The case involved charges against merchants for selling products below cost with the intent to injure competitors and destroy competition, violating California's Unfair Practices Act. The trial court issued preliminary injunctions to halt these practices pending full resolution. The appellate court affirmed these orders, reasoning that conflicting evidence on the defendants' intent left the decision to the trial court's discretion, which was not abused, and that the legislature has authority under police powers to regulate such business practices to maintain the status quo.
The City of Alturas sued for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding a 1930 contract that allowed the city to use soil from defendant Gloster's adjacent ranch to maintain a levee and regulate a diverting dam on the Pit River in exchange for payments up to $100 per year. The contract had been performed for seven years until the city council unilaterally resolved to abandon its rights and cease payments, prompting Gloster to sue in justice court for compensation; the city sought a judicial determination that it was no longer bound while enjoining further suits. The trial court sustained a demurrer, and the California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complaint failed to allege facts showing an actual controversy over the parties' legal rights under the contract and that a valid contract cannot be unilaterally repudiated without cause. The court further held that the trial court acted within its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1061 in declining declaratory relief where other adequate remedies existed.
The case involved a dispute over the termination of a lease for a placer mining claim and equipment in Shasta County, where the plaintiff sought to recover possession and two unpaid rent installments totaling $850, while the defendants conceded termination of the lease but counterclaimed for $266.88 spent on necessary repairs to the leased machinery. The court determined that the plaintiff wrongfully terminated the lease on March 13, 1935, as the second and third rent installments were not yet due under the lease terms given delays from equipment repairs (which the plaintiff knew were needed) and a storm that cut off water supply, both excused by the lease's force majeure clause, and the default notice failed to specify all claimed breaches. Title to the property was quieted in the plaintiff by consent, but the judgment was modified to credit the plaintiff $200 against the counterclaim, resulting in a net award of $66.88 plus costs to the defendants.
This case concerns whether a writ of mandate can compel a city to pay interest on a condemnation award when the judgment itself does not specify interest. The court held that mandate is an appropriate remedy to enforce a statutory obligation to pay interest on a judgment, overruling prior precedent to the contrary. However, the court reversed the lower court's issuance of the writ because the condemnation statute provides an adequate alternative remedy through execution or annulment of the proceedings, and the plaintiffs failed to show that remedy was inadequate. Therefore, the writ was discharged without addressing whether interest was actually due on the award.
This case involved a wrongful death claim by a parent against the City of Los Angeles after an 11-year-old boy drowned in a pool formed by an open storm drain on city property. The complaint alleged that the city had actual notice for over two years of a concealed deep hole in the muddy pool, which had become a playground for local children, but failed to remedy the condition, post warnings, or provide guards as required by a 1923 statute imposing liability for known dangerous conditions on public property. The trial court sustained the city's demurrer without leave to amend, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts were governed by the rule in Beeson v. City of Los Angeles rather than Sanchez v. East Contra Costa Irr. Co. The court reasoned that the dangers of water are matters of common knowledge even to children, that the deep hole resulted from natural erosion rather than an artificial contrivance, and that the city therefore had no duty to protect against the concealed risk under the attractive nuisance doctrine or the statute.
The case involved a dispute over title to 160 acres of public land in California's Kettleman Hills, where the plaintiff and intervener claimed rights based on a 1909 placer mining location notice for oil, which was recorded just after a presidential withdrawal order. The trial court ruled for the defendants, who later obtained federal prospecting permits under the 1920 Leasing Act and subsequent leases after discovering oil in 1928, and the appellate court affirmed. The core reasoning was that the claimants had made no valid discovery of oil in paying quantities by the standards of prudent development, had abandoned the site by 1913 after halting all work and removing equipment, and had failed to diligently prosecute further efforts as required to preserve rights under the Pickett Act, causing any prior claims to lapse. The court also noted the absence of the United States as a necessary party.
