Alex J. Martinez

In BP America Production Co. v. Patterson, royalty owners sued BP for underpaying natural gas royalties from 1986 to 1997 by deducting post-production costs under a netback methodology instead of the lease terms, while allegedly concealing this practice through uniform royalty reports and brochures. Plaintiffs sought class certification to toll the statute of limitations via claims of fraudulent concealment. The trial court certified the class under C.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), the court of appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the decision. The court reasoned that BP's consistent representations and internal decisions allowed common circumstantial evidence to establish class-wide ignorance and reliance, satisfying the predominance requirement, and that the class period did not improperly include undamaged members.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a proposed class action lawsuit by consumers against multiple Medved automobile dealerships and their owner, alleging violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act for failing to disclose the prices and existence of dealer-added aftermarket products like pin striping in sales documents. Plaintiffs sought certification of two classes: one for customers charged for uninstalled products and another for those charged without written disclosure. The Supreme Court of Colorado held that while causation and injury elements under the CCPA can sometimes be inferred on a class-wide basis from common circumstantial evidence like standard sales documents, defendants must have the opportunity to rebut those inferences with individual evidence from face-to-face transactions. The trial court had erred by not rigorously analyzing the dealerships' evidence of individual sales interactions to determine if class-wide proof was feasible, leading the court to affirm the court of appeals' remand for that analysis under class certification rules.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved landowners filing a class action against Unocal for alleged asbestos contamination of their properties stemming from the removal of an old oil pipeline, with claims including nuisance, negligence, and trespass, seeking damages for property value loss and remediation. The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the standards a trial court must apply when deciding class certification under C.R.C.P. 23, clarifying that courts must rigorously analyze evidence to confirm each requirement is met, may consider factual or legal disputes (including those overlapping the merits or expert testimony) but cannot resolve them to prejudge the case, and need not decide ultimate expert admissibility or merits outcomes. The court reversed the court of appeals on the application of a preponderance standard, mandatory resolution of all overlapping disputes, and full expert dispute resolution, while upholding the trial court's certification decision after its detailed review of briefs, exhibits, and hearings. The ruling focused on procedural aspects of class actions rather than the underlying liability claims.

procedurepropertytorts & liabilityenvironment

This case arose from dependency and neglect proceedings in which the Otero County Department of Human Services sought to terminate the parental rights of mother C.M. after one of the children in her household died from chronic abuse and neglect, and she failed to complete a court-ordered treatment plan. The court of appeals reversed the termination order in part and remanded for further findings on the statutory criteria for termination, while also directing an inquiry into whether mother's counsel was ineffective for failing to timely move to disqualify the trial judge on the ground that the judge's clerk was the mother of a key witness (the caseworker). The Colorado Supreme Court held that an ineffective-assistance claim, even if cognizable in a termination proceeding, requires a showing of prejudice, which was absent here because the disqualification motion rested solely on an appearance of impropriety rather than actual bias. The Court therefore concluded that the motion was untimely, reversed the portion of the appellate decision requiring a remand on ineffective assistance or reassignment to a different judge, and left undisturbed the remand for additional findings on the termination criteria, which may be made by the original trial judge.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Gonzalo Santana's conviction for distributing a controlled substance, which the court of appeals reversed on grounds that the prosecution shifted the burden of proof by questioning a defense expert about his ability to perform conclusive tests on the substance. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the prosecutor did not improperly shift the burden because defense counsel had first introduced evidence of the expert's testing capabilities on direct examination. The court reasoned that the context of the questioning, including the defense's prior introduction of the evidence and the trial court's instructions on the burden of proof, meant no burden shifting occurred. The decision emphasized evaluating such claims based on the entire record rather than isolated statements.

criminal lawprocedure

In these consolidated cases, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed trial court orders suppressing statements made by defendants Hughes and Meza-Reyes to police officers, on the grounds that the statements were obtained without Miranda warnings during what the courts deemed custodial interrogations. Hughes was questioned at his home about alleged domestic violence, and Meza-Reyes was questioned during a traffic stop about her identity and immigration status after producing a foreign ID card. The court held that the trial courts applied an incorrect legal standard by conflating the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis (whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave) with the Miranda custody standard (whether a reasonable person would feel deprived of freedom in a significant way), and by improperly relying on officers' uncommunicated subjective intentions. Because the facts as found did not establish custody under the proper Miranda test, the court reversed the suppression orders.

criminal lawprocedure