The case concerned a dispute between the Colorado General Assembly and Governor Lamm over whether the legislature could appropriate federal block grant funds through headnotes in the annual long bill appropriations, or whether such decisions fell under the governor's executive authority. The district court ruled that the block grants were subject to legislative appropriation power and that the governor's vetoes of the headnotes were invalid. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that expenditure of the federal block grant monies is generally within the governor's executive power to allocate resources, except for portions subject to state matching requirements or transferable to other grants. The court reasoned that the flexible nature of block grants distinguishes them from purely custodial federal funds addressed in prior cases like MacManus v. Love, but separation of powers principles still limit legislative control over most executive spending decisions.
This case involved Colorado taxpayers who owned condominium units converted from apartments and challenged increased 1980 property tax assessments imposed by the El Paso County assessor, which the taxpayers argued violated statutory limits on valuation changes outside base years. Some owners who had not protested the assessments under the protest and adjustment statute (section 39-5-122) instead sought partial abatements and refunds through the county commissioners and state administrator under sections 39-1-113 and 39-10-114; after denial for failure to exhaust remedies, they appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals and courts. The court of appeals held that relief was available under the abatement provisions because the assessments were illegal, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The Supreme Court reasoned that the statutory scheme permits use of abatement and refund procedures for taxes that are illegal or erroneous due to an assessor's unauthorized valuation change, as opposed to mere overvaluations that must first be addressed through protest procedures, and it distinguished prior cases involving excessive valuations.
The case involved whether an insurance carrier under Colorado's Workers' Compensation Act could be penalized for failing to admit or deny liability within 25 days when it lacked notice of the employee's injury, even though the employer had notice. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 8-53-102 explicitly exempts the insurer from penalties until it receives actual notice or knowledge of the injury. The court reasoned that while section 8-44-105 requires insurance contracts to deem employer notice as notice to the insurer for compensation purposes, this does not extend to imposing penalties on the insurer for delays attributable to the employer's failure to report. Therefore, the insurer was only liable for penalties based on the period after it received actual notice.
This case involved three Polish nationals who entered the US on temporary visitor visas, applied for political asylum, and obtained INS work authorizations while their applications remained pending, including under a moratorium on deportations for Polish nationals. They sought unemployment compensation benefits based on wages earned during their Colorado employment, but the Division of Employment and Training denied the claims on grounds that they were not "permanently residing in the United States under color of law." The Industrial Commission and court of appeals ruled the claimants eligible, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The court reasoned that the claimants satisfied the eligibility criteria in section 8-73-107(7)(a) because INS actions, including work permissions and suspension of deportation proceedings, established that they were residing in the country under color of law during the relevant base periods.
This case consolidated three appeals concerning whether certain non-citizens married to U.S. citizens were eligible for Colorado unemployment insurance benefits based on wages earned while their applications for permanent residency were pending with the INS. The Industrial Commission and Division of Employment and Training had denied benefits to claimants Arteaga, Zanjani, and Yiadom for periods before their INS petitions were granted, but the court of appeals reversed those denials. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claimants qualified as "permanently residing in the United States under color of law" under the state unemployment statute because the INS had authorized their employment, stayed deportation proceedings, and allowed them to remain while applications were processed. The court reasoned that this federal authorization satisfied the eligibility requirement tied to federal law and that the claimants had earned qualifying wage credits during the relevant base periods.
The case involved two defendants charged with driving under the influence who refused to submit to blood or breath alcohol tests after being advised only that refusal would lead to license revocation. The trial courts admitted evidence of their refusals at trial and instructed juries accordingly, and the district courts affirmed the resulting convictions. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether such evidence violated the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination or due process rights, and whether it was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the statute expressly permits admission of refusal evidence, that refusal is not a compelled act protected by the privilege, and that no additional warnings were constitutionally required. It further found the evidence relevant to consciousness of guilt and that any potential prejudice could be weighed by the jury.