The case involved a licensed real estate broker who sued an attorney and another broker for tortious interference with his business relationship after his commission agreement with a property seller was found unenforceable under General Statutes § 20-325a. The broker had arranged an option agreement for the buyer but was later excluded from subsequent deals. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The appellate court affirmed, ruling that the plaintiff provided no evidence of improper motive or means by the defendants as required to establish tortious interference, and that summary judgment did not violate the right to a jury trial because there were no genuine issues of material fact.
In this case, mall owners sued a roofing manufacturer after a contractor-installed roof leaked and required replacement, alleging breach of contract on the theory that the contractor acted as the manufacturer's agent and also pursuing strict liability in tort. The jury found for the plaintiffs on the agency theory but not strict liability; however, the trial court granted the manufacturer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish either actual or apparent agency because the approved roofer agreement did not create an agency relationship, the manufacturer did not control the contractor's work, and the owners had no direct dealings with or reliance on the manufacturer at the time of the contract. The decision reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict but concluded the trial court correctly determined no agency existed.
This case is an appeal from financial orders issued in a 1981 divorce judgment that dissolved an eighteen-year marriage with no children, along with a supplementary order awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees to defend the appeal. The trial court ordered the family home sold with net proceeds split 40% to the plaintiff and 60% to the defendant, awarded no alimony to either party, and denied the defendant's request for counsel fees. The defendant challenged three factual findings as unsupported by evidence: the plaintiff's sole contribution to acquiring and building the home with no input from her; her prior career and ongoing ability to work as a harpist; and the possibility of her future acquisition of capital assets from family contributions. The Supreme Court reviewed these claims in sequence, finding evidence in the record to support the trial court's determinations on the home's acquisition and the defendant's professional skills and prospects, and it referenced precedents such as Murphy v. Murphy to uphold the denial of fees.
The case concerned whether Edward Socha was personally liable for his father's unpaid nursing home bills of $4093.60 after signing an admission agreement as 'Responsible Party' while acting as conservator of his father's estate. Socha appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to exempt the case from the trial list due to the non-joinder of the state department of social services and its finding that he was individually liable on the contract. The court affirmed the rulings, holding that the trial judge had discretion under Practice Book § 274 to proceed and that the agreement contained no indication of representative capacity, making parol evidence inadmissible to show otherwise.
The case involved a dispute in which the plaintiff, as trustee and owner of real property, sued the defendants for converting and removing over 20,000 cubic yards of earth material from his land in violation of a written agreement that allowed them to enter and grade a specific 'gore' area between adjoining properties. After the plaintiff presented his evidence at a court trial, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment of dismissal under Practice Book § 302, ruling that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case on the threshold issue of the precise location of his property's southern boundary. The court determined that the plaintiff's deeds, probate records, maps (including the key 1954 Goodman map), and surveyor testimony were inadequate to prove the boundary with sufficient certainty, as they lacked independent verification and relied on disputed or derivative evidence. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal.
The case involved a defendant who entered nolo contendere pleas to second-degree kidnapping, first-degree sexual assault, and third-degree robbery, then moved for a psychiatric examination at the Whiting Forensic Institute under General Statutes § 17-244 to determine eligibility for commitment rather than incarceration. The institute's report found no basis for commitment, the trial court denied the defendant's requests for a continuance to present witnesses and later to reopen the judgment citing due process violations and statutory noncompliance, and it imposed a sentence of ten to twenty years. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the denials and sentence, holding that due process does not require additional hearings or continuances in this setting because the defendant was voluntarily seeking alternative treatment after conviction rather than facing involuntary commitment or an enhanced penalty under a separate statute. The court distinguished precedents involving mandatory or involuntary confinement and found no constitutional defect in the statute's hearing provisions.