BP America Production Co. v. Patterson
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2011-10-31 · cited 23×
In BP America Production Co. v. Patterson, royalty owners sued BP for underpaying natural gas royalties from 1986 to 1997 by deducting post-production costs under a netback methodology instead of the lease terms, while allegedly concealing this practice through uniform royalty reports and brochures. Plaintiffs sought class certification to toll the statute of limitations via claims of fraudulent concealment. The trial court certified the class under C.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), the court of appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the decision. The court reasoned that BP's consistent representations and internal decisions allowed common circumstantial evidence to establish class-wide ignorance and reliance, satisfying the predominance requirement, and that the class period did not improperly include undamaged members.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Garcia v. MEDVED CHEVROLET, INC.
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2011-10-31 · cited 15×
This case involved a proposed class action lawsuit by consumers against multiple Medved automobile dealerships and their owner, alleging violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act for failing to disclose the prices and existence of dealer-added aftermarket products like pin striping in sales documents. Plaintiffs sought certification of two classes: one for customers charged for uninstalled products and another for those charged without written disclosure. The Supreme Court of Colorado held that while causation and injury elements under the CCPA can sometimes be inferred on a class-wide basis from common circumstantial evidence like standard sales documents, defendants must have the opportunity to rebut those inferences with individual evidence from face-to-face transactions. The trial court had erred by not rigorously analyzing the dealerships' evidence of individual sales interactions to determine if class-wide proof was feasible, leading the court to affirm the court of appeals' remand for that analysis under class certification rules.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Jackson v. Unocal Corp.
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2011-10-31 · cited 26×
This case involved landowners filing a class action against Unocal for alleged asbestos contamination of their properties stemming from the removal of an old oil pipeline, with claims including nuisance, negligence, and trespass, seeking damages for property value loss and remediation. The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the standards a trial court must apply when deciding class certification under C.R.C.P. 23, clarifying that courts must rigorously analyze evidence to confirm each requirement is met, may consider factual or legal disputes (including those overlapping the merits or expert testimony) but cannot resolve them to prejudge the case, and need not decide ultimate expert admissibility or merits outcomes. The court reversed the court of appeals on the application of a preponderance standard, mandatory resolution of all overlapping disputes, and full expert dispute resolution, while upholding the trial court's certification decision after its detailed review of briefs, exhibits, and hearings. The ruling focused on procedural aspects of class actions rather than the underlying liability claims.
procedurepropertytorts & liabilityenvironment
People Ex Rel. Ag
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2011-10-17
This case arose from dependency and neglect proceedings in which the Otero County Department of Human Services sought to terminate the parental rights of mother C.M. after one of the children in her household died from chronic abuse and neglect, and she failed to complete a court-ordered treatment plan. The court of appeals reversed the termination order in part and remanded for further findings on the statutory criteria for termination, while also directing an inquiry into whether mother's counsel was ineffective for failing to timely move to disqualify the trial judge on the ground that the judge's clerk was the mother of a key witness (the caseworker). The Colorado Supreme Court held that an ineffective-assistance claim, even if cognizable in a termination proceeding, requires a showing of prejudice, which was absent here because the disqualification motion rested solely on an appearance of impropriety rather than actual bias. The Court therefore concluded that the motion was untimely, reversed the portion of the appellate decision requiring a remand on ineffective assistance or reassignment to a different judge, and left undisturbed the remand for additional findings on the termination criteria, which may be made by the original trial judge.
family lawprocedure
People v. Santana
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2011-06-27 · cited 450×
The case involved Gonzalo Santana's conviction for distributing a controlled substance, which the court of appeals reversed on grounds that the prosecution shifted the burden of proof by questioning a defense expert about his ability to perform conclusive tests on the substance. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the prosecutor did not improperly shift the burden because defense counsel had first introduced evidence of the expert's testing capabilities on direct examination. The court reasoned that the context of the questioning, including the defense's prior introduction of the evidence and the trial court's instructions on the burden of proof, meant no burden shifting occurred. The decision emphasized evaluating such claims based on the entire record rather than isolated statements.
criminal lawprocedure
People v. Hughes
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2011-06-06 · cited 2×
In these consolidated cases, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed trial court orders suppressing statements made by defendants Hughes and Meza-Reyes to police officers, on the grounds that the statements were obtained without Miranda warnings during what the courts deemed custodial interrogations. Hughes was questioned at his home about alleged domestic violence, and Meza-Reyes was questioned during a traffic stop about her identity and immigration status after producing a foreign ID card. The court held that the trial courts applied an incorrect legal standard by conflating the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis (whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave) with the Miranda custody standard (whether a reasonable person would feel deprived of freedom in a significant way), and by improperly relying on officers' uncommunicated subjective intentions. Because the facts as found did not establish custody under the proper Miranda test, the court reversed the suppression orders.
criminal lawprocedure
People v. Gallegos
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2011-04-11 · cited 13×
This case consolidated five interlocutory appeals by the People challenging a trial court order that suppressed evidence obtained from wiretap orders in a drug conspiracy prosecution involving multiple defendants. The trial court had ruled the wiretap orders invalid because the issuing chief judge, whose son worked as a deputy district attorney, was not a neutral and detached magistrate under the Fourth Amendment and had allegedly disqualified himself from criminal matters, and it also identified several violations of the state wiretap statute. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the chief judge had properly acted as a neutral and detached magistrate despite his son's employment, as there was no actual conflict or disqualification from issuing the specific orders, and that the statutory violations were not sufficiently prejudicial or significant to require suppression of the evidence. The court emphasized that wiretap orders are presumed valid and reviewed the facts and law de novo on the legal issues.
criminal lawprocedure
Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mid-Century Insurance Co.
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2011-01-18 · cited 49×
This case concerns how two auto insurers must allocate responsibility for losses from an accident in which the driver, covered by Mid-Century as a non-owner operator, crashed a vehicle owned by his father and insured by Shelter. The court held that a step-down provision in Shelter's renewal policy reducing coverage for permissive drivers was unenforceable because Shelter failed to provide clear and unequivocal notice of the change, preserving the original higher policy limits. The court further held that the excess clauses in both policies were valid under Colorado law but mutually repugnant, rendering both insurers co-primary and requiring them to share losses on a dollar-for-dollar basis until one policy is exhausted. The reasoning rested on the insured's reasonable expectation of unchanged renewal terms absent adequate notice, the absence of any statutory mandate for primary coverage by the vehicle owner's insurer, and the need to avoid absurd results from conflicting other-insurance provisions.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
Nunn v. Mid-Century Insurance Co.
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2011-01-10 · cited 41×
This case involved Nicole Nunn, as assignee of insured Bryan James, bringing a bad faith breach of insurance contract claim against Mid-Century Insurance Company after the insurer allegedly refused a policy-limits settlement offer, resulting in a pretrial stipulated judgment of $4 million against James. The trial court and court of appeals granted summary judgment to Mid-Century on the ground that Nunn's covenant not to execute meant James faced no personal liability and thus no actual damages could be shown. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that entry of a judgment in excess of policy limits is sufficient to establish the damages element of a bad faith claim notwithstanding a covenant not to execute, because the claim arises from the insurer's breach of its duty to protect the insured.
torts & liability
People v. Cowart
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2010-12-13 · cited 23×
The case was an interlocutory appeal by the People challenging a trial court's suppression of statements defendant Tommy Cowart made during a pre-arrest interview at his home concerning allegations of sexual assault by his niece. The trial court ruled that Cowart was in custody for Miranda purposes, so the lack of warnings required suppression of the statements and barred the lead investigator from testifying in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, applying an objective custody test and concluding that Cowart was not in custody because officers did not restrain him to a degree associated with formal arrest, and it found no legal basis for the broad prohibition on the officer's testimony.
criminal lawprocedure
ROCKY MOUNTAIN FESTIVALS v. Parsons Corp.
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2010-12-13 · cited 3×
This case involved Rocky Mountain Festivals suing Parsons Corporation for negligence after Parsons prepared a flawed report that led a town to demand over $1.6 million in unpaid water and wastewater tap fees from the festival. In the prior litigation with the town, the festival was found liable for only a portion of the water fees but prevailed on the wastewater claims, and it then sought to recover its attorneys' fees and costs from that case against Parsons under the wrong-of-another doctrine. The trial court and court of appeals granted summary judgment to Parsons, holding that the festival's partial liability in the underlying dispute barred recovery of fees. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a plaintiff may recover fees for a separable subset of claims under the doctrine if those claims rest on different facts and legal theories from the rest of the underlying case. The decision was limited to the damages issue and did not address other elements of the negligence claim.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Martinez v. People
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2010-11-30 · cited 767×
The case involved defendant Arthur Martinez's appeal of his convictions for second degree assault and conspiracy to commit second degree assault arising from a fight outside a bar. Martinez argued that the prosecutor improperly accused him during closing rebuttal of tailoring his testimony based solely on his presence at trial, without tying the claim to any specific evidence in the record, in violation of his rights under the Colorado Constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court held that generic tailoring arguments of this type are improper but concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the strength of other evidence, including a parking-lot security video and inconsistencies between the defendant's testimony and other witnesses. The court therefore affirmed the court of appeals' judgment upholding the convictions, though on different grounds than the lower court.
criminal lawprocedure
CASH ADVANCE & PREF. CASH LOANS v. State
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2010-11-30 · cited 1×
This case involves whether two lending entities operating as Cash Advance and Preferred Cash Loans, which claimed to be arms of the Miami Nation of Oklahoma and Santee Sioux Nation, were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity from a Colorado enforcement action seeking to compel compliance with an investigative subpoena under the state's Uniform Consumer Credit Code. The Colorado Supreme Court held that tribal sovereign immunity applies to state investigatory subpoena enforcement actions, is jurisdictional in nature, and protects tribal officers acting within their lawful authority. On remand, the trial court must apply a three-factor test focused on the entities' creation, ownership, and relationship to the tribes to determine if they qualify as arms of the tribes, with the state bearing the burden to prove subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. The court further ruled that any waiver of immunity must be explicit and unequivocal, and that the entities' voluntary disclosure of information created only a limited waiver as to that information.
federal powercivil rightsprocedurebusiness & regulatory
People v. Vigil
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2010-11-15
The case concerned Clovis Vigil, who was stopped by police after an off-duty officer reported a suspected drug transaction; officers used force including punches and baton strikes to arrest him for disorderly conduct, after which Vigil made incriminating statements and cocaine was found on his person, followed by later statements at the police station. The trial court suppressed the statements and drugs, ruling that the arrest lacked probable cause and that the statements were involuntary due to coercive physical force. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the suppression order, holding that the officers lacked probable cause prior to the confession and that the initial and subsequent statements were not voluntary under the totality of circumstances. A dissent argued the record did not support suppression of the contraband or post-Miranda statements.
criminal lawprocedure
DeBELLA v. People
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2010-06-07 · cited 542×
The case involved John DeBella's conviction for sexual assault on a child and enticement, where the trial court allowed the jury unrestricted access during deliberations to a videotaped interview of the child victim without any limiting instructions or supervision, despite defense objections highlighting inconsistencies with the victim's trial testimony. The court of appeals had affirmed the conviction, treating the trial court's action as a proper exercise of discretion under precedent. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to control jury access to testimonial exhibits as required by Frasco v. People and Settle v. People, which obligate courts to prevent undue emphasis on such evidence; the absence of any controls on the tape, central to resolving credibility issues, left the fairness of the proceedings in doubt.
criminal lawprocedure
Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc.
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2010-05-10
The case concerned homeowners who sued a builder for personal injuries sustained when one slipped on ice that accumulated due to a gutter construction defect. The Colorado Supreme Court held that under the CDARA's two-year statute of limitations, personal injury claims accrue when the claimant discovers or should have discovered the defect that ultimately causes the injury, rather than at the time of the injury itself. The court further determined that the equitable repair doctrine could not toll the limitations period because it is inconsistent with the CDARA's plain language and purpose. As a result, the claims filed nearly three years after the defect was first noticed were time-barred, and the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the builder was affirmed.
proceduretorts & liability
People v. Scott
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2010-04-05 · cited 4×
The case involved the suppression of evidence seized under a second search warrant during an investigation into possible criminal animal fighting at the defendant's residence after initial observations of multiple dogs prompted a first warrant for a municipal code violation. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding insufficient probable cause in the affidavits for items related to dog fighting. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the affidavits, considered together, established probable cause based on observations of dogs and equipment suggestive of dog fighting. The court remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
criminal lawprocedure
Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass'n Ex Rel. Kopfman v. Kopfman
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2010-03-15 · cited 28×
The case concerned the proper steps for a judgment creditor to extend a lien on Colorado real property based on a judgment originally issued by an Arizona court and later domesticated in Colorado under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. Wells Fargo domesticated an Arizona judgment in Saguache County, recorded a transcript in Rio Grande County to create a lien, and later attempted to extend the lien by renewing the judgment in Arizona and recording a renewal affidavit in Colorado. The court held that extension requires first reviving the foreign judgment in Arizona, then reviving the domesticated judgment in Colorado pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(h), and finally recording a transcript of the revived Colorado judgment in the same county. The reasoning centered on the text of section 13-52-102(1), which mandates that revival occur "as provided by law" and that a certified transcript from the Colorado court be recorded to ensure clear notice in property records, rejecting a substantial compliance approach that would permit foreign renewal documents.
propertyprocedure
A.L.L. v. People
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2010-03-01 · cited 25×
This case arose from a dependency and neglect proceeding in which a trial court terminated the parental rights of A.L.L. and D.Z. with respect to their child C.Z. The parents exercised their statutory rights to appeal and to court-appointed counsel, but their attorneys concluded there were no meritorious issues to raise and sought to withdraw under a procedure modeled on Anders v. California. The Colorado Supreme Court held that court-appointed counsel in such appeals have an obligation to advocate on the client's behalf rather than using an Anders-style briefing process. The court reasoned that a parent's rights are better protected through full appellate review of the termination order than through the withdrawal procedures applicable in criminal cases. It therefore remanded the matter to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this approach.
family lawprocedure
People v. Bergerud
Supreme Court of Colorado · 2010-01-11 · cited 1379×
The case involved Allen Bergerud, charged with two counts of first-degree murder, who disagreed with his court-appointed attorneys' strategy of arguing lack of deliberation due to mental conditions and intoxication rather than self-defense. After the trial court denied his request for substitute counsel, Bergerud elected to proceed pro se and was convicted. The court of appeals found a violation of his right to counsel and ordered a new trial, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed that decision. The court held that Bergerud's waiver of counsel required further inquiry to assess whether it was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, including whether his attorneys had infringed on his rights to enter a plea, testify, or have defenses investigated, and remanded for specific proceedings.
criminal lawcivil rights