Greeley W. Whitford

The case involved a defendant who sought to vacate a $3,140 default judgment entered against him after the trial court set the matter for trial based on notice served only on his attorney of record, who refused to accept it and indicated an intent to withdraw. The defendant, a traveling salesman frequently absent from Denver, learned of the judgment months later and promptly moved to vacate on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect, asserting he had received no personal notice or information about the trial setting. The district court denied the motion and issued a body execution. On review, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion, as the defendant had no opportunity to be heard and should have his day in court, and therefore reversed the order with directions to vacate the judgment and proceed accordingly.

procedure

This case was a civil action by the Sherman Mercantile Company to recover possession of 327 cases of eggs stored in a warehouse, after unauthorized orders signed by an employee purported to transfer the eggs first to C.E. Richards and then to the Jagger Produce Company without the owner's knowledge, consent, or consideration. The trial court directed a verdict for the Jagger Produce Company at the close of the plaintiff's evidence and entered judgment accordingly. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the evidence was sufficient to present questions of fact and witness credibility to the jury rather than resolving the matter by directed verdict.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In Herrera v. the People, Amelio Herrera was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting his wife four times and sentenced to death by the jury. He appealed the judgment, primarily contending that the trial court should have directed a verdict of not guilty on the first-degree murder charge due to insufficient evidence of premeditation. The court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the jury, as the sole fact-finder in capital cases, could properly reject the defendant's inconsistent and self-contradictory testimony about a struggle or suicide in light of the physical evidence, such as the location and number of wounds, and that no errors occurred in the admission of evidence or jury instructions.

criminal law

This case involves a wife's action for divorce in district court. After two trials, the second resulting in a verdict for the defendant and dismissal of the complaint, with the motion for new trial denied, the wife sought review via writ of error. The court held that it could not entertain the writ because the statute prohibits writs of error in divorce actions unless a decree of divorce has been granted against the party seeking review, and here no such decree was issued. Citing prior cases, the court dismissed the writ for lack of jurisdiction.

family lawprocedure

This case concerned a widow's petition for a statutory allowance from her intestate husband's estate, which the administrator opposed based on an antenuptial contract the couple signed before their marriage. The contract stipulated a payment of $100 per year of marriage upon separation, required the wife to vacate the home within 24 hours, and released all claims to alimony, support, dower, or widow's rights while barring her from contesting a divorce. The county court denied the petition, but the district court on appeal held the contract void and ruled for the widow. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the agreement was against public policy because it anticipated and provided for future separation and divorce, thereby undermining the indissoluble nature of marriage under the law.

family law

The plaintiff sued the City of Lamar for personal injuries allegedly caused by the city's negligence in allowing a storm sewer manhole in a public street to remain in a defective and dangerous condition. The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the amended complaint on the ground that it did not allege compliance with the statutory requirement of written notice. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that Section 9157, C. L. 1921 requires written notice of the time, place, and cause of injury to be given to the city clerk within ninety days as a condition precedent to maintaining any action, and that the complaint's allegations of oral notice to council members and later written notice to the city attorney did not satisfy the statute. The court held that the statutory mandate is clear and that lack of prejudice to the city or actual knowledge does not excuse timely written notice to the designated official.

proceduretorts & liability