The case involved two 17-year-old defendants convicted by a jury of forcible rape of an 18-year-old woman in a car. The defendants appealed, claiming insufficient evidence of force, erroneous jury instructions regarding corroboration of the victim's testimony and the required resistance, and improper statements by the prosecutor about possible sentences. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find guilt, that the instructions as a whole correctly stated the law on corroboration and resistance, and that any error in the prosecutor's remarks was not preserved or prejudicial since no objection was made at trial.
This case involved a dispute over property division following a divorce between spouses who had jointly operated a taxicab business in Denver. After the trial court granted the wife a divorce and placed her in charge of the business under receivership, it later awarded her control of the seven remaining taxicab licenses (valued at $2,800), requiring her either to pay the husband $1,400 in installments if she kept them or to split any sale proceeds equally; no alimony was awarded. The husband appealed, arguing that the decree improperly divested him of title to property that was his alone and that the court lacked authority to divide assets in this manner rather than awarding alimony. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the trial court's finding of joint ownership and that the statute authorizing division of property (separate from alimony) permitted the method used, which was not an abuse of discretion given the wife's role in salvaging the business.
This case concerns a custody dispute over a ten-year-old girl between her mother and paternal grandmother following the father's death in a mining accident. After the parents' divorce, custody had been awarded to the grandmother, but the trial court modified the decree to grant the mother custody during the school year and the grandmother during summers, allowing the child to leave the state with a bond and directing workers' compensation benefits to a trustee. The court affirmed this modification, holding that the child's best interests are the primary consideration and that evidence of the mother's pre-divorce conduct was irrelevant to the current fitness determination. The trial judge's decisions on evidence, continuances, and out-of-state travel were deemed within discretion and not erroneous.
This case concerned whether May Department Stores Co. could obtain a refund of Colorado service taxes paid on construction and repair services for buildings, including a new Curtis Street store in Denver held under a 50-year lease. The company claimed an exemption under the statute because the costs of the services entered into and became part of the charges to retail customers subject to sales tax. The trial court ruled in favor of the company and granted the refund, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the taxpayer bears the burden to clearly establish the right to exemption and that the comptroller's testimony was insufficient to prove the costs were passed on to ultimate purchasers in the required manner, without needing to reach the estoppel argument based on the company's capitalization and depreciation of the building costs.
This case involved a libel suit brought by George J. Knapp, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor of Colorado, against the Denver Post and related defendants. Knapp challenged a September 1940 newspaper article that included a marked sample ballot designating him as "Not Qualified" for the office while marking other candidates as preferred, claiming the publication was defamatory and caused him damages. The district court sustained the defendants' demurrer and dismissed the complaint, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the statements were not libelous per se because they expressed opinions on the plaintiff's fitness for public office rather than imputing personal misconduct or defects, and that candidates for office invite public scrutiny of their qualifications; it further reasoned that such criticism by the press is protected unless it involves falsehoods or malice that specifically harm reputation in a legally actionable way.
The case involved a dispute over whether Union Oil Company was entitled to specific performance of an agreement to assign a patent for dewaxing petroleum oils from defendant Stanton. The trial court granted specific performance, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the letters exchanged constituted an option supported by consideration, which, upon exercise by the plaintiff, ripened into a mutually binding contract for the sale of the patent, making the option irrevocable and enforceable.