Alva P. Loiselle

The plaintiff sued the defendant corporation to compel registration of a 1935 stock transfer on its books and issuance of certificates reflecting subsequent stock splits and dividends. The plaintiff had acquired title to the original two shares when the prior owner endorsed and delivered the certificate to him in payment for legal services, though he delayed requesting a transfer because he believed the shares had little value. The court reasoned that the corporation's issuance of new certificates for an eight-for-one stock split without requiring surrender of the original certificate exposed it to the plaintiff's claim as title owner under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, but stock dividends accruing to the record owner required separate analysis. The opinion addresses the corporation's obligations when issuing replacement shares claimed to be lost and the remedies available to a transferee who presents the original certificate years later.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case concerns eminent domain proceedings in which the state Commissioner of Transportation took 0.38 acres of Laurel, Inc.'s 9.7-acre property in Fairfield for highway ramp construction in 1974, prompting claims that the taking destroyed access and rendered the remaining land unusable for a planned condominium project. After earlier litigation resolved jurisdictional and inverse condemnation issues, the Superior Court awarded Laurel $2,576,300 in damages for the taking and related impacts on development plans, permits, and improvements already made. Both parties appealed that award to the Supreme Court, which reviewed the trial court's findings on the property's pre-taking condition, zoning restrictions, project expenditures, and the effect of losing the access strip. The core reasoning focuses on applying statutory condemnation procedures under General Statutes §13a-76 and related provisions to calculate just compensation based on the evidence presented.

propertyprocedure

In Wakeman v. Commissioner of Transportation, the plaintiffs, owners of a nursery business on residentially zoned land, challenged the state's assessment of damages after the Commissioner condemned 3.9 acres including most of their Main Street frontage and access for a transportation project. The trial court reassessed damages by determining the difference between the property's market value before and after the partial taking, factoring in the cost to cure lost parking, display areas, and access through proposed improvements like a service road. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the valuation method as consistent with General Statutes § 13a-76 and precedent on just compensation for partial takings but identified an arithmetic error in the award amount and ruled that the trial court's recommendation to widen the remaining accessway was purely advisory. The court therefore set aside the judgment and remanded for entry of a corrected award of $210,482 to the plaintiffs after crediting the initial deposit.

propertyprocedure

This case is an appeal by the plaintiff mother challenging a Superior Court order that granted the defendant father's motion to modify custody of their two minor children, transferring it from the mother to the father. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no error in its factual findings, evidentiary rulings, or conclusion that a material change in circumstances warranted the modification based on the children's best interests. The court noted that the trial judge had the advantage of observing witnesses and parties, received reports from a family relations officer and the children's attorney both recommending custody with the father, and acted within its broad discretion; the mother's claims regarding omitted findings, expert testimony, and pre-divorce evidence were rejected as either within the court's discretion or unsupported by the record. The opinion emphasizes that appellate intervention requires a clear abuse of discretion, which was not shown here.

family law

The case involved a lawsuit by Diane Comba and her father against the Town of Ridgefield and the state commissioner of transportation for injuries sustained when a rotten tree limb fell onto their vehicle while traveling on a public highway. The plaintiffs alleged liability under General Statutes §§ 13a-149 and 13a-144, which impose responsibility on municipalities and the state for injuries caused by defective roads, and also claimed negligence by the state. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint, and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an overhanging rotten limb does not qualify as a road defect under the statutes because it does not obstruct or hinder travel on the highway and could cause injury even to non-travelers, as explained in precedents such as Hewison v. New Haven and Dyer v. Danbury. The court also upheld the state's sovereign immunity on the negligence counts, ruling that only the legislature may waive such immunity through statute.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether evidence from wiretaps should be suppressed in a prosecution for gambling offenses because the applications for the wiretap orders were merely acknowledged rather than submitted under oath by the state's attorney, as allegedly required by Connecticut statutes. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress and dismissed the case with prejudice. On writ of error, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that General Statutes §§ 54-41b and 54-41c require the state's attorney applicant to submit the wiretap application under oath or affirmation, and that General Statutes § 54-41m mandates suppression of evidence obtained from orders based on noncompliant applications. The court reasoned from the statutory text that only the state's attorney is authorized to apply, that supporting affidavits from others do not substitute for the applicant's oath, and that the legislature intended strict limits on wiretap procedures distinct from federal law.

criminal lawprocedure