Jesse W. Carter

The case concerned whether William McKesson, appointed as Los Angeles County District Attorney in 1956 to fill a vacancy and then elected in 1958 to the unexpired term, could receive a salary increase enacted in 1957, given state constitutional and county charter rules barring compensation changes during an officer's term. The California Supreme Court granted the writ of mandate, holding that McKesson was entitled to the higher salary from the start of his elected term. The majority reasoned that the prohibitions target the risk of officials influencing raises after election, a concern absent when the increase precedes the election, and that the rules do not apply to bar such pre-election raises for elected successors to unexpired terms. Dissenting justices argued the constitutional language covers any officer and any part of the term regardless of appointment or election.

electionslabor & employment

In this habeas corpus case, Barney Dennis, convicted in 1954 on multiple counts of assault with intent to murder and assault with a deadly weapon after pleading not guilty by reason of insanity, challenged his confinement on the ground that he was tried and sentenced while insane. Multiple uncontradicted psychiatric reports filed before trial concluded that Dennis suffered from schizophrenia, was insane at the time of the offenses and at trial, and could not cooperate with counsel, yet the trial court proceeded without suspending the action under Penal Code sections 1367 and 1368 to determine his sanity. The California Supreme Court held that the presumption of sanity was overcome by the evidence and that the failure to follow the statutory procedure violated the defendant's rights, requiring the conviction to be set aside. The court granted the writ, ordered Dennis transferred to the custody of the San Diego County sheriff, and directed the trial court to determine his present sanity and, if appropriate, retry the issue of his sanity at the time of the offenses.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an appeal by the People from a trial court's order dismissing an information charging Dr. William G. Bernstein with two counts of contributing to the delinquency of minors under Welfare and Institutions Code section 702. The charges stemmed from allegations that Bernstein's conduct of living with Mrs. Beverly Enns as husband and wife, including his presence in her home and interactions observed by her children, tended to encourage the minors to lead idle, lewd, dissolute, or immoral lives. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the evidence from the preliminary hearing failed to establish probable cause as a matter of law, since the observed conduct in the children's presence—such as Bernstein being in the home, on the bed with the mother, and seen in underclothing—did not tend to cause the children to lead such lives. The core reasoning emphasized that the statute requires acts done directly in relation to the minors that have an untoward effect, not merely conduct between adults that might be viewed as immoral by others, and that the trial court properly set aside the information when no such evidence existed.

criminal lawfamily law

In this case, a minor plaintiff in a personal injury action arising from a vehicle accident sought a writ of mandate after the trial court ordered her to submit to a physical examination by the defendants' doctor but denied her request to have a certified court reporter present (while allowing her attorney to attend). The California Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to have a reporter present during the examination. The court reasoned that, consistent with its prior decision in Sharff v. Superior Court permitting an attorney's presence, a reporter ensures an accurate, disinterested record of any questions asked and statements made, preventing potential disputes at trial over the examination's content. It further concluded that a physician's written report under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032 would not adequately substitute for a reporter's transcript.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether Santa Fe Transportation Company, a railway subsidiary performing intracity pickup and delivery services as part of intercity freight transport under railway bills of lading, owed California's 3% motor vehicle transportation license tax on the gross receipts from those city operations. The company sought a refund of taxes paid under protest, arguing that the intracity services were exempt under Rev. & Tax. Code section 9653 because they occurred wholly within cities without traversing public highways outside city limits. The California Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment for the company, holding that the pickup and delivery services were inseparable from the taxable intercity line-haul operations and thus not exempt, as the statute's exemption applies only to entirely intra-city operations and lacks a proration mechanism for property shipments (unlike passenger transport).

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute among three brothers who formed a partnership in 1944 to purchase and operate a citrus ranch, with each holding a one-third interest. After operations began, conflicts arose leading Nick and Ernest Vangel to sue for dissolution in 1946; the partnership was dissolved effective June 15, 1950, with Charles found to have wrongfully caused the dissolution. The court allowed Nick and Ernest to purchase Charles's interest, valuing it at 23.96 percent of the partnership net worth after accounting for loans, withdrawals, and post-dissolution profits from crops, while denying him wages for voluntary services rendered after dissolution. The judgment affirmed prior appellate rulings on valuations, profit participation until May 1953, and related accounting matters, finding no errors in the trial court's computations or factual determinations following multiple trials.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a habeas corpus petition by Charles Bandmann, Jr., an inmate serving a sentence after pleading guilty to attempted abortion. Petitioner argued that his maximum term should be one year in county jail under Penal Code section 664, subdivision 2, because he had already served more than that period. The court denied relief, holding that subdivision 1 of section 664 applied and authorized a sentence of up to two and a half years in state prison. The core reasoning was that the underlying offense of abortion carries a maximum term of five years, triggering the higher attempt penalty under the statutory language distinguishing offenses punishable by five years or more from those punishable by any term less than five years, with an indeterminate sentence treated as equivalent to the maximum term.

criminal lawabortion

This case concerned whether a plaintiff who prevailed on appeal in a restitution action could recover as costs the premiums paid on a surety bond required to preserve an attachment pending appeal. After the trial court ruled the bond unnecessary due to the defendant's financial standing and assets, the California Supreme Court reversed. The court held that under Code of Civil Procedure section 946 an appeal does not continue an attachment without the bond, making the bond statutorily necessary to preserve the lien, and under section 1035 the premiums must be allowed as costs unless the court determines otherwise; it therefore directed the trial court to award the full amount of the premiums as recoverable costs on appeal.

procedure

The case involved defendant Nellard Berve's conviction for second-degree murder based on evidence that he performed an illegal abortion on Mary Pettit, resulting in her death from infection. At trial, the prosecution introduced a confession Berve made after being kidnapped, threatened, and severely beaten for two hours by Pettit and other relatives seeking revenge, who demanded he confess or die; police arrived afterward, arrested him, and obtained the confession shortly thereafter without providing medical care or rest. The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the confession was involuntary due to the coercive circumstances and its use violated due process under both state and federal constitutions, even though the coercion came from private citizens rather than police and other evidence of guilt existed.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved defendant Nellard Berve's conviction for second-degree murder after he performed an abortion on Mary M. Pettit using unsterilized instruments, leading to a fatal infection. At trial, the prosecution introduced a confession Berve made to police shortly after being kidnapped, beaten, and threatened at gunpoint by Pettit and other relatives of the victim. The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the confession was involuntary and its admission violated due process under both the federal and state constitutions. The court reasoned that the severe physical abuse and ongoing threats created a coercive atmosphere that carried over into the police interrogation, which began without medical attention or rest, rendering the confession inadmissible regardless of other evidence of guilt.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a dispute between property owners (plaintiffs) and a lessee (defendant) over two agricultural leases for land in Kern County, California. Plaintiffs sued for damages related to an unremoved dirt reservoir, alleged poor cultivation and double-cropping practices, and sought an accounting of crop share payments; the defendant cross-complained for breach of a lease clause granting a right of first refusal for a new lease at term's end. The trial court ruled for the defendant on the complaint and awarded him damages on the cross-complaint. On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings that the reservoir was an improvement to be left in place, that cultivation met community standards, and that the plaintiffs' breach of the first-refusal clause caused the defendant measurable lost profits.

property

This case involved the City and County of San Francisco seeking indemnity from abutting property owners Ho Sing and Ho Lum Shee after the city paid part of a damages judgment to a pedestrian injured by a cracked sidewalk skylight installed for the owners' benefit. The trial court sustained the owners' demurrer without leave to amend, and the Supreme Court of California affirmed that ruling. The court reasoned that the city and property owners were joint tortfeasors whose independent negligence each contributed to the injury, with no contractual or other basis for indemnity between them under then-existing law, which generally barred contribution among joint tortfeasors absent special circumstances. The decision addressed a question left open in a prior case and rejected the city's claim that its liability was merely passive compared to the owners' active negligence.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved a dispute over an alleged breach of a contract for the sale of approximately 200,000 gallons of wine between the plaintiffs, owners of the Santa Fe Vintage Company, and defendant Phil J. Severini. At the second trial, the court found that a valid written contract existed and had been breached by the defendant through anticipatory repudiation but concluded that the plaintiffs suffered no damages. On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court's findings regarding contract conditions like gauging the wine tanks and immediate payment were unsupported by the evidence, that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform, and that they had no duty to mitigate damages by purchasing inferior wine. The court directed a retrial solely on the issue of the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiffs.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a nonprofit association of gasoline retailers suing groups of independent service station operators for alleged violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, fraudulent advertising, and conducting illegal lotteries through promotional giveaway programs. The trial court ruled for the defendants on the unfair practices and advertising claims but granted an injunction on the lottery claim. On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the programs did not constitute lotteries under Penal Code section 319 because participants provided no valuable consideration, as no purchase or payment was required to enter or claim prizes. The court reasoned that the statutory definition of lottery requires consideration paid or promised by the ticket recipient, which was absent here even if participants visited the stations.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Anthony Gomez and Ray Cardinal, who were charged with grand theft of a loading shovel valued at $3,000 but convicted by jury of the lesser offense of petty theft; after the convictions were reversed on appeal due to prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecution attempted to retry them on the original grand theft charge in superior court. Petitioners sought writs of prohibition and mandate to bar the retrial and transfer the petty theft matter to justice court, arguing they had already been placed in jeopardy and acquitted of the greater offense. The California Supreme Court issued the writs, ruling that conviction of a lesser included offense operates as an acquittal of the greater charged offense under Penal Code sections 687 and 1023 and the state constitution's double jeopardy clause, rejecting any distinction based on whether the crime was divided into degrees and extending the protection even after reversal on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a 1945 lease of farmland in Kern County, California, where the plaintiffs (lessors or their successors) alleged that the defendants (lessees, assignees, and sublessees) breached the lease by removing substantial irrigation improvements, pumps, pipelines, and buildings from the property upon or after the lease's extension, causing damages of over $31,000; the complaint included causes of action for breach of contract, conversion, restoration, and waste. The defendants moved to change venue from Los Angeles County (where the action was filed) to Kern County on grounds of their residence, injury to real property located in Kern County, and convenience of witnesses. The trial court granted the motions, but the California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the convenience-of-witnesses ground was improperly based on expert testimony regarding property values (which is not material for venue purposes) and that the other grounds lacked sufficient support in the record under the applicable venue statutes.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the dissolution of an advertising agency partnership between Vincent Smith and Frank Bull, where Smith's widow, as administratrix of his estate, sued Bull for appropriating partnership assets including the goodwill tied to their main client account after Smith fell ill. The trial court found that Bull had converted the assets and awarded the plaintiff half the value of the goodwill, along with shares of other accounts and bank deposits, while ruling in favor of employee Mel Roach. On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's factual determinations regarding the appropriation and the calculated value of the goodwill. The court emphasized that issues of evidence weight and witness credibility are for the trier of fact, and it rejected challenges to the goodwill valuation as uncontroverted expert testimony backed the amount.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over whether a judicial district judge and his sureties were liable for funds embezzled by the court's clerk. The trial court held the defendants absolutely liable under Government Code section 1504, but the Supreme Court reversed. The court reasoned that the more specific provision in section 1953.5, which limits liability for stolen moneys to situations where the officer failed to exercise due care, controls over the general absolute liability provision. Because the term "stolen" encompasses embezzlement, the case was remanded for a determination of whether the judge exercised due care.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an employee who sued his railroad employer under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for skin and other injuries from prolonged exposure to silver cyanide solution at work, with the action filed in 1954. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by the Act's three-year statute of limitations, but the California Supreme Court reversed. The majority held that for gradual occupational diseases, the cause of action accrues only upon manifestation of substantial harm rather than initial minor symptoms, so the limitations period began in 1953 when the condition worsened and spread. The court reasoned that this approach aligns with U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Urie v. Thompson, avoids barring claims for inherently unknowable progressive injuries, and treats early minor effects as de minimis under state law principles.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over the distribution of a decedent's estate under a will that included a 20% charitable bequest to the Hazel Hurst Foundation, which the testator had partially lined out on her retained duplicate copy along with a holographic note revoking another bequest. The will was admitted to probate in its altered form, and in a subsequent heirship proceeding the trial court found the Hurst bequest eliminated, directing that portion to intestate succession rather than the named substitutional legatee. The court held that the probate order conclusively determined which documents constituted the will and could not be collaterally attacked in the heirship action, limiting that proceeding to interpretation of the will as admitted; it therefore reversed the heirship order as to the Foundation while affirming it on other grounds. The decision rested on principles that questions of due execution and validity are settled at probate and become res judicata.

propertyprocedure