Frank B. Goudy

The case involved two 17-year-old defendants convicted by a jury of forcible rape of an 18-year-old woman in a car. The defendants appealed, claiming insufficient evidence of force, erroneous jury instructions regarding corroboration of the victim's testimony and the required resistance, and improper statements by the prosecutor about possible sentences. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find guilt, that the instructions as a whole correctly stated the law on corroboration and resistance, and that any error in the prosecutor's remarks was not preserved or prejudicial since no objection was made at trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over property division following a divorce between spouses who had jointly operated a taxicab business in Denver. After the trial court granted the wife a divorce and placed her in charge of the business under receivership, it later awarded her control of the seven remaining taxicab licenses (valued at $2,800), requiring her either to pay the husband $1,400 in installments if she kept them or to split any sale proceeds equally; no alimony was awarded. The husband appealed, arguing that the decree improperly divested him of title to property that was his alone and that the court lacked authority to divide assets in this manner rather than awarding alimony. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the trial court's finding of joint ownership and that the statute authorizing division of property (separate from alimony) permitted the method used, which was not an abuse of discretion given the wife's role in salvaging the business.

family lawproperty

This case concerns a custody dispute over a ten-year-old girl between her mother and paternal grandmother following the father's death in a mining accident. After the parents' divorce, custody had been awarded to the grandmother, but the trial court modified the decree to grant the mother custody during the school year and the grandmother during summers, allowing the child to leave the state with a bond and directing workers' compensation benefits to a trustee. The court affirmed this modification, holding that the child's best interests are the primary consideration and that evidence of the mother's pre-divorce conduct was irrelevant to the current fitness determination. The trial judge's decisions on evidence, continuances, and out-of-state travel were deemed within discretion and not erroneous.

family law

This case concerned whether May Department Stores Co. could obtain a refund of Colorado service taxes paid on construction and repair services for buildings, including a new Curtis Street store in Denver held under a 50-year lease. The company claimed an exemption under the statute because the costs of the services entered into and became part of the charges to retail customers subject to sales tax. The trial court ruled in favor of the company and granted the refund, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the taxpayer bears the burden to clearly establish the right to exemption and that the comptroller's testimony was insufficient to prove the costs were passed on to ultimate purchasers in the required manner, without needing to reach the estoppel argument based on the company's capitalization and depreciation of the building costs.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a libel suit brought by George J. Knapp, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor of Colorado, against the Denver Post and related defendants. Knapp challenged a September 1940 newspaper article that included a marked sample ballot designating him as "Not Qualified" for the office while marking other candidates as preferred, claiming the publication was defamatory and caused him damages. The district court sustained the defendants' demurrer and dismissed the complaint, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the statements were not libelous per se because they expressed opinions on the plaintiff's fitness for public office rather than imputing personal misconduct or defects, and that candidates for office invite public scrutiny of their qualifications; it further reasoned that such criticism by the press is protected unless it involves falsehoods or malice that specifically harm reputation in a legally actionable way.

electionsfree speechtorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over whether Union Oil Company was entitled to specific performance of an agreement to assign a patent for dewaxing petroleum oils from defendant Stanton. The trial court granted specific performance, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the letters exchanged constituted an option supported by consideration, which, upon exercise by the plaintiff, ripened into a mutually binding contract for the sale of the patent, making the option irrevocable and enforceable.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a customer who was injured when the plate glass panel in a swinging entrance door at the Home Public Market broke as he placed his hand on it. He sued the store for negligence and obtained a jury verdict in county court. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the plaintiff presented no evidence of any defect in the door, any dangerous condition known or reasonably knowable to the defendant, or any other act of negligence. The court further ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply because the accident could reasonably be attributed to causes other than negligence, and that the trial court's oral instruction to the jury misstated the applicable standard of care for business invitees. The case was remanded with directions to enter judgment for the defendant.

torts & liability

This case involved a challenge to the jurisdiction of a Denver justice of the peace court over a debt collection action brought against a Jefferson County resident for goods sold on open account by a Denver business. The plaintiff sought relief under Rule 106 to restrain the justice court proceedings after his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was denied, arguing that his refusal to pay while residing in Jefferson County meant the cause of action accrued there. The court affirmed the judgment upholding the justice court's jurisdiction. It reasoned that, absent any specific agreement on the place of payment, a debt is payable at the creditor's place of business, so the cause of action accrued in Denver, and a debtor cannot select the forum by breaching the contract through nonpayment.

procedure

The case concerned whether an individual adopted in Illinois in 1916 by a man who predeceased his sister Isabel Warr could inherit from Warr's estate as her heir at law, or whether Warr's blood cousins were the proper heirs. The court held that the adoptee had no right to inherit through her adoptive parent from the adoptive parent's blood relatives. The core reasoning was that Colorado's adoption statutes, including those enacted in 1931, create a personal relationship only between the adopter and adoptee and do not alter the rule that intestate succession follows bloodlines; prior decisions such as Russell v. Jordan and Wilson v. Wilson had already established that adoption does not expand an adoptee's inheritance rights to remote kin of the adoptive family.

family lawproperty

The case involved defendant Martinez, convicted under a Colorado statute (section 65, chapter 48, ’35 C.S.A.) of attempting to take indecent liberties with an eight-year-old child and of enticing the child into his automobile for that purpose, though acquitted on a count alleging the completed act. The district court entered judgments on the attempt and enticement verdicts. On review, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the attempt conviction despite the acquittal on the completed offense, that an automobile qualifies as "any other place" under the statute's broad language intended to protect children's morals, and that the rule of ejusdem generis did not limit the statute's reach. The court found no reversible error in the proceedings or jury instructions.

criminal law

The case involved a criminal prosecution in which defendant Emerick was convicted in Denver district court on charges of obtaining $10,000 in bonds belonging to Sadie Rogers by false pretenses (claiming authority via power of attorney) and by use of the confidence game. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the trial judge gave an erroneous jury instruction on the defense theory that the bonds were a gift, requiring a new instruction on retrial. It further held that substantial hearsay evidence was improperly admitted, including testimony by witness Strickland about investigations and statements by third parties, letters and a deposition containing self-serving declarations, and records of related civil filings, in violation of the defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses and fundamental evidentiary rules.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an adverse proceeding in which plaintiffs challenged defendant’s application for a patent on the Starlight Extension mining claim in Gilpin County, Colorado. Plaintiffs sought to relocate and amend their earlier East Extension Independence Lode claim—originally located in 1924—to include a discovery shaft that lay outside the original boundaries, thereby overlapping defendant’s claim. The trial court upheld the amended location, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the original location was invalid because the discovery shaft was not within the claim’s limits and that an amended certificate could not cure the defect once intervening rights had attached under the Starlight Extension. The court reasoned that valid mining locations on public land require the discovery point to be inside the described boundaries and that relocation statutes do not permit interference with existing third-party rights.

property

This case concerned a claim filed against the estate of John F. Olson by Jim Jorgensen based on two allegedly lost promissory notes totaling $1,660, which the county court allowed in 1936. After Jorgensen's death, the estate's administratrix petitioned to set aside the allowance more than five years later, leading to a district court ruling that disallowed the claim due to lack of proper notice, failure to file the notes, and misleading statements in the claim. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the district court improperly relied on inadmissible testimony from the administratrix regarding events before Jorgensen's death, in violation of the dead man's statute. Without that evidence, there was no valid basis to disturb the original allowance after such a long period. The court remanded with instructions to allow the claim.

procedure

This case was an ejectment action over ownership and possession of the Zip lode, an unpatented mining claim in Boulder County, Colorado. Plaintiffs held title through a 1919 location certificate and a 1929 sheriff's deed, had filed annual labor affidavits through 1940, and used the claim for operations tied to an adjoining mine; defendants, after working the site under a lease that ended, attempted to relocate the claim in 1941 as the Gold Coin Fraction lode. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs, finding that a presumption of regular discovery and location existed and had not been rebutted, that annual assessment work had been performed, and that defendants' relocation was motivated by a desire to use the surface for a dump rather than to mine the claim itself. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the trial court's findings and that the presumption arising from long use and recorded documents had not been overcome. The opinion discusses Colorado mining-location statutes and case law on presumptions favoring ancient claims but does not reach the validity of defendants' new location certificate.

property

The case involved real estate brokers suing a property owner for a commission after the owner sold her apartment house following the cancellation of an exclusive listing agreement. The trial court granted a nonsuit and dismissed the case, which the appellate court affirmed. The court found insufficient evidence of fraud in procuring the cancellation and held that no consideration was required to cancel an executory contract by mutual consent. The brokers' claims that the cancellation was fraudulent or lacked consideration were rejected due to lack of clear evidence supporting those theories.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In Norton v. People, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit the felony of obtaining money by false pretenses based on an indictment alleging that he and a co-defendant made specific false representations about their influence with Denver's Civil Service Commission and social entertainment of commissioners or influential people to secure a police appointment for the victim in exchange for $50. The jury acquitted the defendant on a separate count of obtaining money by false pretenses. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the conspiracy conviction and ordered the defendant's discharge, reasoning that the evidence did not support the material averments in the indictment regarding the alleged representations about influence and entertainment, but instead showed only a different claim about reimbursement for a dinner, and that proof on a conspiracy charge must correspond to the indictment's specific allegations.

criminal law

This case concerned whether an irrigation district and related companies could be taxed by a county on reservoir-adjacent land, buildings, and personal property located within that county, even though the irrigated lands were elsewhere. The trial court denied an injunction against the assessment, ruling that the properties were not exempt. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the land and improvements formed integral parts of the reservoir system and thus qualified for the constitutional exemption from separate taxation under Article X, Section 3, which covers ditches, canals, and flumes used exclusively for irrigation; however, it affirmed that agricultural implements, machinery, and livestock were not covered by that exemption. The court reasoned that the exemption extends to property necessary for the system's operation and maintenance, including land above the high-water line used to protect the reservoir, because such assets are encompassed within the value of the water rights assessed on the benefited lands.

taxesproperty

This case involved a claim for death benefits under Colorado's Workmen’s Compensation Act after Edgar Rand, a meat salesman, died in a car accident on a Saturday afternoon in 1940. The Industrial Commission denied the claim, finding that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of Rand’s employment, a decision affirmed by the district court and now on review. The court held that the commission, as fact-finder, could reasonably infer from the evidence that Rand had left work upon arriving home, that his subsequent activities including driving to the theater and attempting to service his personal car were not employment-related, and that the claimant had not met her burden to show resumption of employment duties. Supporting precedents established that the commission’s findings and inferences from the record are binding if supported by competent evidence, even if contrary inferences are possible.

labor & employment

The case concerned a wife's attempt to enforce monthly payments owed under a written property settlement agreement entered during divorce proceedings in county court, after the husband stopped payments and claimed the agreement had merged into the final divorce decree and been satisfied by prior payments exceeding the court's $2,000 jurisdictional limit. The district court dismissed the wife's suit, ruling that the agreement had merged into the decree per prior precedent and thus the matter was already adjudicated. The court reversed, holding that the agreement was not merged because the decree only referenced and approved it without setting forth its specific terms, leaving the parties' rights as contractual rather than decreed obligations enforceable in a separate action. It distinguished the facts from Gavette v. Gavette and applied the rule from Kastner v. Kastner that mere approval does not incorporate an independent contract into the decree.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a property owner suing the City of Colorado Springs for $125 in damages to her abutting real estate after the city removed a landscaped center parkway on Platte Avenue to construct an underpass under railroad tracks, with no change to the street grade in front of her property. A jury found for the plaintiff, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the judgment and ordered the action dismissed. The court reasoned that a city holds title to its streets in trust for public use, so abutting owners may recover only for injuries differing in kind from those to the general public; here, the record showed no special easement or unique damage to the plaintiff from the reasonable street improvement, which affected the community at large.

propertytorts & liability