Mary J. Mullarkey

This case involved the warrantless police entry into Arnold Wehmas's apartment after he was suspected of driving under the influence and leaving the scene of a minor car accident in the parking lot of his apartment complex. Officers entered without a warrant after witnesses reported the incident, knocked on the door, and obtained a key from the property owner; they then arrested Wehmas and observed signs of intoxication. The county court suppressed the resulting evidence, and the district court affirmed on the grounds that DUI was not grave enough to support warrantless entry and that dissipating blood alcohol did not create sufficient exigency. The Colorado Supreme Court held that DUI qualifies as a sufficiently grave offense under the exigent-circumstances doctrine but affirmed the suppression order because the prosecution failed to show that the circumstances here—such as the one-hour-and-twenty-two-minute delay and lack of any effort to obtain a warrant—justified the entry. The court therefore concluded that the officers acted unreasonably in entering the home without first securing a warrant.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Wehmas, the defendant faced misdemeanor charges for DUI and leaving the scene of an accident after witnesses reported him driving drunk, colliding with a parked car in his apartment complex lot, and returning to his unit without exchanging information. Officers entered his apartment without a warrant after obtaining a key from the property manager, arrested him, and gathered evidence of intoxication, prompting a motion to suppress all resulting evidence. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that DUI is a grave enough offense to support a potential warrantless home entry but affirmed suppression of the evidence. It held that the potential dissipation of blood alcohol content did not create sufficient exigent circumstances under the facts, including the one hour and twenty-two minutes that passed from dispatch to arrest, the presence of four officers, and the absence of any attempt to obtain a warrant. The court concluded that the officers acted unreasonably by entering without first securing a warrant or the premises.

criminal lawprocedure

In this medical malpractice case, plaintiff Phillip Garrigan alleged that defendant anesthesiologist Dr. Philip J. Bowen negligently managed his care during lumbar spine surgery, causing postoperative visual loss. The dispute before the Colorado Supreme Court concerned the trial court's order striking the trial testimony of one of Dr. Bowen's expert witnesses, Dr. Lorri A. Lee, as a discovery sanction for failing to produce raw data underlying a published study on postoperative visual loss that she had authored and planned to discuss. The trial court had found that the data was considered by the expert under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I) and thus discoverable, even though neither the defendant nor the expert had possession or control of it. The Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, the raw data was not 'considered' by the expert in forming her opinions for the case, so there was no discovery violation and the sanction order must be vacated.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, plaintiff Richard Tucker sued Volunteers of America for tort damages after he fell and was injured at a sponsored event, incurring $74,242 in medical bills that his health insurer Aetna satisfied for only $43,236 after negotiated discounts. The jury awarded Tucker damages including the full billed medical amount, but the trial court reduced the verdict under Colorado's collateral source statute (section 13-21-111.6) to reflect the insurance discounts. The court of appeals reversed, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff could recover the full amount of medical expenses. The court's core reasoning was that the statute's contract exception preserves the common-law collateral source rule for benefits obtained through the plaintiff's own insurance contract, so those amounts are not offset against the tortfeasor's liability.

torts & liability

This case concerned whether Colorado's Board of Assessment Appeals must award costs to taxpayers who partially prevail in an appeal of a county property tax valuation under section 39-8-109(1). After the BAA reduced the assessed value of the taxpayers' home but denied their request for expert appraiser costs, the court of appeals held that costs were mandatory. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute grants the BAA discretion to award or deny costs rather than requiring reimbursement. The decision rested on the plain language of the provision, which uses permissive terms like "may" when addressing the fixing of costs and does not impose a mandatory refund obligation on the BAA.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with second-degree kidnapping, third-degree assault, and menacing, plus habitual criminal counts based on prior felony convictions, who sought to waive his jury trial right for a bench trial due to concerns that his prior convictions, drug involvement, and status as a confidential informant would bias the jury. The prosecution objected under Colorado law granting it the right to insist on a jury trial. The trial court granted the bench trial, finding due process issues, but the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction because a defendant has no constitutional right to waive a jury over the prosecution's objection absent a showing that a jury trial would violate due process. The court explained that standard safeguards such as voir dire, peremptory challenges, and limiting instructions adequately protect against prejudice from prior convictions or collateral facts like drug involvement, and vacated the order directing a jury trial instead.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is the third appeal in a class action by airport employees against Denver alleging personal injuries from environmental contamination at Concourse B of Denver International Airport. After the state tort claims were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act due to untimely notice, Denver sought mandatory attorney fees and costs under sections 13-17-201 and 13-16-113(2). The plaintiffs sought reductions in the award for work that could benefit a related federal RCRA lawsuit, but the trial court partially reduced it and the court of appeals reversed the reduction. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutes require full awards of fees and costs upon pre-trial dismissal of tort claims under C.R.C.P. 12(b) without exception for overlapping utility in companion litigation.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved the City of Aurora's application for water rights as part of its Prairie Waters Project, specifically appropriative rights of exchange on the South Platte River and an augmentation plan using treated effluent. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District opposed the exchanges, arguing Aurora should discount potential Colorado-Big Thompson Project water in the exchange reach, while East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation District challenged Aurora's right under a 1976 contract to reuse all effluent from sewage flows sent by ECCV. The water court granted the decree, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that without a contract between Northern Water and Aurora, Northern Water could not require any discounting of C-BT flows, and that the contract language unambiguously permitted Aurora to reuse all effluent regardless of source. The court reasoned that no injury to other rights was shown, the contract terms controlled, and there was no basis to limit reuse or find improper rate-making or exaction.

environmentproperty

In this criminal case, defendant Malinda Spykstra, charged with child sexual assault, issued subpoenas duces tecum to the parents of the victim B.G. seeking production of their home computers and electronic devices to search for emails that might contain inconsistent statements or recantations by the victim. The trial court denied the District Attorney's motion to quash, found the DA had standing under the Victim Rights Act, and modified the subpoenas to allow a defense expert to search the parents' computer for the victim's emails, subject to in camera review for privileged material. On appeal in an original proceeding, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the DA had standing but that the trial court abused its discretion by enforcing the subpoenas. The court reasoned that the procedure effectively turned the subpoenas into search warrants, that Spykstra failed to provide any factual basis showing a reasonable likelihood that relevant, evidentiary emails existed, and that the broad requests were therefore unreasonable and oppressive under Crim. P. 17(c).

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Disher, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether a defendant convicted of harassing a woman he had dated exclusively could be ordered to complete a domestic violence evaluation absent evidence of a sexual relationship. The county and district courts had held that the statute's definition of an intimate relationship required proof of sexual intimacy, so no evaluation could be mandated. The supreme court reversed, ruling that evidence of a sexual relationship is not necessary to find an intimate relationship under the domestic violence statute. The court reasoned from the statutory text defining intimate relationships to include past or present unmarried couples, the broader meaning of intimacy, and factors such as the nature and duration of the relationship.

criminal lawfamily law

This case involved a father seeking custody of his minor child A.H. after a dependency and neglect proceeding in which juries found the child was not dependent and neglected as to him, leading to his dismissal from the case, while the mother admitted allegations and the trial court retained jurisdiction over the child based on her admissions and denied the father's custody request on best-interests grounds. The father petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court under C.A.R. 21 for relief from the trial court's order instead of pursuing other avenues. The court held that C.A.R. 21 relief was inappropriate, discharged the rule to show cause, and explained that the father had failed to timely exercise his right to an expedited appeal under C.A.R. 3.4 and could instead intervene in the ongoing proceedings to seek custody. The core reasoning was that extraordinary relief under C.A.R. 21 is not a substitute for an unexercised adequate appellate remedy absent a compelling need.

family lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Brian Clayton, who was arrested on suspicion of stabbing two people at a party and made incriminating statements to police after being advised of and signing a written waiver of his Miranda rights. The trial court suppressed the statements, finding the waiver invalid because the detective's actions were coercive, Clayton appeared pressured and rushed, and he was not permitted to call his mother beforehand. On interlocutory appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the suppression order, concluding that Clayton had been advised of his rights three times, understood them, engaged in a non-coercive discussion about the waiver's consequences, and validly waived them knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The court further held that any violation of the statute requiring arrestees to be allowed family contact at the earliest possible time would not justify suppression because the statute does not create a constitutional right.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of multiple felony counts including sexual assault, assault, menacing, and child abuse following a trial presided over by a county judge. The court of appeals had vacated the convictions, holding that the county judge lacked authority to make numerous significant pretrial rulings because no written appointment as a district judge existed at the time, and a later nunc pro tunc order could not retroactively validate them. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the county judge had proper authority to conduct the pretrial hearings. It reasoned that any initial lack of documentation in the record did not invalidate the rulings, as the chief judge's subsequent nunc pro tunc order effectively documented the assignment of district court authority. The matter was remanded for consideration of the defendant's remaining appellate issues.

criminal lawprocedure

In this workers' compensation case, claimant Gladys Louise Clark suffered a work-related back injury while employed as a secretary at Avalanche Industries in 2000, leading to a closed claim with an average weekly wage (AWW) calculated at her then-salary of $415.63; her condition later worsened, she petitioned to reopen the claim under the statute, and by 2005 she was earning $625 weekly at a subsequent employer before being taken off work due to disability. The administrative law judge, Industrial Claim Appeals Office, and court of appeals all ruled that her AWW for the reopened permanent partial disability award could be based on her higher earnings from the later employer plus the cost of COBRA health benefits she would incur after losing that coverage. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the discretionary exception in section 8-42-102(3) permits deviation from the default AWW formula tied to the original accident date when necessary to fairly reflect the claimant's circumstances upon worsening injury, and that such calculations may incorporate post-accident wages and actual COBRA costs. The core reasoning centered on the statute's text allowing flexibility to achieve an equitable result without being strictly limited to wages at the time of the initial injury.

labor & employmenthealthcare

The case concerned whether a trial court could reject a defendant's waiver of conflict-free counsel and disqualify his chosen attorney, Harvey Steinberg, who had been endorsed as a witness in a separate drug case against the defendant. Maestas, facing murder charges, signed a written waiver after consulting independent counsel and repeatedly confirmed his knowing, voluntary, and intelligent choice to retain Steinberg despite the potential conflict. The trial court refused the waiver, citing concerns that the defendant could revoke it later under Colo. RPC 1.7 and thereby disrupt proceedings. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on speculation rather than record evidence, as Colorado law requires substantial deference to a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice absent concrete factors outweighing that right, and therefore made the rule to show cause absolute.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved James Kinney, who was convicted of sexually assaulting R.B. after being acquitted in prior trials for allegedly assaulting two other women, E.S. and M.C. The Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether evidence of the prior alleged assaults was admissible under CRE 404(b) despite the acquittals, whether the jury should have been informed of those acquittals, and whether Kinney could cross-examine E.S. about a pending misdemeanor charge against her. The court held that prior act evidence remains admissible even after acquittal but that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury about the acquittals, given the testimony's references to police involvement that invited speculation about the outcomes. It further ruled that limiting cross-examination of E.S. violated Kinney's confrontation rights because the pending charge created a potential incentive for favorable testimony due to prior prosecutorial assistance. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned whether an indigent defendant, Renee Bryant, who faced a default money judgment from county court in an insurance subrogation action stemming from a traffic accident, must post a judgment bond as a condition of appealing to the district court. The Colorado Supreme Court held that a party found indigent and permitted to proceed in forma pauperis is not required to post a judgment bond to appeal from county court, although the judgment would remain enforceable during the appeal. The court reasoned that the bond requirement in section 13-6-311 and C.R.C.P. 411 must be harmonized with section 13-16-103's directive to waive costs for indigent litigants, consistent with prior decisions waiving appellate bonds for indigents.

procedure

The case involved a dispute over discovery in an underinsured motorist benefits lawsuit: after a car accident, plaintiff Julie Stone sued her insurer State Farm to recover for alleged lost income and other damages, and State Farm sought her tax returns to verify the claimed wage loss. The trial court ordered Stone to authorize release of the returns without applying a specific test for such confidential documents. The Colorado Supreme Court held that tax returns may be compelled only if they are relevant to the case and there is a compelling need because the information is not readily available from other sources, a standard drawn from prior precedent rather than the Martinelli factors. Because the record showed the trial court had not considered whether alternative sources existed, the court vacated the portion of the discovery order requiring the tax records and returned the case for further proceedings consistent with this analysis.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved an interlocutory appeal by the prosecution challenging a trial court's suppression of statements made by defendant Sebet Redgebol, a recent Sudanese refugee with limited English proficiency, during a custodial police interrogation. Redgebol faced charges of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the suppression order, holding that Redgebol did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights due to inadequate translation by an untrained interpreter, substantial miscommunication, his cultural background, and limited intellectual functioning. The court also determined that the officer failed to honor Redgebol's unambiguous request for a lawyer by not ending the questioning.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Strauss, the case centered on whether evidence from five computers seized and forensically examined under a 2006 search warrant should be suppressed because an earlier 2004 warrant in a separate investigation had included a 90-day deadline for completing computer analysis. The trial court granted the defendant's suppression motion, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed that ruling on interlocutory appeal. The court decided that the 2004 warrant's time limit did not bar police from later obtaining and executing a new warrant to access the same computers. The core reasoning was that no constitutional or statutory provision prevented issuance of the 2006 warrant, which was independently supported by probable cause, and the earlier warrant's self-imposed limit applied only to that original investigation without creating any bar to future warrants.

criminal lawprocedure