Libertarian Party v. Eu
California Supreme Court · 1980-12-18 · cited 22×
The case concerned whether candidates David Bergland and Jim Gallagher, nominated by the Libertarian Party through the independent nomination process under Elections Code sections 6800 et seq., could be listed on the 1978 general election ballot with the designation "Libertarian" rather than "Independent" as mandated by section 10210. The trial court ordered the Secretary of State to use the "Libertarian" label, but the California Supreme Court reversed on the constitutional question, holding that section 10210 does not violate the equal protection clause of the U.S. or California Constitutions. The court explained that the Legislature possesses plenary power over elections, that only parties meeting statewide qualification requirements receive party labels on the ballot, and that independent nominees follow a distinct process that rationally supports the statutory distinction in designations. The opinion placed the challenged section within the broader statutory scheme for party organization, primary participation, and ballot access.
elections
In Re Marriage of Moore
California Supreme Court · 1980-10-30 · cited 94×
This case concerned the division of property in a divorce between David and Lydie Moore, specifically the community property interest in a house Lydie had purchased before the marriage and the alleged misappropriation of other community assets. The court held that the community acquired a pro tanto interest in the house based on mortgage principal payments made with community funds during the marriage, calculated by multiplying the house's equity value by the ratio of community principal reductions to total principal reductions from all sources; payments for interest, taxes, and insurance were excluded from this calculation. It reversed the trial court's finding that David had deliberately misappropriated community property due to insufficient evidence that he had disposed of items without valuable consideration or in violation of specific statutory restrictions on household furnishings. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects.
family lawproperty
Perez v. City of San Bruno
California Supreme Court · 1980-08-14 · cited 37×
The case concerned Helen Perez's challenge to the City of San Bruno's practice of discontinuing water service for nonpayment of the garbage collection portion of a unified municipal services bill covering water, sewer, and garbage, after Perez refused payment because she handled her own waste through recycling. The city code authorized shutoff of water for any unpaid municipal service charges, and the city contracted with a private firm for garbage collection while billing for all services together. The court examined whether this enforcement mechanism, enacted under the city's police power and state statutes, infringed on constitutional rights by conditioning a fundamental service on payment for unrelated services. It concluded that the policy was constitutional because it advanced compelling public health interests through regulation of utility services tied to sanitation, was expressly authorized by law, and applied only to health-related municipal enterprises rather than unrelated city functions.
civil rightsbusiness & regulatoryenvironment
In Re Marriage of Lucas
California Supreme Court · 1980-08-07 · cited 141×
This case involved the dissolution of the marriage between Gerald and Brenda Lucas, focusing on how to divide ownership interests in their family residence and a vehicle that were purchased using a mix of Brenda's separate trust funds and community property funds. The trial court had calculated a 24.42 percent community interest in the home based on payments made and confirmed the rest as Brenda's separate property. The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the division of the residence, holding that the form of title as joint tenancy creates a presumption of equal ownership that can be rebutted only by evidence of an agreement or understanding between the spouses regarding their respective interests. The court clarified the proper method for determining separate and community property shares in such mixed-fund purchases, rejecting conflicting approaches from lower courts and emphasizing the need for proof of intent rather than automatic reimbursement or pro rata apportionment.
family lawproperty
Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center
California Supreme Court · 1980-07-07 · cited 119×
The case involved physician Donald Miller, who was repeatedly denied medical staff membership and privileges at Eisenhower Medical Center, a private nonprofit hospital, based on references indicating concerns about his ability to work with others despite assessments of his professional competence. After hearings before the hospital's judicial review and appellate review committees, both upheld the denial under the medical staff bylaws requiring an ability to work harmoniously with others. Miller petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel admission, which the trial court denied. The California Supreme Court examined whether the hospital's criterion was validly applied, emphasizing that any exclusion must be supported by evidence showing an adverse impact on patient care or hospital operations rather than mere personality conflicts, and it remanded the matter for further review under this standard.
procedurehealthcare
People v. Pompa-Ortiz
California Supreme Court · 1980-07-03 · cited 241×
In People v. Pompa-Ortiz, the defendant was convicted of rape after a jury trial and appealed on the ground that his preliminary hearing had been closed to the public over his objection, without any stated reason from the prosecution. The court held that California statutes, particularly Penal Code section 868 and related provisions, grant a defendant a right to a public preliminary examination, and that denial of this right renders the commitment unlawful under section 995. However, the court concluded that such an error does not require reversal of the conviction on appeal unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice affecting the fairness of the subsequent trial. The opinion rejected any federal constitutional basis for the right and distinguished the issue from rights of the public, press, or to a public trial itself, which was not implicated here.
criminal lawprocedure