Arthur H. Healey

The case involved a licensed real estate broker who sued an attorney and another broker for tortious interference with his business relationship after his commission agreement with a property seller was found unenforceable under General Statutes § 20-325a. The broker had arranged an option agreement for the buyer but was later excluded from subsequent deals. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The appellate court affirmed, ruling that the plaintiff provided no evidence of improper motive or means by the defendants as required to establish tortious interference, and that summary judgment did not violate the right to a jury trial because there were no genuine issues of material fact.

torts & liabilitypropertybusiness & regulatory

In this case, mall owners sued a roofing manufacturer after a contractor-installed roof leaked and required replacement, alleging breach of contract on the theory that the contractor acted as the manufacturer's agent and also pursuing strict liability in tort. The jury found for the plaintiffs on the agency theory but not strict liability; however, the trial court granted the manufacturer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish either actual or apparent agency because the approved roofer agreement did not create an agency relationship, the manufacturer did not control the contractor's work, and the owners had no direct dealings with or reliance on the manufacturer at the time of the contract. The decision reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict but concluded the trial court correctly determined no agency existed.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case is an appeal from financial orders issued in a 1981 divorce judgment that dissolved an eighteen-year marriage with no children, along with a supplementary order awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees to defend the appeal. The trial court ordered the family home sold with net proceeds split 40% to the plaintiff and 60% to the defendant, awarded no alimony to either party, and denied the defendant's request for counsel fees. The defendant challenged three factual findings as unsupported by evidence: the plaintiff's sole contribution to acquiring and building the home with no input from her; her prior career and ongoing ability to work as a harpist; and the possibility of her future acquisition of capital assets from family contributions. The Supreme Court reviewed these claims in sequence, finding evidence in the record to support the trial court's determinations on the home's acquisition and the defendant's professional skills and prospects, and it referenced precedents such as Murphy v. Murphy to uphold the denial of fees.

family lawproperty

The case concerned whether Edward Socha was personally liable for his father's unpaid nursing home bills of $4093.60 after signing an admission agreement as 'Responsible Party' while acting as conservator of his father's estate. Socha appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to exempt the case from the trial list due to the non-joinder of the state department of social services and its finding that he was individually liable on the contract. The court affirmed the rulings, holding that the trial judge had discretion under Practice Book § 274 to proceed and that the agreement contained no indication of representative capacity, making parol evidence inadmissible to show otherwise.

procedurefamily lawhealthcare

The case involved a dispute in which the plaintiff, as trustee and owner of real property, sued the defendants for converting and removing over 20,000 cubic yards of earth material from his land in violation of a written agreement that allowed them to enter and grade a specific 'gore' area between adjoining properties. After the plaintiff presented his evidence at a court trial, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment of dismissal under Practice Book § 302, ruling that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case on the threshold issue of the precise location of his property's southern boundary. The court determined that the plaintiff's deeds, probate records, maps (including the key 1954 Goodman map), and surveyor testimony were inadequate to prove the boundary with sufficient certainty, as they lacked independent verification and relied on disputed or derivative evidence. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a defendant who entered nolo contendere pleas to second-degree kidnapping, first-degree sexual assault, and third-degree robbery, then moved for a psychiatric examination at the Whiting Forensic Institute under General Statutes § 17-244 to determine eligibility for commitment rather than incarceration. The institute's report found no basis for commitment, the trial court denied the defendant's requests for a continuance to present witnesses and later to reopen the judgment citing due process violations and statutory noncompliance, and it imposed a sentence of ten to twenty years. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the denials and sentence, holding that due process does not require additional hearings or continuances in this setting because the defendant was voluntarily seeking alternative treatment after conviction rather than facing involuntary commitment or an enhanced penalty under a separate statute. The court distinguished precedents involving mandatory or involuntary confinement and found no constitutional defect in the statute's hearing provisions.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved Emhart Industries seeking a temporary injunction against its union, Local 376, and individual officers and members during a strike that began after the collective bargaining agreement expired in September 1982. The company alleged unlawful picketing tactics, including mass circular picketing that blocked vehicle access to the plant for up to two hours, causing significant employee delays and traffic issues, as well as some intimidation of non-striking workers. The trial court granted the temporary injunction after hearings, finding sufficient evidence of unlawful acts under General Statutes §§ 31-114 and 31-115, and the defendants appealed, challenging the evidence sufficiency, the injunction's breadth, and certain evidentiary rulings. The appellate court addressed claims regarding the burden of proof for union responsibility and the admissibility of evidence but upheld the injunction's basis in the documented picketing conduct and resulting harms.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Salvatore Scielzo, who was charged with larceny in the second degree for receiving and disposing of a stolen Boston Whaler boat valued over $500. After a jury trial, he was convicted, and on appeal he challenged the sufficiency of evidence regarding his knowledge that the boat was stolen, its value, and his trial counsel's effectiveness. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding that the evidence, including witness testimony about the defendant's statements and actions, was sufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict to support the jury's finding of guilt under the statute defining larceny by receiving stolen property.

criminal law

The case concerned defendant Louis Roque's conviction after a jury trial for one count of rioting at a correctional institution under General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 53a-179b, arising from his alleged participation in a disturbance in the West Mess Hall at the Connecticut Correctional Institution in Somers on December 17, 1978. The state's bill of particulars limited the charge to the defendant having "take[n] part in" the disorder by fighting with and resisting correctional officers after another inmate initiated it. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court's jury instructions erroneously permitted conviction under any of the statute's nine alternative theories of liability (such as inciting or aiding), violating his constitutional rights by allowing conviction on an uncharged theory, and that the bill of particulars had bound the state to proving only the "taking part" theory. The court addressed whether these unpreserved claims could be reviewed under State v. Evans, the purpose and effect of a bill of particulars in narrowing the prosecution's theory, and the propriety of the instructions given both initially and in response to the jury's request for a rereading of the statute.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved property owners suing the City of West Haven after the city removed a bridge on their land without permission or compensation, cutting off access to another parcel, and constructed a sewage facility on their property. The jury awarded damages based on counts alleging an uncompensated taking and nuisance, after which the trial court trebled the award under General Statutes § 52-566 for willful bridge destruction. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that treble damages were improperly assessed because the count specifically invoking that statute was not submitted to the jury. The plaintiffs' cross-appeal claims regarding the verdict and other counts were not properly presented or briefed, so the court did not reach their merits.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned defendant Antoine Reddick's convictions for third-degree burglary, theft of a firearm, and third-degree larceny, followed by a guilty plea as a persistent offender; on appeal he challenged only the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from a warrantless search of his automobile. Police located the unregistered vehicle, informed Reddick it would be towed per department policy, and obtained his consent to open the trunk after he stated he had nothing to hide, revealing a cassette player whose serial number was later checked and used to support a warrant for a residence containing additional stolen property. The trial court ruled the search voluntary and protective in nature, and the appellate court examined whether that consent was knowing and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's statements and actions, without needing to resolve the validity of the towing and inventory procedures themselves.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether plaintiffs could stack uninsured motorist coverage limits under an auto insurance policy that covered two vehicles when one plaintiff was injured by an uninsured driver. The trial court permitted stacking, treating the $20,000 per-person limit as applying separately to each vehicle for a total of $40,000 and awarding $35,000 after other payments. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that even if policy language barred stacking, General Statutes § 38-175c and related regulations precluded such restrictions, and separate premiums paid for each car supported stacking under prior precedent.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case concerns post-judgment proceedings in a 1966 divorce, where the defendant wife moved in 1977 (and later) to modify alimony and child support orders based on alleged material changes in the parties' financial circumstances, including her cancer-related medical expenses. The trial court held hearings, appointed an accountant to review the plaintiff's business records and tax returns, and issued 1980 modification orders after considering financial data, which the pro se defendant appealed on multiple grounds. The appellate court addressed claims that the trial court erred by limiting her direct access to tax returns, failing to apply statutory modification criteria under General Statutes §§ 46b-82 and 46b-86 or 1966-era law, disregarding a state constitutional provision, and other procedural issues, ultimately evaluating whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion on the record presented.

family lawprocedure

This case involves a dispute over a $7400 deposit in a real estate purchase and sale agreement for a three-family house, where the buyer plaintiffs sought to recover the funds after failing to obtain the specified mortgage financing, leading to an interpleader action against the sellers and their real estate agent. The trial court found that the plaintiffs breached the contract by refusing to proceed with the purchase after securing a 75% mortgage commitment instead of the required 80%, and it awarded damages and attorney's fees to the defendants. On appeal, the court affirmed, reasoning that the plaintiffs had waived the strict mortgage contingency deadline and terms by signing commitment papers, requesting eviction assistance, and delaying their withdrawal until April 9, thereby making their later refusal a breach that entitled the sellers to recover losses from the failed sale and related expenses. The court also upheld the award splitting the commission and fees based on the evidence of actual damages sustained by the sellers.

property

The case concerned a dispute over the probate of a decedent's second codicil, which an attorney had drafted with an alleged scrivener's error that reinstated prior charitable beneficiaries instead of those designated in an earlier codicil. The Probate Court admitted the codicil after excluding extrinsic evidence of the mistake, and the Superior Court granted summary judgment upholding that ruling on the grounds that such evidence is inadmissible when the instrument's language is unambiguous. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Connecticut law does not permit extrinsic evidence to prove a scrivener's mistake in a testamentary instrument absent ambiguities or a fundamental error of identity, consistent with the statute of wills' policy of protecting the probate of duly executed documents and deriving intent solely from the words used. The court distinguished this from cases involving fraud, undue influence, or mistaken execution of an entirely different instrument.

propertyprocedure

In Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., the plaintiff stored personal goods with the defendant warehouse company for a fee in 1953, but upon demanding their return in 1973 she was informed the goods had been destroyed in a fire at the defendant's Donald Street warehouse in Hartford. The plaintiff sued to recover their value, and the trial court awarded damages; the defendant appealed, claiming it had rebutted the presumption of negligence, that warehouse receipt terms limited its liability, and that damages were miscalculated. The appellate court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that the bailee failed to rebut the presumption of negligence because it only proved the fact of the fire rather than the actual circumstances of the loss and precautions taken, that the receipt provisions did not validly limit liability, and that the damage award was supported by the evidence of the goods' value.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved M & L Homes, Inc. seeking a writ of mandamus against the Montville Zoning and Planning Commission to compel issuance of a certificate of approval for its subdivision plan for Scarborough Estates, Section II, claiming automatic approval under General Statutes §§ 8-26 and 8-26d due to the commission's failure to act within the required sixty-five days after receipt. The trial court denied the writ. On appeal, the court reviewed the timeline showing the plaintiff's agent requested and received an extension, later requested withdrawal of the original application, submitted a revised new application that differed in lot count and other details, and received a denial of the new application for incomplete documentation. The court concluded that the original application had been withdrawn, so the statutory time limits did not trigger automatic approval and no certificate was required.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatoryenvironment

This case involves a dispute between Appliances, Inc. and Eldridge G. Yost, individually and as president of Yost Construction, Inc., over a promissory note given in exchange for services, following an earlier remand from the Connecticut Supreme Court. The trial court had interpreted the remand to require only a hearing on damages after concluding that liability under a contract theory had already been established, and it denied the defendant's motion to amend his answer to raise a lack of consideration defense. The Supreme Court held that the prior opinion had not resolved liability but instead required the trial court to consider enforceability of the note as a simple contract, and that limiting proceedings to damages violated the mandate by preventing necessary fact-finding. The court therefore set aside the judgment on the second count and remanded for a new trial to address the note's enforceability under contract principles along with related claims for attorney's fees and costs under General Statutes § 52-245.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute over ownership of a beach area in Fairfield, Connecticut, where private landowners sued the town to stop its use of the land as a public beach with lifeguards and maintenance. The plaintiffs claimed the beach had formed through gradual accretion, extending their property lines to the high-water mark of Long Island Sound, while the town asserted it resulted from sudden avulsion due to storms destroying a protective sand spit and that it had acquired rights through long-term public use. The court ruled for the town, holding that the changes were due to avulsion rather than accretion, so the plaintiffs had no title to the disputed area. It further concluded that even if the plaintiffs had owned the land, the town's open and continuous operation of the public beach since 1959 established title by adverse possession.

property

The case concerned the defendant's conviction for murder under General Statutes §53a-54a(a) after he fatally shot Valerie Vickers with a shotgun at a gathering following heavy drinking and drug use; the defense maintained the shooting was accidental while the state presented evidence that the defendant pointed the gun at the victim and stated he would shoot her. The defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his motions for acquittal and a new trial, raising seven claims including errors in admitting custodial statements, excluding child witness testimony, giving a Chip Smith charge, instructing the petit and grand juries on intent, and denying relief for alleged juror misconduct. The court examined whether the evidence sufficed to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt and whether jury instructions on inferring intent from conduct or use of a deadly weapon violated due process under Sandstrom v. Montana by creating improper presumptions, while also reviewing the other evidentiary and procedural challenges.

criminal lawprocedure