award and Dalton moved to vacate it. The court vacated the award and remanded for a full hearing, holding that the panel had denied Dalton a fundamentally fair opportunity to present evidence under the NASD Arbitration Code and that defenses such as absolute privilege or statutes of limitations did not justify dismissal at that stage.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

The case involved an appeal by the United States from a Bankruptcy Court order in Laura Parmele's Chapter 13 case that reduced the IRS's secured claim for unpaid taxes from 1984-1988 by roughly $8,000. The Bankruptcy Court had exempted certain property under 26 U.S.C. § 6334 and further reduced the claim by the amount of Parmele's estimated 1993 taxes. The District Court reversed, holding that § 6334 addresses only administrative levies and does not limit the attachment or value of a federal tax lien under § 6321, consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent in United States v. Barbier. It further held that no provision of the Bankruptcy Code authorized reducing the claim to account for future tax liabilities.

taxesfederal power

The case concerned whether the IRS was required to file a new notice of tax lien against RMC after property subject to an existing lien against MAKO was transferred to RMC through a confirmed bankruptcy plan of which the IRS had notice. The bankruptcy court ruled that under 26 U.S.C. § 6323 the IRS must refile to preserve its lien's validity against subsequent parties, allowing the debtors to avoid the lien via 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) and reducing the IRS to an unsecured claim. On appeal, the district court affirmed, holding that the IRS's failure to refile after learning of the transfer meant the lien was not valid against judgment lien creditors, drawing on precedents requiring refiling when a taxpayer's name changes. The court rejected the IRS's argument that no additional filing was needed once the original lien attached.

taxesfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a CERCLA contribution action by Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) against other potentially responsible parties for cleanup costs at the Sand Springs Petrochemical Complex Superfund Site. ARCO sought court approval of partial settlements that would bar non-settling defendants from pursuing contribution or indemnity claims against settling defendants and asked the court to apply the pro tanto credit rule (reducing non-settlers' liability by the dollar amount of settlements) to any future recovery. The non-settling defendants argued for the proportionate credit rule instead (reducing liability by the settling parties' percentage of fault, determined at trial). The court, reviewing de novo, adopted the magistrate's recommendation to apply the pro tanto rule on a case-by-case basis, finding it superior under the facts because it promotes early settlement, simplifies litigation, aligns with SARA's policy for government settlements, and encourages responsible parties to conduct cleanups without disproportionate remaining liability.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved televangelist Robert G. Tilton seeking a preliminary injunction to bar ABC and related defendants from rebroadcasting specific statements from 1991 and 1992 PrimeTIME Live segments that investigated his ministry's practices regarding holy water, prayer requests, and charitable donations, which Tilton claimed were libelous and defamatory. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. It found that Tilton, as a public figure, faced a high bar for proving libel and that the requested relief would constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech by a private broadcaster under the First Amendment, which protects against government-imposed restrictions on publication absent narrow exceptions that did not apply here. The court further noted that the First Amendment shields against prior restraints even when the speech at issue concerns matters of public interest, and equitable balancing did not favor granting the injunction.

free speechtorts & liability

In Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., televangelist Robert G. Tilton sought a temporary restraining order and injunction to prevent ABC from rebroadcasting segments from its "Prime Time Live" program that allegedly defamed him or portrayed him in a false light, claiming the broadcasts infringed on his First Amendment rights to freedom of religion. The court denied the application for a temporary restraining order. It reasoned that monetary damages provide an adequate remedy for libel claims, that the First Amendment strongly protects against prior restraints on the press, that the public interest favors allowing criticism of religious leaders, and that Tilton, as a public figure, would face significant challenges in proving falsity and actual malice on the merits.

free speechreligious liberty

In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Lujan, the plaintiff oil company challenged a 1989 Minerals Management Service order requiring it to recalculate and pay additional royalties on natural gas produced from Indian and federal leases dating back to October 1980, contending that claims for the period through September 1983 were barred by the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). The court first addressed the limitations issue, rejecting the agency's argument that the claim accrued only after an audit and instead finding that the right of action accrued when the royalty payments were originally due. Based on undisputed facts, the court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on the pre-1983 claims and dismissed the remainder of the suit without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

In Spears v. United States, the plaintiff sought a refund of taxes he paid to the IRS after it assessed a $8,264.22 penalty against him under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 as a responsible person for Phoenix Energy Corporation; the assessment occurred while Spears was in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and he paid the amount in 1988 to clear a lien for a home loan after the IRS denied his refund claim. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the IRS assessment was void. The core reasoning was that the assessment violated the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362, which renders such actions void rather than merely voidable, so the debtor had no obligation to challenge it during bankruptcy proceedings, as supported by In re Schwartz and Ellis v. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp.

taxesprocedurefederal power

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court judgment denying James and Margaret Stripling a discharge in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) and (a)(4). The bankruptcy court found that the debtors had transferred a medical building and formed and transferred stock in Quality Care Medical Center, Inc., with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditor Mill Creek Lumber & Supply Co., and had made material false oaths by omitting assets, income, and lawsuits from their schedules. The district court affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court's findings of fraudulent intent and materiality were not clearly erroneous, that even transfers or omissions of assets with little or no value can support denial of discharge, and that the spouses' actions were properly considered together as a partnership.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs Sandra Howell and her minor daughter Tina Patterson suing the City of Catoosa and two police officers after the officers responded to a break-in and sexual assault by Howell's ex-husband on May 2, 1987, but did not arrest him on either of two visits that night. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the officers failed to enforce the law due to gender bias in domestic violence cases, along with pendent state tort claims. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims. It reasoned that there was insufficient evidence of a municipal policy or custom of intentional gender discrimination, the officers were protected by qualified immunity because the relevant law was not clearly established, and the state claims were untimely under the statute of limitations and barred by procedural requirements of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved a motion to dismiss a medical malpractice suit brought by Oklahoma residents against a Texas physician and his professional association for an allegedly negligent diagnosis of a skin lesion slide. The slide was sent unsolicited from the plaintiffs' Oklahoma doctor to the defendants in Texas, where the error occurred, and the incorrect report was mailed back, leading to improper treatment and the later discovery of advanced cancer. The court held that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants under Oklahoma law and the Due Process Clause. The core reasoning was that the defendants had no minimum contacts with Oklahoma, as they performed all services in Texas, did not solicit business there, maintained no presence or licenses in the state, and the plaintiffs' unilateral actions in sending the sample could not establish jurisdiction; exercising jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves a plaintiff injured on May 29, 1986, who on May 31, 1988, filed an application to amend his original complaint to add Chicago Steel Container as a defendant, along with a proposed amended complaint. The defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint as barred by Oklahoma's two-year statute of limitations, and the plaintiff sought a nunc pro tunc order to adjust the filing date. The court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the timely filing of the motion for leave to amend with the proposed complaint tolled the limitations period under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) and supporting precedent, even though the court order and formal filing occurred later. It also denied the nunc pro tunc request as unnecessary because the application itself was filed within the limitations window, accounting for the intervening Sunday and federal holiday.

procedure

This case involved a products liability claim brought by the widow of Joe Barringer against Wal-Mart and Action Products Company after her husband drowned in an Oklahoma lake in 1987. The plaintiff alleged that a defective plastic boat seat, sold by Wal-Mart and made by Action Products, broke while Mr. Barringer was fishing, causing him to fall into the water and drown. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not prove the seat's defect proximately caused the death, as the available circumstantial evidence and expert affidavit left open equally plausible alternative explanations such as the boat capsizing first or the engine starting in gear. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case, holding that the evidence failed to establish causation as a reasonable probability rather than mere speculation or conjecture, consistent with Oklahoma precedent requiring more than consistency with the plaintiff's theory.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved environmental organizations and the State of Oklahoma challenging the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of a permit to the North Texas Municipal Water District and Greater Texoma Utility Authority for a project transferring water from Lake Texoma to Lake Lavon for municipal and industrial use. The plaintiffs claimed the Corps violated the National Environmental Policy Act by granting the permit based on a Finding of No Significant Impact without first preparing an Environmental Impact Statement, and they sought declaratory and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for the Corps and permittees, declaring that the Corps had complied with NEPA and denying the requested injunction. The court's decision rested on findings of fact that the project's anticipated effects on water quality, wildlife, recreation, and other resources were not significant enough to require an EIS.

environmentfederal power

The case involved an appeal by Wesley R. McKinney from bankruptcy court orders denying his motions to dismiss Chapter 11 proceedings for Republic Financial Corporation and Republic Trust & Savings, claiming the entities were banks exempt from bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 109. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, finding that neither entity qualified as a bank or exempt institution because they lacked the authority to accept general deposits under Oklahoma law and were not insured as required. The court applied the state classification test and independent classification test, concluding that the entities were eligible for Chapter 11 relief as the findings were not clearly erroneous and supported by legal authority.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a property owner, Sand Springs Home, seeking to recover cleanup costs it incurred under a CERCLA administrative order from the EPA for a hazardous waste site in Oklahoma; the owner had absorbed part of the costs and sought contribution from identified generators and other responsible parties. Defendant Reid Supply Company moved for summary judgment, arguing that CERCLA neither imposes joint and several liability on responsible parties nor creates a private right of action for contribution among them. The court denied the motion for summary judgment, holding that CERCLA permits joint and several liability and allows contribution claims based on established case law interpreting the statute's legislative history and purpose. It granted the alternative motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that the mechanics of any contribution are governed by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A, though application to the facts would require further proceedings.

environmentproceduretorts & liability

The case involved creditor Genave Rogers Palmer appealing a bankruptcy court ruling that an oil and gas lease acquired by debtor Heston Oil Co. was not an executory contract or unexpired lease subject to assumption or rejection under 11 U.S.C. § 365. The district court affirmed the ruling after determining the order was appealable and examining the nature of the lease under Oklahoma law. The court held that oil and gas leases create interests more akin to profits à prendre or estates in real property, with limited obligations that do not qualify as executory contracts where breach by one party excuses performance by the other.

propertybusiness & regulatory