Jean E. Dubofsky

The case concerned a dispute between the Colorado General Assembly and Governor Lamm over whether the legislature could appropriate federal block grant funds through headnotes in the annual long bill appropriations, or whether such decisions fell under the governor's executive authority. The district court ruled that the block grants were subject to legislative appropriation power and that the governor's vetoes of the headnotes were invalid. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that expenditure of the federal block grant monies is generally within the governor's executive power to allocate resources, except for portions subject to state matching requirements or transferable to other grants. The court reasoned that the flexible nature of block grants distinguishes them from purely custodial federal funds addressed in prior cases like MacManus v. Love, but separation of powers principles still limit legislative control over most executive spending decisions.

federal power

This case involved Colorado taxpayers who owned condominium units converted from apartments and challenged increased 1980 property tax assessments imposed by the El Paso County assessor, which the taxpayers argued violated statutory limits on valuation changes outside base years. Some owners who had not protested the assessments under the protest and adjustment statute (section 39-5-122) instead sought partial abatements and refunds through the county commissioners and state administrator under sections 39-1-113 and 39-10-114; after denial for failure to exhaust remedies, they appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals and courts. The court of appeals held that relief was available under the abatement provisions because the assessments were illegal, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The Supreme Court reasoned that the statutory scheme permits use of abatement and refund procedures for taxes that are illegal or erroneous due to an assessor's unauthorized valuation change, as opposed to mere overvaluations that must first be addressed through protest procedures, and it distinguished prior cases involving excessive valuations.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case involved whether an insurance carrier under Colorado's Workers' Compensation Act could be penalized for failing to admit or deny liability within 25 days when it lacked notice of the employee's injury, even though the employer had notice. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 8-53-102 explicitly exempts the insurer from penalties until it receives actual notice or knowledge of the injury. The court reasoned that while section 8-44-105 requires insurance contracts to deem employer notice as notice to the insurer for compensation purposes, this does not extend to imposing penalties on the insurer for delays attributable to the employer's failure to report. Therefore, the insurer was only liable for penalties based on the period after it received actual notice.

labor & employment

This case involved three Polish nationals who entered the US on temporary visitor visas, applied for political asylum, and obtained INS work authorizations while their applications remained pending, including under a moratorium on deportations for Polish nationals. They sought unemployment compensation benefits based on wages earned during their Colorado employment, but the Division of Employment and Training denied the claims on grounds that they were not "permanently residing in the United States under color of law." The Industrial Commission and court of appeals ruled the claimants eligible, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The court reasoned that the claimants satisfied the eligibility criteria in section 8-73-107(7)(a) because INS actions, including work permissions and suspension of deportation proceedings, established that they were residing in the country under color of law during the relevant base periods.

immigrationlabor & employment

This case consolidated three appeals concerning whether certain non-citizens married to U.S. citizens were eligible for Colorado unemployment insurance benefits based on wages earned while their applications for permanent residency were pending with the INS. The Industrial Commission and Division of Employment and Training had denied benefits to claimants Arteaga, Zanjani, and Yiadom for periods before their INS petitions were granted, but the court of appeals reversed those denials. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claimants qualified as "permanently residing in the United States under color of law" under the state unemployment statute because the INS had authorized their employment, stayed deportation proceedings, and allowed them to remain while applications were processed. The court reasoned that this federal authorization satisfied the eligibility requirement tied to federal law and that the claimants had earned qualifying wage credits during the relevant base periods.

immigrationlabor & employment

The case involved two defendants charged with driving under the influence who refused to submit to blood or breath alcohol tests after being advised only that refusal would lead to license revocation. The trial courts admitted evidence of their refusals at trial and instructed juries accordingly, and the district courts affirmed the resulting convictions. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether such evidence violated the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination or due process rights, and whether it was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the statute expressly permits admission of refusal evidence, that refusal is not a compelled act protected by the privilege, and that no additional warnings were constitutionally required. It further found the evidence relevant to consciousness of guilt and that any potential prejudice could be weighed by the jury.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Paul Louis Fields, who was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder after shooting coworkers following his termination from a K-Mart security guard position. Fields appealed on the ground that the prosecutor had used peremptory challenges to systematically exclude Spanish-surnamed persons from the jury, violating his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment and the Colorado Constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges to exclude cognizable groups from the jury deprives a defendant of the right to an impartial jury, and such a claim may be established based on the use of challenges in a single trial. However, after reviewing the voir dire transcript, the court concluded that the prosecutor's excusal of three of four Spanish-surnamed panel members did not violate this right in the present case. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the convictions.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved the appeal of Steven L. Wiser's convictions for first degree burglary and felony menacing after a jury trial, based on an incident where he entered an apartment and threatened a woman with a knife. The defendant argued that two instances of juror misconduct during deliberations—one juror consulting a dictionary for the definition of burglary and another asking a legal secretary about the source of jury instructions—required reversal of the convictions. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision upholding the convictions, ruling that the misconduct was improper but did not warrant a new trial. The court reasoned that exposure to extraneous information does not automatically create a presumption of prejudice, and the defendant failed to show that the misconduct actually influenced the jury's verdict, consistent with CRE 606(b) restrictions on inquiring into jurors' mental processes and an objective evaluation of potential influence.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a defendant charged with second-degree murder, a class 2 felony, could waive a jury trial on the issue of sanity without the consent of the district attorney, as required by section 16-8-105(2). The district court permitted the waiver over the prosecution's objection, relying on appellate precedent suggesting a broad right to waive jury trials. The Colorado Supreme Court made the rule absolute and reversed, holding that the specific statutory consent requirement for sanity trials in class 1, 2, or 3 felonies controls over the general jury-waiver statute and is constitutional. The court reasoned that specific statutes govern over later general ones absent clear repeal, that legislative conditions on waivers are reasonable and permissible under precedent like People v. Brisbin, and that distinctions among felony classes reflect valid policy choices within the legislature's authority.

criminal lawprocedure

In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution challenged a district court order suppressing the defendant's inculpatory statements to police and derivative evidence in a first-degree murder case. The defendant had walked into a police station, confessed to shooting her former boyfriend, and provided details and physical evidence, while later expert testimony conflicted over whether her borderline personality disorder and possible psychosis rendered the statements involuntary. The district court had suppressed the evidence under the state court's prior ruling in People v. Connelly. After the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that decision in Colorado v. Connelly, holding that a defendant's mental condition alone does not render statements involuntary under the Due Process Clause, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the suppression order, noting that reliability questions are governed by state evidentiary rules rather than federal constitutional voluntariness standards.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the admissibility of out-of-court statements made by a five-year-old child victim in a prosecution against her father for second-degree sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, aggravated incest, and child abuse. The trial court disqualified the child from testifying due to her inability to understand an oath or communicate facts accurately but permitted four professional witnesses (a psychologist, physician, investigator, and social worker) to recount the child's descriptions of the abuse and identification of the perpetrator. The court of appeals upheld admission of the statements under the medical hearsay exception in CRE 803(4), but the Colorado Supreme Court disapproved that rationale while concluding the statements were sufficiently trustworthy to qualify under a hearsay exception and affirmed the judgment of conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a dispute between two nursing homes and the Colorado Department of Social Services over the amount and timing of Medicaid payments, in which a state hearing officer issued an interlocutory order directing immediate payment of over $35,000 to one provider. The Department filed a complaint in Denver district court seeking review of that order under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) after the court determined it lacked jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the district court had no jurisdiction under Rule 106 because the APA supplies the exclusive avenue for review of agency action, including interlocutory orders, and requires parties to exhaust administrative remedies. The court emphasized that allowing judicial interference via Rule 106 would undermine the separation of powers and the statutory framework for agency proceedings.

procedurehealthcare

The case Smith v. Charnes involved a challenge to the revocation of Robert O. Smith's driver's license by the Colorado Department of Revenue under a statute prohibiting driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.15 or higher. The plaintiff argued there was insufficient evidence he drove the vehicle, that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, and that holding the administrative hearing while criminal proceedings were pending violated his due process rights and privilege against self-incrimination. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the revocation, holding that actual physical control of a vehicle with the engine running constitutes driving under the statute, the breath test was timely administered within one hour, and the statute provided adequate notice without violating constitutional protections.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a partner could be prosecuted for felony theft under Colorado law after using funds from a real estate partnership bank account to pay a personal debt arising from a prior partnership dissolution. The trial court dismissed the charge, finding that partnership property does not qualify as a 'thing of value of another' under the theft statute. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that both common law and the state's Uniform Partnership Law treat partners as co-owners of partnership property, so an unauthorized taking by one partner cannot constitute theft of property belonging to another. The court noted that jurisdictions allowing such charges have enacted specific statutory exceptions absent from Colorado law.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a university professor who sued eighteen faculty colleagues and administrators for defamation after they submitted memos to university officials criticizing his leadership and conduct as department head, which contributed to the non-renewal of his contract. The plaintiff also raised claims for negligence, outrageous conduct, breach of contract, and violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the judgment, ruling that even if there was a factual dispute about whether the plaintiff consented to publication of the second memo, he failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on actual malice, which was required to overcome the defendants' qualified privilege in this internal employment matter.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved an interlocutory appeal by the prosecution after a Denver district court suppressed evidence of burglary tools and a watch found on the floor of the defendants' car during an investigatory stop near a reported burglary. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the suppression ruling. The court held that the stop was justified under the Fourth Amendment because the totality of circumstances—including the car's proximity to the burglary scene shortly after the dispatch, the driver's evasive series of turns and accelerations, and the officer's experience-based assessment that the occupants did not appear to belong in the neighborhood—provided a specific and articulable basis for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved disciplinary proceedings against Colorado attorney Richard L. Garnett for his role in advising clients on a gold mining claim dispute. Garnett accepted a retainer and a one-percent interest in the mine, formed corporations with the clients in which he held stock and officer positions, filed a quiet title action on behalf of one corporation against his own clients as individuals, and later withheld corporate records and files until a promissory note for legal fees was paid. The grievance committee found by clear and convincing evidence that these actions violated rules prohibiting acceptance of employment where the lawyer's personal or financial interests conflict with the client's (DR 5-101(A)), serving as counsel when the lawyer should be a witness (DR 5-101(B)), and failing to deliver client property (DR 9-102(B)(4)), along with a general violation of standards of honesty. The Colorado Supreme Court approved the committee's recommendation and suspended Garnett from practice for 60 days.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether defendant Jimmy Lee Waits's 1979 guilty pleas to attempted first degree murder and second degree burglary satisfied the requirements of Crim.P. 11 and due process. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the advisement on attempted first degree murder was inadequate because it failed to explain the elements of the offense in a coherent manner, requiring vacation of that plea. The court upheld the burglary plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the search-and-seizure law in effect at the time of the plea, even though that law was later overruled. The People were permitted either to retain the existing sentence on the burglary conviction or to retry the defendant on the attempted murder charge, which would vacate the entire plea agreement.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a negligence lawsuit by Marilyn Mason against the state of Colorado, its parole board, and individual board members, alleging that the board carelessly granted parole to Larry Smith in 1976, after which Smith committed a murder in Texas in 1978. The trial court dismissed the claims based on official immunity for the board members, which it extended to the board and state. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the entities lacked immunity despite the individuals' immunity and that sovereign immunity had been waived by insurance. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, ruling that quasi-judicial immunity for parole decisions extends to the parole board as an entity and the state itself, because the functional rationale of protecting independent decision-making and avoiding litigation applies equally to the governmental bodies performing those quasi-judicial acts.

criminal lawcivil rights

In Kort v. Carlson, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed a district court's orders in a criminal case where defendant Ross Michael Carlson, charged with first-degree murder and found incompetent to stand trial, was committed to the state psychiatric hospital. The district court had granted the defendant's request for treatment by a private psychotherapist of his choice at the hospital, required the state to pay the therapist's fees, and directed the Department of Institutions to seek supplemental appropriations and include those fees in its budget. The Supreme Court held that the district court exceeded its authority in issuing these orders. The core reasoning was that decisions about treatment at state institutions are within the professional discretion of the Department of Institutions and its staff, not subject to judicial micromanagement, and that statutes governing criminally committed defendants do not authorize courts to compel specific outside treatment or funding mechanisms in this manner.

criminal lawhealthcareprocedure