Mary J. Mullarkey

This case involved the warrantless police entry into Arnold Wehmas's apartment after he was suspected of driving under the influence and leaving the scene of a minor car accident in the parking lot of his apartment complex. Officers entered without a warrant after witnesses reported the incident, knocked on the door, and obtained a key from the property owner; they then arrested Wehmas and observed signs of intoxication. The county court suppressed the resulting evidence, and the district court affirmed on the grounds that DUI was not grave enough to support warrantless entry and that dissipating blood alcohol did not create sufficient exigency. The Colorado Supreme Court held that DUI qualifies as a sufficiently grave offense under the exigent-circumstances doctrine but affirmed the suppression order because the prosecution failed to show that the circumstances here—such as the one-hour-and-twenty-two-minute delay and lack of any effort to obtain a warrant—justified the entry. The court therefore concluded that the officers acted unreasonably in entering the home without first securing a warrant.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Wehmas, the defendant faced misdemeanor charges for DUI and leaving the scene of an accident after witnesses reported him driving drunk, colliding with a parked car in his apartment complex lot, and returning to his unit without exchanging information. Officers entered his apartment without a warrant after obtaining a key from the property manager, arrested him, and gathered evidence of intoxication, prompting a motion to suppress all resulting evidence. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that DUI is a grave enough offense to support a potential warrantless home entry but affirmed suppression of the evidence. It held that the potential dissipation of blood alcohol content did not create sufficient exigent circumstances under the facts, including the one hour and twenty-two minutes that passed from dispatch to arrest, the presence of four officers, and the absence of any attempt to obtain a warrant. The court concluded that the officers acted unreasonably by entering without first securing a warrant or the premises.

criminal lawprocedure

In this medical malpractice case, plaintiff Phillip Garrigan alleged that defendant anesthesiologist Dr. Philip J. Bowen negligently managed his care during lumbar spine surgery, causing postoperative visual loss. The dispute before the Colorado Supreme Court concerned the trial court's order striking the trial testimony of one of Dr. Bowen's expert witnesses, Dr. Lorri A. Lee, as a discovery sanction for failing to produce raw data underlying a published study on postoperative visual loss that she had authored and planned to discuss. The trial court had found that the data was considered by the expert under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I) and thus discoverable, even though neither the defendant nor the expert had possession or control of it. The Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, the raw data was not 'considered' by the expert in forming her opinions for the case, so there was no discovery violation and the sanction order must be vacated.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, plaintiff Richard Tucker sued Volunteers of America for tort damages after he fell and was injured at a sponsored event, incurring $74,242 in medical bills that his health insurer Aetna satisfied for only $43,236 after negotiated discounts. The jury awarded Tucker damages including the full billed medical amount, but the trial court reduced the verdict under Colorado's collateral source statute (section 13-21-111.6) to reflect the insurance discounts. The court of appeals reversed, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff could recover the full amount of medical expenses. The court's core reasoning was that the statute's contract exception preserves the common-law collateral source rule for benefits obtained through the plaintiff's own insurance contract, so those amounts are not offset against the tortfeasor's liability.

torts & liability

This case concerned whether Colorado's Board of Assessment Appeals must award costs to taxpayers who partially prevail in an appeal of a county property tax valuation under section 39-8-109(1). After the BAA reduced the assessed value of the taxpayers' home but denied their request for expert appraiser costs, the court of appeals held that costs were mandatory. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute grants the BAA discretion to award or deny costs rather than requiring reimbursement. The decision rested on the plain language of the provision, which uses permissive terms like "may" when addressing the fixing of costs and does not impose a mandatory refund obligation on the BAA.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with second-degree kidnapping, third-degree assault, and menacing, plus habitual criminal counts based on prior felony convictions, who sought to waive his jury trial right for a bench trial due to concerns that his prior convictions, drug involvement, and status as a confidential informant would bias the jury. The prosecution objected under Colorado law granting it the right to insist on a jury trial. The trial court granted the bench trial, finding due process issues, but the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction because a defendant has no constitutional right to waive a jury over the prosecution's objection absent a showing that a jury trial would violate due process. The court explained that standard safeguards such as voir dire, peremptory challenges, and limiting instructions adequately protect against prejudice from prior convictions or collateral facts like drug involvement, and vacated the order directing a jury trial instead.

criminal lawprocedure