Wiley Manuel

The case concerned whether candidates David Bergland and Jim Gallagher, nominated by the Libertarian Party through the independent nomination process under Elections Code sections 6800 et seq., could be listed on the 1978 general election ballot with the designation "Libertarian" rather than "Independent" as mandated by section 10210. The trial court ordered the Secretary of State to use the "Libertarian" label, but the California Supreme Court reversed on the constitutional question, holding that section 10210 does not violate the equal protection clause of the U.S. or California Constitutions. The court explained that the Legislature possesses plenary power over elections, that only parties meeting statewide qualification requirements receive party labels on the ballot, and that independent nominees follow a distinct process that rationally supports the statutory distinction in designations. The opinion placed the challenged section within the broader statutory scheme for party organization, primary participation, and ballot access.

elections

This case concerned the division of property in a divorce between David and Lydie Moore, specifically the community property interest in a house Lydie had purchased before the marriage and the alleged misappropriation of other community assets. The court held that the community acquired a pro tanto interest in the house based on mortgage principal payments made with community funds during the marriage, calculated by multiplying the house's equity value by the ratio of community principal reductions to total principal reductions from all sources; payments for interest, taxes, and insurance were excluded from this calculation. It reversed the trial court's finding that David had deliberately misappropriated community property due to insufficient evidence that he had disposed of items without valuable consideration or in violation of specific statutory restrictions on household furnishings. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects.

family lawproperty

The case concerned Helen Perez's challenge to the City of San Bruno's practice of discontinuing water service for nonpayment of the garbage collection portion of a unified municipal services bill covering water, sewer, and garbage, after Perez refused payment because she handled her own waste through recycling. The city code authorized shutoff of water for any unpaid municipal service charges, and the city contracted with a private firm for garbage collection while billing for all services together. The court examined whether this enforcement mechanism, enacted under the city's police power and state statutes, infringed on constitutional rights by conditioning a fundamental service on payment for unrelated services. It concluded that the policy was constitutional because it advanced compelling public health interests through regulation of utility services tied to sanitation, was expressly authorized by law, and applied only to health-related municipal enterprises rather than unrelated city functions.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatoryenvironment

This case involved the dissolution of the marriage between Gerald and Brenda Lucas, focusing on how to divide ownership interests in their family residence and a vehicle that were purchased using a mix of Brenda's separate trust funds and community property funds. The trial court had calculated a 24.42 percent community interest in the home based on payments made and confirmed the rest as Brenda's separate property. The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the division of the residence, holding that the form of title as joint tenancy creates a presumption of equal ownership that can be rebutted only by evidence of an agreement or understanding between the spouses regarding their respective interests. The court clarified the proper method for determining separate and community property shares in such mixed-fund purchases, rejecting conflicting approaches from lower courts and emphasizing the need for proof of intent rather than automatic reimbursement or pro rata apportionment.

family lawproperty

The case involved physician Donald Miller, who was repeatedly denied medical staff membership and privileges at Eisenhower Medical Center, a private nonprofit hospital, based on references indicating concerns about his ability to work with others despite assessments of his professional competence. After hearings before the hospital's judicial review and appellate review committees, both upheld the denial under the medical staff bylaws requiring an ability to work harmoniously with others. Miller petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel admission, which the trial court denied. The California Supreme Court examined whether the hospital's criterion was validly applied, emphasizing that any exclusion must be supported by evidence showing an adverse impact on patient care or hospital operations rather than mere personality conflicts, and it remanded the matter for further review under this standard.

procedurehealthcare

In People v. Pompa-Ortiz, the defendant was convicted of rape after a jury trial and appealed on the ground that his preliminary hearing had been closed to the public over his objection, without any stated reason from the prosecution. The court held that California statutes, particularly Penal Code section 868 and related provisions, grant a defendant a right to a public preliminary examination, and that denial of this right renders the commitment unlawful under section 995. However, the court concluded that such an error does not require reversal of the conviction on appeal unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice affecting the fairness of the subsequent trial. The opinion rejected any federal constitutional basis for the right and distinguished the issue from rights of the public, press, or to a public trial itself, which was not implicated here.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Ronald Eugene Lanphear, who was convicted of first-degree murder committed during a robbery after escaping from jail, with special circumstance allegations and aggravating factors including prior convictions; he was sentenced to death following a jury trial. The California Supreme Court affirmed the guilt verdict, the special circumstance finding, and the trial court's rulings on evidence and instructions, while also rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court reversed the death penalty judgment because prospective jurors had been improperly excluded during voir dire without it being unmistakably clear that they would automatically vote against capital punishment regardless of the evidence or could not impartially decide guilt, in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois standards. The proceedings included both a direct appeal and a habeas corpus petition, which were consolidated.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiff James Forsher suing Vincent Bugliosi and publishers for libel and invasion of privacy over statements in the book Helter Skelter that recounted Forsher's account of attorney Ronald Hughes' disappearance during the Manson family trial and raised questions about police investigations and possible retaliation killings. The trial court sustained a general demurrer without leave to amend, resulting in dismissal of the first amended complaint. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the statements were not actionable as libel because they did not allege special damages as required by statute and did not meet the standards for false light invasion of privacy in a matter of public interest.

free speechtorts & liability

This case concerned whether employees of Interstate Brands who were locked out during a multi-employer labor dispute with bakery unions were eligible for unemployment insurance benefits under California law. The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board granted benefits, finding the employees were not voluntarily unemployed, but the trial court reversed this decision and ordered the benefits set aside along with charges to the employer's reserve account. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the employees left work because of a trade dispute under Unemployment Insurance Code section 1262, making them ineligible for benefits. The court also upheld the trial court's use of independent judgment review, determining that the employer's interest in its unemployment reserve account constituted a fundamental vested right warranting such scrutiny.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned efforts by Los Angeles County and the City of Torrance to establish a public beach recreation easement over nearly two acres of shoreline property owned by Shirley Berk and her late husband through the doctrine of implied dedication based on historical public use. After the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and rejected the Berks' affirmative defenses and cross-claims for declaratory relief, damages, and inverse condemnation, the Berks appealed. The Supreme Court reviewed the property's history of development attempts, sales, public access, and maintenance, along with the requirements of Civil Code section 1009, which addresses when governmental use of private land or public recreational use of coastal property ripens into a vested right absent timely owner objections or compliance with statutory protections such as posting signs or recording notices.

property

The case involved a dispute over whether the Lieutenant Governor could appoint a presiding justice to the Court of Appeal while the Governor was briefly absent from California and whether the Governor could revoke that appointment upon his return. The Supreme Court of California determined that the Lieutenant Governor possesses full authority to exercise gubernatorial appointment powers during the Governor's physical absence from the state under Article V, section 10 of the California Constitution. The court further held that the Governor retains the power to withdraw an unconfirmed appointment. The reasoning centered on the constitutional text directing the Lieutenant Governor to act as Governor during such absences, supported by longstanding historical practice of over 1,400 similar actions by acting governors.

procedure

The case involved the division of community property, including out-of-state real estate in Florida, following the dissolution of a 31-year marriage between Sybil and Max Fink. The trial court had used an asset distribution method to equally divide the property and then granted a new trial on the ground that the division of the Florida real property violated Civil Code section 4800.5. The appellate court reversed that order, concluding that the original division complied with the statute because section 4800.5 creates only a preference against changing the nature of interests in out-of-state real property when a practical and equitable equal division is possible, while preserving the trial court's broad discretion in property division.

family lawproperty

In Hays v. Wood, the California Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to Government Code section 87207(b)(2) of the Political Reform Act of 1974, which required public officials who are attorneys or brokers to disclose clients paying fees of $1,000 or more annually, while other business entities faced a $10,000 threshold for similar disclosures of income sources. The case arose when a city councilman who was an attorney refused to name such clients on his required financial statements, arguing overbreadth, impairment of client confidentiality, and equal protection violations. The court upheld the Act's general requirement that covered officials disclose sources of personal and business income to promote awareness of potential conflicts of interest under a strict scrutiny standard. It invalidated only the special lower threshold for attorneys and brokers as lacking a sufficient basis under equal protection, while leaving the overall disclosure framework intact.

electionscivil rights

The case involved defendant Barry Floyd Braeseke, who was convicted of three counts of first degree murder after his parents and grandfather were found shot to death. The issues centered on the trial court's pretrial ruling suppressing defendant's initial confession obtained during booking after he had invoked his right to counsel, while admitting a later taped confession and physical evidence like the murder weapon. The California Supreme Court reviewed whether the subsequent statements and evidence were tainted as the fruit of the first unlawful confession and whether the People could challenge the suppression ruling. The court determined that the first confession was properly suppressed due to a Miranda violation, as the defendant had invoked his rights and the "off the record" discussion did not constitute a valid waiver or reinitiation, but the second confession was admissible because the defendant voluntarily recontacted officers and knowingly waived his rights. As a result, the remaining evidence supported the conviction without requiring suppression.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a juvenile wardship proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, in which minor Johnny G. was alleged to have committed assault with a deadly weapon. The victim testified at the hearing that he did not recognize his assailants, could not confirm any prior identification due to loss of consciousness, and described individuals whose heights did not match Johnny's; the prosecution introduced a police officer's testimony about the victim's earlier out-of-court identification of Johnny. The trial court admitted the prior statement as substantive evidence under Evidence Code section 1235 and found the allegation true. The California Supreme Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding, applying the longstanding rule that an extrajudicial identification not confirmed at trial cannot sustain a conviction absent other evidence connecting the defendant to the crime; because no such connecting evidence existed here, the order was reversed.

criminal lawprocedure

Bendix Forest Products Corporation challenged a directive from the Division of Occupational Safety and Health requiring the company to provide gloves or mittens at its expense for employees handling lumber at its Martell facility. The Court of Appeal had invalidated the order as exceeding the Division's authority, but the Supreme Court upheld the directive and denied Bendix's petition for a writ of mandamus. The court concluded that although the order did not qualify as a "special order" under Labor Code section 6305 because no uncorrectable unsafe condition was shown, the Division has broad statutory authority under sections 6307 and 6308 to enforce safety standards and require employers to supply necessary protective equipment. This power allows the agency to prescribe safety devices and safeguards to protect employee health in the workplace.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned an indigent defendant's appeal from a robbery conviction after appointed counsel filed a brief summarizing the record and facts but identifying no arguable issues and asking the appellate court to conduct its own review. The California Supreme Court granted hearing to determine whether the proceedings satisfied the constitutional requirements established in Anders v. California and People v. Feggans for handling no-merit appeals by indigents. The court decided that counsel may remain in the case without withdrawing if the brief sets forth the facts with transcript citations, refers to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal, and informs the defendant of the right to file a supplemental brief; the reviewing court must then independently examine the entire record to decide if the appeal is wholly frivolous. If any arguable issue is identified, new counsel must be appointed to argue it. The ruling rests on the need to provide indigent appellants with substantial equality and fair process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved property owners in Sacramento's Natomas area who were assessed and paid for sewer improvements under a special district created in anticipation of urban development, after which the city annexed the area and later adopted an open-space plan and ordinance that barred development and prevented the owners from realizing benefits from the sewers. The owners sued for inverse condemnation damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and mandate, but the trial court sustained demurrers without leave to amend. The California Supreme Court held that the city could not apply the plan and ordinance to these owners indefinitely without providing reassessment or other relief, because the assessments were levied based on expected benefits from urban use that the city had previously promoted. The core reasoning was that the subsequent regulatory change frustrated the fundamental purpose of the assessments without compensation or adjustment, rendering the restrictions inapplicable absent such measures.

propertyenvironmentprocedure

The case involved defendant Winfred Saddler, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree robbery based on an eyewitness identification by the motel clerk victim and other prosecution evidence placing him near the scene. Saddler appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.62, which permits adverse inferences from a defendant's failure to explain or deny evidence against him. The California Supreme Court held that the instruction is valid and does not violate constitutional rights but was improperly given in this case because the record showed no evidentiary basis for it—the defendant had addressed or denied the relevant facts in his testimony. The court further concluded that giving the instruction was harmless error that did not affect the verdict. The conviction was therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Southern California Gas Company and other utilities challenging orders from the Public Utilities Commission that required them to provide loans for residential attic insulation at 8 percent interest over 60 months as part of implementing the Home Insulation Assistance and Financing Act. The court annulled the portions of the commission's decisions mandating the financing program. It reasoned that the Act only authorizes the commission to permit utilities to institute such programs voluntarily and to set requirements for those that do, without granting authority to mandate participation or impose different financing terms than specified in the statute. The court found no such mandatory power in other provisions of the Public Utilities Code, as they must be cognate to utility regulation but here the specific legislation limited the commission's role.

business & regulatoryenvironment