Ira F. Thompson

The case involved charges against merchants for selling products below cost with the intent to injure competitors and destroy competition, violating California's Unfair Practices Act. The trial court issued preliminary injunctions to halt these practices pending full resolution. The appellate court affirmed these orders, reasoning that conflicting evidence on the defendants' intent left the decision to the trial court's discretion, which was not abused, and that the legislature has authority under police powers to regulate such business practices to maintain the status quo.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The City of Alturas sued for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding a 1930 contract that allowed the city to use soil from defendant Gloster's adjacent ranch to maintain a levee and regulate a diverting dam on the Pit River in exchange for payments up to $100 per year. The contract had been performed for seven years until the city council unilaterally resolved to abandon its rights and cease payments, prompting Gloster to sue in justice court for compensation; the city sought a judicial determination that it was no longer bound while enjoining further suits. The trial court sustained a demurrer, and the California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complaint failed to allege facts showing an actual controversy over the parties' legal rights under the contract and that a valid contract cannot be unilaterally repudiated without cause. The court further held that the trial court acted within its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1061 in declining declaratory relief where other adequate remedies existed.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over the termination of a lease for a placer mining claim and equipment in Shasta County, where the plaintiff sought to recover possession and two unpaid rent installments totaling $850, while the defendants conceded termination of the lease but counterclaimed for $266.88 spent on necessary repairs to the leased machinery. The court determined that the plaintiff wrongfully terminated the lease on March 13, 1935, as the second and third rent installments were not yet due under the lease terms given delays from equipment repairs (which the plaintiff knew were needed) and a storm that cut off water supply, both excused by the lease's force majeure clause, and the default notice failed to specify all claimed breaches. Title to the property was quieted in the plaintiff by consent, but the judgment was modified to credit the plaintiff $200 against the counterclaim, resulting in a net award of $66.88 plus costs to the defendants.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case concerns whether a writ of mandate can compel a city to pay interest on a condemnation award when the judgment itself does not specify interest. The court held that mandate is an appropriate remedy to enforce a statutory obligation to pay interest on a judgment, overruling prior precedent to the contrary. However, the court reversed the lower court's issuance of the writ because the condemnation statute provides an adequate alternative remedy through execution or annulment of the proceedings, and the plaintiffs failed to show that remedy was inadequate. Therefore, the writ was discharged without addressing whether interest was actually due on the award.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a wrongful death claim by a parent against the City of Los Angeles after an 11-year-old boy drowned in a pool formed by an open storm drain on city property. The complaint alleged that the city had actual notice for over two years of a concealed deep hole in the muddy pool, which had become a playground for local children, but failed to remedy the condition, post warnings, or provide guards as required by a 1923 statute imposing liability for known dangerous conditions on public property. The trial court sustained the city's demurrer without leave to amend, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts were governed by the rule in Beeson v. City of Los Angeles rather than Sanchez v. East Contra Costa Irr. Co. The court reasoned that the dangers of water are matters of common knowledge even to children, that the deep hole resulted from natural erosion rather than an artificial contrivance, and that the city therefore had no duty to protect against the concealed risk under the attractive nuisance doctrine or the statute.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved a dispute over title to 160 acres of public land in California's Kettleman Hills, where the plaintiff and intervener claimed rights based on a 1909 placer mining location notice for oil, which was recorded just after a presidential withdrawal order. The trial court ruled for the defendants, who later obtained federal prospecting permits under the 1920 Leasing Act and subsequent leases after discovering oil in 1928, and the appellate court affirmed. The core reasoning was that the claimants had made no valid discovery of oil in paying quantities by the standards of prudent development, had abandoned the site by 1913 after halting all work and removing equipment, and had failed to diligently prosecute further efforts as required to preserve rights under the Pickett Act, causing any prior claims to lapse. The court also noted the absence of the United States as a necessary party.

propertyfederal power

This case involved attorney Roth facing charges from the State Bar for violating professional conduct rules by soliciting clients through unlicensed individuals and other misconduct in two separate incidents involving accident victims. The local committees and board of governors investigated and recommended suspensions of varying lengths based on findings of solicitation and related violations. The court, after reviewing the evidence including conflicting testimonies and patterns of behavior, concluded that Roth had engaged in improper solicitation over time and ordered a six-month suspension from practicing law.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a plaintiff's appeal from a defense judgment in a personal injury action arising from a collision between her car and a Southern Pacific passenger train at a railroad crossing in San Jose. The plaintiff contended that the trial court erred in its jury instructions on negligence and contributory negligence, in submitting a special interrogatory that omitted proximate cause, in certain evidentiary rulings, and in communicating with the jury through the bailiff outside counsel's presence. The court held that the case was properly submitted to the jury on conflicting evidence regarding visibility, warnings, and the plaintiff's conduct, but reversed the judgment because multiple trial errors—including an instruction limiting consideration of the train's pre-crossing speed, the refusal of requested instructions on the duty to look, the exclusion of impeachment evidence about the engineer's refusal to testify at a coroner's inquest, and the improper jury communication—were prejudicial to the plaintiff.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned an award of workers' compensation benefits for an employee injured while working for both a general employer (a cement contractor whose brother was the employee) and a special employer (a construction company on the Golden Gate Bridge project). The Industrial Accident Commission held the general employer's insurer solely liable and discharged the special employer's insurer. The court determined that liability of the general employer's insurer was proper under the facts showing control and payroll inclusion, but the discharge of the special employer's insurer was erroneous because both employers were jointly and severally liable. The court allowed the general employer's insurer to object to the discharge, as it impacted rights of contribution between the parties, and remanded the matter for a joint and several award.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a high school student, Barouk Perumean, who was injured in an automobile mechanics class when a fellow student, George Wills, started a car that had been left in reverse gear, pinning Perumean against a workbench. Perumean and his father sued the Los Angeles City High School District, the instructor Samuel Pick, Wills, and others for damages based on negligence. The trial court directed verdicts in favor of the school district and Pick, the jury found Wills liable, and the California Supreme Court affirmed those directed verdicts while dismissing an unauthorized appeal from the denial of a new-trial motion. The court held there was no substantial evidence of negligence by Pick or the district, noting that safety rules had been taught, Wills was an experienced student who had not previously taken risks, and the instructor could not reasonably be expected to monitor every action amid supervising two dozen pupils.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned whether a writ of prohibition could prevent the California State Board of Optometry from proceeding with a license revocation against optometrist Ward M. Whitten for allegedly false advertising under the Optometry Law. The superior court had issued the writ, but the California Supreme Court reversed that decision on appeal by the board. The court held that the writ of prohibition is available only to restrain judicial acts in excess of jurisdiction and does not apply to state boards performing administrative functions, such as investigating and enforcing licensing rules. It reasoned that the optometry board lacks judicial power and that any review of its actions would instead be available through other remedies like mandamus, leaving the board free to proceed with its hearing.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case challenges the validity of Santa Rosa Ordinance No. 473, which makes it unlawful to sell or distribute within the city any milk pasteurized outside its limits. The plaintiff, whose dairy and pasteurization plant are located just outside the city but within the city's approved state milk inspection district, alleged full compliance with all state and local requirements except the ordinance. The trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the complaint, but the California Supreme Court reversed, ruling the ordinance invalid. The core reasoning was that the state Agricultural Code comprehensively regulates milk production, inspection, and sale, and the local rule adds an unreasonable, arbitrary restriction unrelated to health or safety that effectively creates an invalid barrier to out-of-city businesses.

business & regulatory

The case was a wrongful death action brought by the plaintiff after her husband was struck and killed by the defendants' car while crossing Long Beach Boulevard. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants and denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiff's own witness testimony showed the decedent crossed the street diagonally outside a crosswalk with his back partly turned to oncoming traffic from the north, establishing contributory negligence as a matter of law. The court further reasoned that this direct evidence left no room for the statutory presumption that the decedent exercised due care. The appeal from the order denying a new trial was dismissed as non-appealable.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the validity of land transfers from Irving Hill to defendant G.B. Podesta, where the plaintiff alleged that Hill was mentally incompetent and that the deeds and related agreement were obtained through fraud and undue influence. The trial court rejected these claims, finding the transactions voluntary and competent, and quieted title in Podesta. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that substantial evidence supported the findings of competence and free action by Hill, that any evidentiary rulings were not prejudicial, and that the denial of a new trial was within the trial court's discretion.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute over payments due to the decedent's widow under a trust created by a decree of distribution in probate court. The decree directed the trustee to pay the widow $300 monthly from trust income and described the bequest as an annuity, leading the widow to claim the payments should begin at the testator's death under Probate Code rules. The trustee argued it was merely a share of income that could start only after the trustee received and invested the assets. The trial court awarded the widow back payments from the date of death, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding the decree ambiguous and inconsistent. Resorting to the will itself to resolve the ambiguity, the court held that the bequest was a gift of income only, with no right to payments during administration or from the trust corpus.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a suit by the Mortgage Guarantee Company against guarantors on a $70,000 promissory note secured by a deed of trust on real property, seeking a deficiency after a trustee's sale. The note's maker was a building corporation whose officers and stockholders had signed a guaranty waiving notice and authorizing extensions; the property was later conveyed to others, and the holder granted extensions to those grantees without the guarantors' consent. The trial court ruled for the guarantors, finding the guaranty lacked consideration, was limited by oral agreement to extensions only to the maker, and was discharged by the extensions under suretyship rules. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the coincidental execution provided consideration, parol evidence could not vary the unambiguous written guaranty, and under the Negotiable Instruments Law the maker was not discharged by extensions to grantees so the guarantors were likewise not exonerated. The judgment was therefore reversed in favor of the plaintiffs.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned whether a writ of attachment could be maintained in an action where Los Angeles Drug Co. alleged that defendants had converted goods and merchandise valued at $18,000 and sought recovery of their reasonable value, including through an accounting. Defendants moved to dissolve the attachment on the ground that it was unavailable in a conversion suit. The court determined that the complaint could be read as stating a claim in assumpsit for the value of the property, which rests on an implied contract, and therefore fell within the statutory provisions authorizing attachment. On that basis, the court issued a peremptory writ of prohibition barring the superior court from dissolving the attachment.

proceduretorts & liability

The case was an action by Kenneth Watson against several insurance companies for damages arising from the alleged conversion of 2,500 shares of stock in the Watson & Taylor insurance agency corporation. The dispute stemmed from 1931 agreements to address the agency's substantial debts to the insurers, which included bills of sale transferring business assets and stock to a trustee with power to sell if the debts remained unpaid, followed by a reorganization that placed control with new operators Richards and Rhorer and changed the corporate name. The trial court ruled for the defendants after reforming one contract to bind Watson personally, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trustee had authority to dispose of the stock, that Watson and Taylor had ratified the transactions through later corporate resolutions and mutual cancellations of agency contracts, and that treating the corporate acts as those of the individuals was warranted to avoid inequitable results.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case involves an appeal by the prosecution from a trial court order that set aside a guilty verdict against the defendant on two counts of attempted murder and one count of assault with a deadly weapon, on the ground that no valid plea had been entered before trial. The trial court had suspended proceedings to determine the defendant's sanity, found him sane, and then convicted him after trial, but later vacated the verdict believing the original not guilty plea had been superseded. The appellate court held that the order was appealable because it effectively granted a new trial, and reversed it, ruling that under Penal Code sections 1368 and 1370 the original plea remained in effect and proceedings simply resumed after the sanity determination without needing rearraignment. The court further noted that no actual motion for a new trial had been made or ruled upon. The matter was remanded for entry of judgment on the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over coverage under an automobile liability insurance policy after plaintiff Card R. Williams, driving a borrowed car with the owner's permission, caused an accident, paid a judgment to the injured party, and sought reimbursement from defendant General Casualty Company. The insurer denied the claim, arguing that Williams owned or partly owned the vehicle (contrary to policy terms), that he was estopped from denying ownership based on a prior statement, that he failed to deliver the summons and complaint as required, and that he provided false information violating the cooperation clause. The trial court found for Williams on the issues of non-ownership and waiver of the delivery requirement, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding of non-ownership, that estoppel was neither pleaded nor established, that the insurer's prior disclaimer of liability made delivery of papers futile, and that any misstatement about ownership caused no prejudice under the policy.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory